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This dissertation is a collection of five independent chapters that aim to better understand
the investment decisions of institutional investors. The share of institutional investors that
holds and trades securities has substantially increased over the past decades. Since the
eighties, the share of US equities held by institutional investors has grown by more than
half, from 52 percent to approximately 80 percent (Stambaugh, 2014). This increase raises
three important questions. First, what are the drivers behind the investment decisions of
institutional investors? Second, how do their investment decisions subsequently affect asset
prices? Third, and perhaps most importantly, how do their decisions affect the investors
where we ultimately care about, namely, the households?
Regulation is one key channel that shapes the investment decisions of institutional investors
(e.g. Ellul et al., 2011; Koijen and Yogo, 2015; Andonov et al., 2017). Understanding how
regulation shapes investment decisions is important, because it allows us to better foresee
how institutional investors will react to policy changes in the future. We can furthermore use
this information to improve particular aspects of regulation, such as the design of risk-based
capital requirements. For instance, if regulation creates incentives to take on additional risks,
we could alter the regulation in such a way to reduce these incentives. Because regulation
often creates similar incentives across institutional investors, simultaneous changes in asset
demand can directly affect the prices of these assets. Therefore, in the first chapter, I study
how regulation shapes investment decisions of pension funds and insurance companies, along
with evidence how these decisions subsequently affect asset prices.
The investment decisions of institutional investors may also have real consequences for
households. In the case of pension funds, the investment decisions have a direct impact on
the retirement income of the beneficiaries. For instance, if a pension fund invests heavily in
stocks, this may result in pension cuts during economic downturns. Hence, in the second
chapter, I study determinants of pension funds’ investment decisions, such as the liability




Another prominent trend in financial markets is the increased share of illiquid assets in
institutional investors’ portfolios. For instance, a report by Willis Towers Watson (2019)
shows that pension funds have expanded their illiquid asset allocation by on average 20
percentage points over the past decades. The liquidity of a portfolio, i.e. the ease at which
assets can be traded, is crucial because it determines the extent to which investors are able
to fulfill their immediate, liquid obligations (e.g. Scholes, 2000; Duffie and Ziegler, 2003).
As a result, investing in illiquid assets makes liquidity management highly complex. In the
third chapter, I therefore analyse how investors should optimally invest in illiquid assets
when faced with liquidity shocks, and the compensation investors require for holding these
illiquid assets. In the fourth chapter, I study the actual investment decisions of pension funds
towards illiquid assets and relate these decisions to both liquidity and capital requirements.
To better understand institutional investors’ own views about illiquid assets, the last chapter
studies how pension funds deal with illiquid assets by means of a survey study. I will turn
to a detailed summary of each of the chapters next.
In the first chapter, ‘Long-term Investors and the Yield Curve’, I show that pension funds
and insurance companies (henceforth: P&Is) change their bond holdings following a shift
in regulation and find that, at the same time, these changes substantially affected yields.
In particular, I exploit a change in the regulatory discount curve at which liabilities are
evaluated that made the long-end of the discount curve less dependent on market interest
rates. Following the regulatory change, I show that P&Is decreased long-term bond holdings
by 42 percent on average. The decline is stronger for constrained than unconstrained P&Is.
Furthermore, I show that the aggregate decline in demand resulted in an increase of long-term
bond yields by 24 basis points on average. These findings have important implications for
the evaluation of other regulatory or monetary policy measures, such as quantitative easing,
because they show how demand shifts, and subsequently the impact on yields, depend on
the regulatory framework and time-varying characteristics of investors.
In the second chapter, ‘Pension Funds and Heterogeneous Investment Strategies’, which
is joint work with Dirk Broeders, we study the heterogeneity in investment decisions across
defined-benefit pension funds. Globally, 50 percent of all occupational retirement savings is
in defined-benefit pension funds (Willis Towers Watson, 2019). Yet, so far only a few studies
have analysed the investment strategies of pension funds. The lack of access to comprehensive
and detailed data on pension funds is the main reason for the limited number of studies.
We show that pension funds make very distinct investment decisions, despite having similar
objectives. Consistent with a model of mean-variance preferences over asset minus liabilities,
xiv
we first show that the funding ratio, risk aversion, and liability duration affect investment
strategies of pension funds. However, together these characteristics only explain 36 percent
of the heterogeneity in the average returns across pension funds. The heterogeneity that
remains reflects an economically important difference in expected retirement income of 16-
32 percent over a 40-year accrual phase. We show that these remaining differences reflect
heterogeneity in beliefs across pension funds. Pension funds reveal these differences in beliefs
through their choices of asset management firms to which they delegate the implementation
of their investment strategies. Our findings are important because beneficiaries are typically
not free to choose their own pension fund as it comes with the job.
In the third chapter, ‘The Liquidity Premium Across Asset Classes’, which is joint
work with Bas Werker, we study how liquidity affects the portfolio choice of investors
and we compute the costs of holding these illiquid assets. We solve a flexible model that
captures transactions costs and infrequencies of trading opportunities. The latter implies
that investors are unable to trade the illiquid asset for an uncertain period of time. We
show that illiquidity that results in suboptimal asset allocations carries low costs for the
investor, whereas these costs are high when illiquidity results in suboptimal consumption.
As a result, the costs of holding illiquid assets are high for short-term investors, investors who
face substantial liquidity shocks, and investors who desire to allocate a substantial fraction
of their wealth to illiquid assets. Looking at separate asset classes, back-of-the-envelope
calculations suggest that the holding costs for private equity and real estate asset classes
are low: varying between 5 and 30 basis points, whereas the ranges are higher for stocks
and corporate bonds: varying between 20 and 45 basis points. Our results give important
guidance to the opposing findings of empirically estimated liquidity premiums across asset
classes.
In the fourth chapter, ‘Pension Fund’s Illiquid Asset Allocation under Liquidity and
Capital Requirements’, which is joint work with Dirk Broeders and Bas Werker, we study how
pension funds decide to allocate towards illiquid assets. We show that liquidity and capital
requirements are two key channels through which illiquid asset allocations are affected.
Liquidity requirements consist of short-term pension payments and margin calls on derivative
positions. Capital requirements result from regulation that requires pension funds to have
sufficient capital to manage the risks they are exposed to, such as interest rate risk. Liquidity
and capital requirements interact through the liability duration as a measure of a pension
fund’s average investment horizon. On the one hand, a pension fund with a high liability
duration is less liquidity constrained as it will have to pay less pensions in the short-term.
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This allows for a higher allocation to illiquid assets. On the other hand, a high liability
duration also implies more exposure to interest rate risk through the present value of its
liabilities. This restricts the opportunity to invest in illiquid assets as more of the available
capital is required for interest rate risk. Consistent with this intuition, we theoretically
and empirically find that these two requirements create a hump-shaped impact of liability
duration of the fraction of risky assets invested in illiquid assets. These findings are important
to better understand the decisions that drive the allocation to illiquid assets.
In the fifth chapter, ‘A Survey of Institutional Investors’ Investment and Management
Decisions on Illiquid Assets’, which is joint work with Patrick Tuijp, we interviewed Dutch
and Canadian pension funds and fiduciary managers on the investment and management
decisions regarding illiquid assets to achieve better understanding of investors’ own attitudes
towards illiquid assets. Survey data are important to understand investors’ decisions, because
the process to get to an investment decision are often not fully observed by the econometrician.
We find that both Dutch and Canadian survey participants indicated the risk-return trade-
off and diversification benefits as their main reasons to invest in illiquid assets. However,
Dutch pension funds in our sample invest 15 percent of their portfolio in illiquid assets,
while for the Canadian pension funds this is 34 percent. We put forward three reasons
for the stark difference in the average illiquid asset allocations. First, the strong focus of
Dutch survey participants on investment costs, which are made available to the public and
higher for illiquid assets. Second, supervisory requirements that are risk-based and hence
more strict for Dutch pension funds. Third, the division of Dutch pension fund assets into a
liability matching portfolio and a return portfolio, which may lead to liquid assets crowding
out illiquid assets. Our findings shed important light on how illiquid assets are perceived by
large institutional investors that operate in different regulatory frameworks.
Summarizing, this dissertation has three main messages. First, regulation drives a
large part of the investment decisions of institutional investors. Second, their investment
decisions matter for asset prices. And third, their investment decisions have important
welfare implications for the investors where we ultimately care about, namely, the households.
xvi
Chapter 1
Long-term Investors and the Yield Curve1
1.1 Introduction
Over recent years academics have uncovered evidence that long-term investors, such
as pension funds and insurance companies, affect yields. For instance, Domanski et al.
(2017) argue that ‘hunt-for-duration’ behavior by German insurance companies might have
amplified the decline in euro area bond yields. If liabilities are linked to market interest
rates, a reduction in interest rates increases the duration gap between assets and liabilities
and solvency positions decrease. To reduce their exposure to this risk, long-term investors
have an incentive to buy long-term bonds and thereby reducing yields at the long-end of the
curve.2 Additionally, Greenwood and Vayanos (2010) and Greenwood and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2018) provide suggestive evidence for regulatory effects on yields. They show that changes
in regulation which increase the incentive to buy (sell) long-term bonds result in a decline
(increase) in long-term yields around policy announcement days. All these findings are
consistent with the preferred habitat view: clientele demand creates price pressure in bond
1First version: May 2020. First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisors Theo Nijman
and Bas Werker for their invaluable support and guidance. I also thank Aleksandar Andonov, Jules
van Binsbergen, Martijn Boons, Marie Brière, Dirk Broeders, Maria Chaderina, Stefano Cassella, Joost
Driessen, Esther Eiling, Frank de Jong, Ralph Koijen, Jac Kragt, Martin van der Schans, and conference
and seminar participants at the ECB Young Economist Competition, EEA, PhD Mentoring Day (Nova),
Tilburg University, Netspar Pension Day, De Nederlandsche Bank, FMA doctoral consortium, FMA Special
PhD session, and AFA PhD Poster session for very useful comments. I am grateful to the Dutch Central Bank
for providing me with the data and acknowledge financial support from Inquire Europe. Views expressed
are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect official positions of De Nederlandsche Bank.
2Similarly, Klinger and Sundaresan (2018) explain the negative 30-year US swap spreads as a result of
underfunded pension plans optimally using swaps for duration hedging rather than long-term bonds.
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markets.
Because of data limitations, the literature so far uses price data or aggregate holdings
data alone to study the implications of the preferred habitat theory. As a result, there are
two questions largely left unanswered. First, event studies based on price data alone do not
reveal the shift in demand that is causing the price effect. In other words, how large are the
shifts in demand that cause the yields to change? Second, and more importantly, price data
or aggregate holdings data alone do not reveal the motives of long-term investors to change
their bond holdings. For instance, why do investors react to regulatory changes in the first
place? Which assets do they buy or sell in return? Do investors close to their solvency
constraint react differently to regulatory changes compared to non-constrained ones?
I aim to answer these questions by providing direct evidence how long-term investors
shifted their bond holdings following a regulatory change and how this behavior subsequently
affected yields. First, I find a substantial shift in demand that is long-lasting and with
large heterogeneity across institutions. Second, the aggregate shift in demand created
substantial price effects on long-term yields. These findings have important implications
for the evaluation of other regulatory shocks, such as QE. In preferred habitat models, the
demand for long-term bonds is assumed to be exogenous. My findings show how demand
shifts, and subsequently the impact on yields, depend on the regulatory framework and
time-varying characteristics of investors.
My study combines holdings data and price data for institutional investors domiciled in
the Netherlands. In particular, I exploit a positive shock to the regulatory discount curve at
which insurers and pension funds (henceforth: P&Is) have to value their liabilities that was
introduced in June 2012. The introduced regulatory discount curve made the long-end of
the discount curve less dependent on market interest rates. The discount curve uses market
interest rates for maturities up to 20 years, whereas interest rates for maturities exceeding
20 years are set equal to a weighted average between market interest rates and a fixed rate,
the Ultimate Forward Rate (UFR). The UFR is substantially higher than market interest
rates and as a result, the new regulatory discount curve reduces the value of the liabilities
and its sensitivity towards changes in market interest rates.
Why does a change in the regulatory discount curve affect demand for long-term bonds?
The demand for long-term bonds arises mainly in two parts: economic and regulatory
hedging incentives. The long-term nature of P&Is’ liabilities creates a natural preference for
long-term bonds from a liability hedge perspective (Sharpe and Tint, 1990a; Campbell and
Viceira, 2002). Regulatory hedging incentives are particularly important when the regulatory
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framework does not fully reflect the economic state in which investors are operating. For
instance, the regulatory discount curve is important in solvency assessments, as its used
to estimate the solvency position and hence the financial position of P&Is. As a result,
incentives to hedge the regulatory discount curve may increase if the regulatory discount
curve diverges from the economic discount curve. The introduction of the UFR thus decreased
regulatory hedging demand whereas economic hedging demand was unaffected. The extent
to which regulatory hedging demand decreases, as I show, depends on the liability structure
and solvency positions of P&Is.
I report the following key results. First, I find that P&Is that are more exposed to
the regulatory change, i.e. the ones with long liability durations, decrease long-term bond
holdings to a larger extent than less exposed ones. The decrease in long-term bond holdings
is economically significant: The total decline in long-term bond holdings (T ≥ 30) due to the
regulatory change equals 15.30 billion, which is equivalent to a relative decrease in demand of
42 percent. Besides, to give additional support for the economic effects, P&Is in my sample
invest 20 percent of their bond portfolio in Dutch government bonds, which corresponds to
a decline in holdings equivalent to 22 percent of its long-term bonds outstanding. Second,
I find that P&Is close to their solvency constraint decrease long-term holdings to a larger
extent than non-constrained ones. Third, P&Is increase their allocation to equities following
the regulatory change, with a stronger effect for more constrained P&Is. These findings
are consistent with a mean-variance optimization problem in an asset liability context with
regulatory constraints.
Second, I estimate the effect of the aggregate decline in long-term bond holdings on yields.
To cleanly identify the effects of demand on yields, I apply an instrumental variable approach
that uses the weights assigned to the UFR for different maturity buckets as instrument for
changes in demand. Even though investors may have anticipated the UFR, the determinants
of the shape of the UFR such as its level and the slope were unknown. I show that the change
in the regulatory discount curve results in an increase of Dutch long-term bond yields by 24
basis points on average, with larger magnitudes for longer maturity bonds. My estimates are
larger than the estimates found by typical event studies because P&Is did not sell everything
at once, but spread out the decrease in long-term bond holdings over three to four quarters.
Finally, I connect the changes in yields to responses in the demand curves of the different
investor types by using the framework of Koijen and Yogo (2019). The estimates show
substantial heterogeneity in demand curves across investor types, with P&Is having strong
upward sloping demand curves in prices, whereas demand curves are strongly downward
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sloping for banks and the foreign sector. Moreover, the steepness of the upward sloping
demand curves depend, as I show, on the liability duration and solvency positions of P&Is.
These findings add to further understand the drivers behind the estimated price effect.
Additionally, they are important for the recent intermediary asset pricing literature which
directly models intermediaries and how they matter for asset prices, e.g. He and Krishnamurthy
(2013). Typically, these models use only one class of intermediaries. My results highlight
the importance of incorporating heterogeneity across investor types in order to understand
the effects of intermediaries on asset prices, adding to findings of Greenwood et al. (2018),
Timmer (2018), and Koijen and Yogo (2019).
My findings also have important policy implications. In recent years, government bond
yields have not always reacted in a predictable way to macroeconomic or monetary policy
announcements. For instance, long-term yields in the US remained low even as the FED
initiated a series of interest rate increases away from zero starting in 2015. My findings show
that regulation plays an important role in understanding these patterns. The demand for
bonds by long-term investors increases when interest rates decline, reinforcing the decline in
long-term yields. My results show that this reinforcing effect decreases if the valuation of
assets and liabilities becomes less dependent on market interest rates. Policy makers should
take the regulatory framework of long-term investors into account when analyzing the impact
of conventional and unconventional monetary policies.
Related Literature
This paper contributes to the preferred-habitat theory proposed by Culbertson (1957) and
Modigliani and Sutch (1966), who argue that there are investor clienteles with preferences
for specific maturities, and the interest rate for a given maturity is influenced by the demand
of the corresponding clientele and the supply of bonds with that maturity. Vayanos and Vila
(2009) and Greenwood and Vayanos (2014) study supply effects on yields. Supply shocks
positively affect yields, because supply shocks change the amount of bonds arbitrageurs are
holdings and thus the duration risk they carry. Similarly, Guibaud et al. (2013) model a
clientele-based yield curve. They show that an increase in the relative importance of the
clientele with the longer investment horizon, i.e. the young, has two related effects: it renders
long-term bonds more expensive, and it increases their optimal supply by the government.
I contribute to this literature by showing direct empirical evidence in favor of the preferred
habitat theory by using data on holdings and yields simultaneously.
My paper also links to the recent demand based asset pricing literature. For instance,
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Koijen and Yogo (2019) propose an asset pricing model with flexible heterogeneity in asset
demand across investors. Koijen et al. (2017) and Koijen et al. (2020) apply this model to
study the effects of quantitative easing in the euro area. I contribute to this work by relating
institutional investor specific characteristics to their demand curves. For instance, I show
that the steepness of the upward sloping demand curves of P&Is depends on their liability
durations and solvency positions.
This paper also links to Sen (2019), who studies interest rate risk hedging activities by
US life insurers after a shift in regulation. The regulatory change leads to distorted hedging
incentives due to different treatments of interest rate risk for products with similar economic
exposures. Insurers underwriting products that are regulatory sensitive to interest rates
do increase hedging activities, and vice versa. I contribute to this paper in two ways: (1)
studying spillovers to other asset classes following a shift in hedging incentives and (2) linking
changes in hedging incentives to changes in long-term yields.
Finally, this study contributes to the literature on fire sales: forced selling of assets
that result in a significant price drop followed by price reversals. Coval and Stafford (2007)
study securities commonly held by mutual funds that experience large outflows. Mitchell
et al. (2007) study convertible bond prices around hedge fund redemptions. Pulvino (1998)
considers commercial aircraft transactions for capital constrained versus unconstrained airlines.
Campbell et al. (2011) study house prices for houses sold after foreclosures, or shortly after
the death or bankruptcy of a seller. Finally, Ellul et al. (2011) show fire sales as a result
of regulatory constraints imposed on insurance companies for corporate bond markets. I
also show evidence in favor of regulatory effects on asset prices. Different from the fire sale
literature, but consistent with stock additions and deletions to market indexes in e.g. Chang
et al. (2015), I detect a permanent effect on prices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I start with describing the introduction
of the regulatory discount curve based on the UFR in Section 1.2. Section 1.3 provides a
simple model to derive testable implications of the effect of the change in the regulatory
discount curve on long-term bond holdings and yields. A description of the data is given
in Section 1.4. In Section 1.5, I test the empirical predictions that follow from the model
by using a difference-in-difference specification, and in Section 1.6, I connect changes in
holdings directly to changes in yields by using an instrumental variable approach. Section 2.8
concludes.
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1.2 Institutional setting - Ultimate Forward Rate (UFR)
The regulatory discount curve is important in solvency assessments, as its used to estimate
the liability value and hence the financial position of P&Is. As such, it shows whether P&Is
are expected to meet nominal obligations. Important decisions are made based on the
solvency positions, such as the amount of dividends paid to the shareholders or the ability
to index pension rights. In the Netherlands, the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) constructs and
publishes the regulatory discount curve on a monthly basis.
1.2.1 Regulatory discount curve without UFR
Prior to the end of June 2012, the regulatory discount curve was based on the euro
swap curve for all maturities. Market interest rates were used until a maturity of 50 years,
and interest rates with maturities beyond 50 years equaled the last observed forward rate.
Because the regulatory discount curve was based on market interest rates only, the regulatory
discount curve approximately equaled the economic discount curve. Formally, the regulatory
discount curve was constructed as follows:3
1. European semi-annual swap rates from Bloomberg for the time to maturities 1 to 10,
12, 15, 25, 30, 40, and 50 years.4
2. Zero-coupon interest rates are derived from the swap rates by using bootstrapping
(Veronesi, 2010).
3. Interest rates for which swap rates are non-observable are estimated by assuming
constant forward rates, thereby iterating the following relationship:
(1 + y(h))h = (1 + y(h−1))h−1(1 + fhh−1) (1.1)
where y(h−1) equals the interest rate for time to maturity h − 1 and fhh−1 the forward
rate for time-to-maturity h−1 to h. For instance, the forward rate from 24 to 25 years
(f 2524 ) is used to derive the zero-coupon interest rates for maturities 26-29 years.
3See https://www.toezicht.dnb.nl/binaries/50-212329.pdf.
4Bloomberg also offers swap rates for all maturities from 1 to 30 years, and for 35 and 45 year time to
maturities. However, the regulator refrained from using some of these interest rates because of less liquid
markets for these maturities.
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1.2.2 Regulatory discount curve with UFR
DNB announced a change in the regulatory discount curve to anticipate on the new
regulatory framework of Solvency II for insurance companies on July 2, 2012. The introduced
regulatory discount curve is similar to the regulatory discount curve applicable to all European
insurers when Solvency II was introduced in 2016. DNB announced a similar regulatory
discount curve for pension funds on September 24, 2012.
The new regulatory discount curve uses an extrapolation method based on the UFR,
where the UFR is the convergence of long interest rates to a stable level. In essence, the
regulatory discount curve with UFR uses market interest rates up to a maturity of 20 years,
and interest rates with maturities longer than 20 years are determined by using a weighted
average between market interest rates and a fixed rate, the UFR. The main argument that
was used to justify the implementation of the UFR is that the market for long durations
(>20 years) is fairly illiquid and only few securities with such long durations exists. As a
result, the implied market interest rates were regarded unreliable: a discount curve purely
based on market data is highly sensitive to supply and demand shocks, and therefore also
the solvency positions of P&Is. A regulatory discount curve based on the UFR solves this
issue by making long-term interest rates less dependent on market interest rates.
Formally, the discount curve with UFR is constructed as follows:
1. For maturities 1 to 20, zero-coupon interest rates are still derived as before.
2. For pension funds, forward rates exceeding maturities of 20 years are a weighted average
between the market forward rate and the UFR. The weights are constant over time.
As of a maturity of 60 years, forward rates equal the UFR:
fh,∗h−1

fhh−1 1 ≤ h ≤ 20
(1− wh)× fhh−1 + wh × UFR 21 ≤ h ≤ 60
UFR h ≥ 60
(1.2)
For insurance companies, the regulatory discount curve is slightly different and uses
the forward rate fhh−1 = f
20
19 for all maturities 21 ≤ h ≤ 60.
3. The weights are equal to
wh =
fh,SWh−1 − f 2019
f 61,SW60 − f 2019
for h = 21, ..., 60, (1.3)
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where fh,SWh−1 are the one year forward rates that follow from the Smith-Wilson method.
5
The Smith-Wilson technique uses the following parameter values: the last liquid point
which defines the start of the UFR equals 20 years, the full convergence to the UFR
equals 60 years, the UFR level equals 4.2%, and the convergence parameter that defines
how quickly the discount curve converges to the UFR equals α = 0.1. Details on
the parameter values for the Smith-Wilson technique are described in Appendix A.
Table 1.14 shows the corresponding weights, where the weights are fixed and increase
in h.
4. Zero-coupon interest rates y(h) are computed as follows:
(1 + y(h))h =
h∏
n=1
(1 + fn,∗n−1) for h = 1, 2, ...120 (1.4)
The regulatory discount curve with UFR has two important effects. First, it decreases
current liability values as liabilities are discounted against higher rates. Second, it decreases
the impact of interest rate changes. Figure 1.1 shows both effects. The red solid line shows
the economic discount curve and the blue solid line the economic discount curve after a
parallel shock in interest rates of −1%. The dashed green line and the dotted black line
show the same discount curves including the UFR.
1.2.3 Impact of the UFR on the liability value
In order to show the economic effects of the UFR, I compute the liability value using
both the economic and the regulatory discount curve. Figure 1.2 shows the cash flow pattern
of a (fictitious) pension fund. The cash flows are the average cash flow patterns across the
Dutch pension funds in my sample. The peak of the cash flow distribution is at a maturity
of 20 years, reflecting the importance of the UFR as half of the cash flows materialize at
maturities beyond 20 years. The cash flows allow me to compute the value of the liabilities










5The Smith-Wilson technique is described in an EIOPA paper: ‘QIS 5 Risk-
free interest rates – Extrapolation method’: eiopa.europa.eu/Publications/QIS/
ceiops-paper-extrapolation-risk-free-ratesen-20100802.pdf.
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Figure 1.1. Regulatory discount curve
This graph shows the economic discount curves (solid red line) and the regulatory discount
curve (dashed green line) at implementation of UFR on September 30, 2012. The graph also
shows the economic (solid blue line) and regulatory (dotted black line) discount curve after
a parallel shock in market interest rates of 4y = −1%.
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Regulatory discount curve
Regulatory discount curve parallel shift









R,t under the regulatory discount curve.
In Table 1.1, I compute the liability values for the projected pension payments for an
average pension fund in my sample using the discount curve with and without UFR on
September 30, 2012. Moreover, the table shows the change in the liability value after a
parallel decrease in the economic discount curve of 1%. The liability value at implementation
of the UFR decreases with 664 million for the average pension fund, or a decrease of 4.23%.
This reflects the first effect of the UFR: a direct decrease in the liability values. The average
liability value after a negative 1% parallel shift in interest rates equals 19,878 million using
the economic discount curve, whereas using the regulatory discount curve this value equals
18,433 million. In other words, following the table, the increase in the value of liabilities
equals 3,518 million after the negative interest rate shock pre UFR, and only increases with
2,737 million at implementation of the UFR, or a relative decrease of 28.5%. This reflects the
second effect of the UFR: a dampening impact of changes in interest rates on liability values,
which is much larger in magnitude than the first effect. Obviously, this effect is particularly
visible looking at cash flows that materialize after 20 years in isolation. A negative 1%
parallel shock in interest rates increases the value of the liabilities with 1,680 million after
implementation of the UFR, which is 46.5% less than the increase in the liability value prior
9
CHAPTER 1. LONG-TERM INVESTORS AND THE YIELD CURVE
to the implementation of the UFR.
Figure 1.2. Cash flows of pension payments
This graph shows the cash flows of pension payments (not discounted) for an average pension
fund in million euros.





















Table 1.1. Value liabilities with and without UFR: This table shows the value of the
liabilities with and without UFR for an average pension fund in my sample on September
30, 2012. The table also shows the liability value after a parallel shock in interest rates of
−1%. The liability values are computed for all projected cash flows and for cash flows with
maturities longer than 20 years only. The relative change computes the percentage drop in
the liability value due to implementation of the UFR. The values are in million euros.
Cash flows all maturities without UFR with UFR relative change
Discounted value liabilities 16360 15696 −4.23%
Discounted value liabilities 4r = −1% 19878 18433 −7.84%
Change value liabilities 3518 2737 −28.52%
Cash flows maturities T > 20 without UFR with UFR relative change
Discounted value liabilities 6694 6030 −11.01%
Discounted value liabilities 4r = −1% 9155 7711 −18.74%




I derive my main testable predictions from a mean-variance optimization framework with
liabilities, where P&Is care about both their economic and regulatory solvency constraints.
Prior to the UFR, economic and regulatory hedging demand were identical, whereas after
implementation of the UFR regulatory hedging demand deviated from economic hedging
demand. The extent to which economic and regulatory hedging demand deviate depends on
the liability structure and solvency positions of P&Is. This results in heterogeneity in the
effect of the regulatory change on long-term bond holdings across P&Is.
To derive testable asset pricing implications of P&I demand for long-term bonds, I
close the section by solving a simple equilibrium framework where arbitrageurs, or myopic
investors, determine yields in equilibrium.
1.3.1 The financial market
The financial market consists of an equity index and a set of bonds. The equity index
is denoted by St and its corresponding return by r
S
t+1. The set of bonds is denoted by Bt,
where each bond is characterized by its maturity h and corresponding yield y
(h)
t .

















The vector of bond returns is denoted by rBt+1, the return expectations by Et[rBt+1], and
the variance-covariance matrix by Vart[r
B
t+1]. I assume that the bond returns are imperfectly
correlated, whereas the equity index and the set of bonds are uncorrelated. Furthermore, I
assume throughout that the yield curve can be determined using this set of bonds.
1.3.2 Long-term investors











t+1 − rf )
)
At, (1.7)
where Rf equals the gross risk-free interest rate, w
S
t the portfolio weight to stocks and w
B
t
the vector of portfolio weights to the bonds.
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For the liabilities, I assume P&Is have to pay out a fixed set of cash flows CFt, where
each cash flow is characterized by its maturity h. I also assume that P&Is have a large
enough number of participants such that idiosyncratic longevity risk is fully diversified.
Large projected cash flows for long maturities h implies that liabilities have to be paid out
in the more distant future.
Finance theory implies that risk-free market interest rates are the applicable discount
for guaranteed benefits to exclude arbitrage (e.g. Brown and Wilcox, 2009; Novy-Marx and









A first-order Taylor expansion in hy
(h)
t results in the following economic value of the


































Notice that the discounted cash flows are P&I specific, so that a
(h)
t is high for long maturities
h if the corresponding cash flow CF
(h)
t is large relative to L
E
t .
The regulatory value of the liabilities is similar to its economic counterpart, except that
for long maturities the regulatory discount curve is less sensitive to market interest rates.
The sensitivity of the regulatory discount curve to market interest rates is defined by ξL,
where ξL has the same length as the set of bonds and 0 ≤ ξ(h)L ≤ 1 for all h. This means
that the economic and regulatory value of the liabilities are identical if ξ
(h)
L = 1 for all h, as
was the case prior to implementation of the UFR. If on the other hand ξ
(h)
L = 0 for all h,
the regulatory value of the liabilities is insensitive to changes in interest rates. An example
is a regulatory discount curve that uses a fixed rate for all maturities. In case of the specific
event I look at here, the introduction of the UFR, we have that ξ
(h)





L < 1 for h > 20. The regulatory value of the liabilities thus evolves as:
LRt+1 = (ξL ◦ at)′RBt+1LRt , (1.11)
where (◦) is the Hadamard product.
I furthermore assume P&Is have mean-variance preferences over the assets minus liabilities,
or the surplus, similar to Sharpe and Tint (1990a) and Hoevenaars et al. (2008). Following
Koijen and Yogo (2015), I also assume P&Is care about the volatility in the regulatory
funding ratio. Important decisions are made based on funding positions of P&Is, such as
the amount of dividends paid to shareholders or the ability to index pension rights. The




































t ι ≤ 1, (1.13)
wSt , w
B
h,t ≥ 0 ∀h, (1.14)
where γ equals the risk-aversion parameter, FRt =
At
LRt
, and λ(FRt ) defines the importance of
the regulatory funding ratio. As in Sen (2019), I assume that the variance of the regulatory
funding ratio is proportional to λ(FRt ), where λ
′(FRt ) < 0, or in other words P&Is care more
about the regulatory funding ratios when the regulatory funding ratio is low. I additionally
assume that λ(FRt ) is convex: P&Is care more about a decline in the regulatory funding
ratio when the regulatory funding ratio is already low than in case its high.6
6To keep the model tractable, the functional form of λ(FRt ) is a reduced form of the strict constraint
that the funding ratio should be higher than a certain threshold.
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As I show in Appendix B, solving for wt results in:
wS∗t =
Et[rSt+1 − rf ] + νt + δSt






Et[rBt+1 − rf ] + νtι+ δBt

































h,t = 0 ∀h,
where νt equals the Lagrange multiplier for the restriction that w
′
tι = 1, and δt the Kuhn-
Tucker multipliers for the restrictions that the portfolio weights are nonnegative.
The optimal demand for stocks consists of speculative demand only, because the liabilities
are valued using the yield curve and yields are assumed to be independent of the stocks. The
liability hedge portfolio consists of three components: the speculative demand, the economic
hedging demand, and the regulatory hedging demand. The economic (regulatory) hedging
demand equals the desired hedge against changes in the economic (regulatory) liability value.
The heterogeneity in demand for long-term bonds across P&Is depends on two main factors.
First, the relative weights of the liabilities in the different maturity buckets. Second, the
weight assigned to the economic versus regulatory hedging demand depends on the relative
magnitudes of λ(FRt ) and γ, which is driven by solvency positions.
These results together lead to three important model implications. Throughout I indicate
variables at implementation of the UFR with a plus sign (+).
Implication 1 - bond holdings
Prior to the UFR, the regulatory funding ratio exactly equals the economic funding ratio,
14
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i.e. FEt = F
R
t , and the optimal weights are defined as:
wB∗t =
Et[rBt+1 − rf ]− νtι+ δBt







Right after implementation of the UFR, the optimal holdings equal:
wB∗+t =
Et[rBt+1 − rf ]− νtι+ δBt




















t − wB∗t =
Et[rBt+1 − rf ]− νtι+ δBt
Vart[rBt+1]
( 1
γ + λ(FRt )
− 1
γ + λ(FEt )
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
change in speculative demand>0
+
λ(FRt )










change in liability hedge demand<<0
≤ 0 (1.19)
Because FEt < F
R
t we have that speculative demand increases, whereas liability hedge
demand decreases. The UFR substantially decreases the sensitivity towards interest rate
changes, but only leads to a small decline in current solvency positions. As a result, the
decline in the liability hedge demand is stronger than the increase in the speculative demand.7
Furthermore, we have that ξ
(h)
L converges to zero for long maturities, and hence P&Is
with large projected cash flows a
(h)
t in the distant future decrease long-term bond holdings
to a larger extent than the ones with projected cash flows in the near future. Formally, for





























In other words, my model predicts that P&Is with long liability durations decrease long-term
bond holdings more than the ones with short liability durations.
7The average increase in the regulatory funding ratio is from 0.99 to 1.03, which equals the 4% difference
in the change in the liability value. On the other hand, the sensitivity towards interest rates decline with
29% (see Table 1.1).
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Implication 2 - bond holdings
Constrained P&Is put a larger weight on the regulatory hedging demand relative to the
economic hedging demand compared to non-constrained ones, and only regulatory hedging
demand is affected by the UFR. Formally, for non-constrained investors we have:
lim
λ(FRt )→0
ct = 0. (1.21)
For constrained investors we have (ξ
(h)

















In the limit unconstrained investors do not decrease long-term bond holdings, whereas
constrained P&Is do.
Implication 3 - stock holdings
My model also predicts a positive change in the stock holdings due to implementation of the
UFR (λ(FRt ) < λ(F
E
t )):
wS∗+t − wS∗t =
Et[rSt+1 − rf ]− νtι+ δSt
Vart[rSt+1]
( 1
γ + λ(FRt )
− 1
γ + λ(FEt )
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
change in speculative demand
> 0 (1.23)
Because the weight that is assigned to the regulatory hedge demand, λ(FRt ), decreases
more sharply for P&Is with low funding ratios than for the ones with high funding ratios at
implementation of the UFR (convexity), the speculative demand for stocks increases more
for P&Is with low funding ratios (similar limits as in (1.21)-(1.22)).
1.3.3 Testable predictions holdings
The first prediction of the model is that the decrease in long-term bond holdings is
stronger for P&Is with long liability durations at implementation of the UFR:
Prediction 1 - bond holdings P&Is with long liability durations decrease long-term
holdings more compared to P&Is with short liability durations.
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Second, the model shows that more capital constrained P&Is decrease long-term holdings
to a larger extent compared to non-constrained ones because they have a stronger incentive
to hedge the regulatory value of the liabilities. This leads to the second prediction:
Prediction 2 - bond holdings P&Is close to their solvency constraint decrease long-
term holdings more compared to non-constrained P&Is.
Third, the model predicts that more capital constrained P&Is increase their stock holdings
to a larger extent than less constrained ones:
Prediction 3 - stock holdings P&Is close to their solvency constraint increase stock
holdings more compared to non-constrained P&Is.
1.3.4 Model implied impact on yields
Why would the change in long-term bond holdings have such a significant effect on yields?
The regulatory change introduces a shock to the demand for long-term bonds. However, the
supply of long-term bonds was not affected by the regulatory change. This implies that
the interest rate risk, or duration risk, carried by other investors in the market increases.
In the preferred habitat models of Vayanos and Vila (2009) and Greenwood and Vayanos
(2014), these other investors are defined as the arbitrageurs.8 In order to carry the increased
duration risk, arbitrageurs (or myopic investors) require a higher return on the long-term
bond. The level, however, depends on the risk-bearing capacity of the myopic investors.
I start with describing the optimization problem of the myopic investor. The wealth of







t+1 − rf )
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Bt. (1.24)
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8Similarly, to explain the bond pricing implications of the prepayment option in MBS in the US, Hanson
(2014) assumes arbitrageurs price interest rate risk in the market.
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Solving for α∗t , the optimal solution to the mean-variance investors equals:
α∗t =
Et[rBt+1 − rf ]
γVart[rBt+1]
, (1.26)
First, the two set of investors in the market have to clear. This implies that the yields
are determined endogenously depending on the preferences of the long-term and myopic
investors. Therefore, the market clearing condition implies:
α
(h)
t Bt + w
(h)
t At = Q
(h)
t for all h. (1.27)
Plugging in the optimal solution of the myopic investor (1.26) for α
(h)
t , solving for y
(h)
t and
using (1.6) results in:
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t At. Moreover, this implies that the excess return equals:







γ(h− 1)2Vart[y(h−1)t+1 ]. (1.29)
In other words, the excess return decreases in the holdings of long-term investors: the larger
the holdings of the long-term investors, the less interest rate risk has to be carried by the
myopic investors, which decreases expected returns.
The market clearing condition should still hold after implementation of the UFR9, which
implies an excess return that equals:
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Under the assumption that the conditional variance of future yields does not change
because of the introduction of the UFR, i.e. Vart[y
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γ(h− 1)2Vart[y(h−1)t+1 ] (1.31)






















This result shows that the price impact of the regulatory change depends on changes in
expectations about future yields, E+t [y
(h−1)
t+1 ] − Et[y
(h−1)
t+1 ], the demand shock, c
(h)
t , the risk-
aversion parameter γ, and the wealth of the arbitrageurs, Bt, relative to the wealth of the
long-term investors, At. Equation (1.29) and (1.32) result in the following two additional
model implications.
Implication 3 - future excess returns


















γ(h− 1)2Vart[y(h−1)t+1 ] > 0. (1.34)
Implication 4 - yields
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1.3.5 Testable predictions future excess returns and yields
The model predicts that future excess return increase if long-term investors hold a smaller
share of long-term bond holdings, which according to my model occurs if the funding ratio
is high:
Prediction 3 - future excess returns Yields and future excess bond returns are
negatively related to the aggregate funding positions of P&Is.
Second, the UFR leads to a structural decrease in P&Is long-term bond holdings, which,
in turn, increase the yields:
Prediction 4 - yields Yields increase due to the implementation of the UFR.
1.4 Data
In this section I describe the three data sources that I use for my analysis: the SHS
database (Subsection 1.4.1), the CSDB database (Subsection 1.4.2), and the supervision
database (Subsection 1.4.3).
1.4.1 SHS database
I use Dutch security holdings (SHS) data for four types of institutional investors: banks,
insurance companies, investment funds, and pension funds. The investment funds mainly
consist of mutual funds. All institutions that report are domiciled in the Netherlands and the
regulator decides which institutions have to report, with the aim to have sufficient coverage
in terms of AUM for every sector. Institutions have to report their holdings of all securities,
both foreign and domestic, to the regulator on a quarterly basis.10
DNB gathers holdings data to setup, among others, the Dutch balance of payments, the
international investment position, and the financial accounts, and subsequently reports the
holdings data to the ECB for the setup of the aforementioned statistics at an euro area
level. The data that I use is therefore also available at the euro area level. I have three
main reasons to use the Dutch data instead. First, the European data starts at the end of
10All institutions report their foreign holdings on a monthly basis, whereas this is not the case for domestic
holdings. However, since Dutch institutions hold significant fixed income holdings in the Netherlands, I use
quarterly data to ensure data consistency.
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2013 only, whereas introductions of the ultimate forward rates (UFR) in several European
countries already happened in 2011 and 2012. Moreover, the European data aggregates over
all sectors, whereas the Dutch data is at the institutional level. This allows me to make use
of the cross-sectional variation in institutions. For instance, measuring effects of the solvency
positions on holdings is only possible when there is data availability at the institutional level.
Third, looking at the total AUM of pension funds alone in my database, I already cover 53
percent of the assets of pension funds in the euro area, OECD (2019).
The data provide bond and stock holdings at the International Securities Identification
Number (ISIN) level. Institutions report their positions at the start of the corresponding
quarter, the total purchases and sales of each position, and the positions at the end of the
quarter, all in euros. For both stocks and bonds, purchases and sales are in market values.
For stocks, start and end holdings are available in number of shares and market values. For
bonds, start and end holdings are available in both nominal and market values.
1.4.2 CSDB database
The SHS database is linked to the Centralised Securities Database (CSDB). The aim of
the CSDB database is to hold accurate information on all individual securities relevant for
the statistical purposes of the European System of Central Banks, ECB (2010). From the
CSDB database I obtain market relevant information: debt type, maturity dates, coupon
rates, coupon frequencies, coupon type (e.g. fixed, floating or zero-coupon), last coupon
payment date, yield-to-maturity, and closing price. The data from the CSDB database
allows me to assign bonds in maturity buckets and compute bond durations.
1.4.3 Supervision database
The supervision database is from mandatory annual and quarterly statements that P&Is
report to DNB. P&Is have to report, among others, solvency positions, the value of the assets
and liabilities, liability durations, asset allocations, and derivative positions. I describe the
solvency requirements for both pension funds and insurance companies in the next two
subsections.
Solvency requirements pension funds
A pension fund’s solvency position is assessed by computing its funding ratio, or its assets
divided by its liabilities. The minimum funding requirement is a flat rate equal to a funding
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ratio of about 104.2%. In contrast, the required funding ratio is based on a pension fund’s
risk profile and is calculated such that the probability that the funding ratio falls below
100 percent on a one-year horizon equals 2.5 percent. For a median pension fund this ratio
amounts to a required funding ratio of 116 percent.
Solvency requirements insurance companies
Instead of funding ratios, insurance companies compute solvency ratios to assess the
solvency position. Solvency ratios equal the available capital divided by the required capital.
Prior to the introduction of Solvency II in 2016, solvency ratios of insurance companies were
not risk-based. The required eligible capital prior to 2016 equaled 4 percent of the value
of the liabilities. At the introduction of Solvency II, the required capital is computed in a
similar way as for pension funds, except that the required capital is calculated such that the
probability that the funding ratio falls below 100 percent on a one-year horizon equals 0.5
percent, rather than the 2.5 percent for pension funds.
Solvency ratios can be converted into funding ratios and vice versa. Because the model
makes predictions based on funding ratios, I convert insurers’ solvency ratios to funding
ratios. Formally, prior to Solvency II regulation solvency ratios equal SR = A−L
0.04L
, which
implies that the funding ratio equals A
L
= 0.04 ∗SR+ 1. The solvency ratios under Solvency
II are more complex and hence I collect data on the assets and the liabilities for each insurer
to compute the funding ratios manually.
1.4.4 The sample
The total sample covers 20 banks, 42 pension funds, 12 life insurers, 27 non-life insurers
and 160 non-equity mutual funds. This group of institutional investors represents on average
80-90 percent in terms of AUM for all institutional investors domiciled in the Netherlands.11
I only analyze investors’ direct holdings, that is, investments that are not made via other
investor types such as mutual funds. The data, unfortunately, does not allow for a linkage
between the indirect holdings of the investor to its direct holdings, except for the two largest
pension funds and the two largest insurance companies. For these P&Is I know their shares
in mutual funds which allows me to use both their direct and indirect holdings.
11See for details on reporting requirements https://statistiek.dnb.nl/statistiek/index.aspx.
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1.4.5 Summary statistics
This section briefly describes the summary statistics. Banks are the largest in terms of
AUM, followed by life insurers and pension funds.12 Life insurers and pension funds also
have the highest bond duration of their fixed income portfolios. The average bond duration
equals 11.3 and 10.6 years for life insurers and pension funds respectively, whereas this equals
4.3 years for banks, 7.3 for mutual funds and 6.3 for non-life insurers.
Life insurers and pension funds have the longest liability durations, equal to 11.0 and
17.8 years respectively. The liability duration of non-life insurers is much shorter and equals
4.2 years. The average funding ratio of pension funds equals 109% and 110% for insurers.
The heterogeneity in the funding ratios for pension funds is substantially larger than for
insurers. Insurers generally hedge their liabilities more closely than pension funds because
they face costs of financial distress, whereas pension funds cannot default.13 Life insures and
non-life insurers do not substantially deviate in terms of their solvency ratios.
1.5 Empirical methodology changes in holdings
I now turn to the testing of the empirical predictions from my theoretical framework. As
the regulatory change affected the pension and insurance sector only, I focus in this section
on P&Is and come back to the other investor types in Section 1.6. For bond holdings, I use
the notional values in all my analyses such that market prices are not driving the results. A
change in notional values reflects active choices by investors, which is exactly the focus of
this paper.
1.5.1 Long-term bond holdings and the regulatory discount curve
I start with the main regression specification. Even though the regulatory discount curve
already affected interest rates as of maturities of 21 years, I focus here on long-term bonds
with maturities of 30 years or longer. The weight assigned to the UFR is relatively small for
the first affected maturities and these interest rates are closely linked to the 20 year interest
12Note that these summary statistics are based on the direct holdings only.
13In case a pension fund is not compliant with funding requirements, it files a recovery plan to the
supervisor. Recovery measures may include an increase in contributions, a reduction of the future benefit
accrual rate or, as a measure of last resort, a reduction of accrued benefits.
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Table 1.2. Summary statistics: This table shows the following summary statistics: total
AUM of directly reported assets (AUM), AUM in bonds (AUM bonds), AUM in stocks
(AUM stocks), bond duration (Bond duration), liability duration (Liability duration), and
the solvency positions (Funding ratio). The funding ratio is in percentage points, AUM in
million euro, bond and liability duration in years. Equity mutual funds are excluded from
the sample.
AUM mean std.dev. p50 AUM bonds mean std.dev. p50
Banks 20,695 26,558 8,893 Banks 19,591 25,185 8,893
Life insurers 19,917 17,695 21,534 Life insurers 14,557 13,788 13,594
Non-life insurers 1,383 1,332 831 Non-life insurers 1,112 1,237 650
Mutual funds 763 1,422 432 Mutual funds 622 853 371
Pension funds 14,760 39,731 4,322 Pension funds 7,876 20,143 2,450
AUM stocks mean std.dev. p50 Bond duration mean std.dev. p50
Banks 1,104 3,291 9 Banks 4.3 3.5 3.7
Life insurers 5,360 4,644 3,743 Life insurers 11.3 3.5 11.4
Non-life insurers 271 417 117 Non-life insurers 6.3 4.1 6.2
Mutual funds 141 668 145 Mutual funds 7.3 4.8 6.8
Pension funds 6,884 20,197 1,851 Pension funds 10.6 3.7 10.4
Liability duration mean std.dev. p50 Funding ratio mean std.dev. p50
Life insurers 11.0 3.5 11.7 Life insurers 110 4 109
Non-life insurers 4.1 2.8 3.5 Non-life insurers 110 5 108
Pension funds 17.8 2.9 17.6 Pension funds 109 12 108
rates and hence a good substitute to hedge the 20 year interest rate.
Figure 1.3 shows the average fraction of long-term bonds in the bond portfolio for P&Is
over time. Following the two quarters after the UFR was implemented, there is a sharp
decline in long-term bond holdings for both life insurers and pension funds. Long-term bond
holdings slightly increase again towards the end of 2014, but remain substantially lower than
the pre-UFR levels.
To bring the predictions of the model to the data, I use a difference-in-difference specification
which compares long-term bond holdings before and after implementation of the UFR. I
exploit the heterogeneity in exposure towards the UFR, which depends on the liability
duration of P&Is. I conjecture that investors with long liability durations decrease long-
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Even though investors may have anticipated the UFR, the determinants of the shape of the
UFR such as its level and the slope were unknown.14
Figure 1.3. Long-term bond holdings by institutional investor type
This graph shows the average fraction of bonds with a maturity of 30 years or longer for
life insurers, non-life insurers, and pension funds over the period 2009q1-2018q1.













term bond holdings more compared to investors with short liability durations:
wBit = α + β0UFRt + β1UFRt ×DL2012q1,i + β2FRit−1 + β3DLit−1 + νi + εit, (1.36)
where UFRt equals one after implementation of the UFR and zero otherwise, D
L
2012q1,i is the
liability duration as of 2012q1, FRit−1 the lagged funding ratio, D
L
it−1 the lagged liability
duration, and νi are fund fixed effects.
Table 1.3 shows the results. P&Is with long liability durations decrease long-term
holdings to a larger extent than the ones with short liability durations, supporting the
first prediction of my theoretical framework in Section 1.3. The effect is also economically
significant. The average liability duration in the cross-section of P&Is equals 14 years, which
implies long-term bond holdings decreased by approximately 14×0.0018 = 2.5 percent. The
total decline in long-term bond holdings due to the regulatory change equals:
N∑
i=1
β̂1 ×DL2012q1,i × AUMBi = 15.30 billion, (1.37)
where AUMBi is the total AUM in bonds. The total AUM in long-term bonds prior to
the regulatory change equals 36.10 billion, so this means a relative decrease of 42 percent.
Besides, to give additional support for the economic effects, P&Is invest 20 percent of the
25
CHAPTER 1. LONG-TERM INVESTORS AND THE YIELD CURVE
total bond portfolio in Dutch government bonds on average, which means a decline in these
holdings of 25% × 15.30 = 3.06 billion. The average amount outstanding of 30-year Dutch
government bonds equals 14 billion, and hence, the total decline corresponds to 22 percent
of its amount outstanding.15
Table 1.3 also shows the changes in bond holdings with maturities varying between 15
and 25 years, and maturities less than 15 years. P&Is increased their holdings towards
bonds with maturities varying between 15 and 25 years, whereas they did not change their
holdings to bonds with maturities less than 15 years. These results show that P&Is moved
their long-term bonds with maturities of 30 years or longer to bonds with maturities around
20 years.
1.5.2 Long-term bond holdings and constraints
My model also predicts that P&Is closer to their solvency constraint decrease long-term
bond holdings to a larger extent than funded P&Is. I use a triple difference-in-difference
estimation technique to test this hypothesis:
wBit = α + β0UFRt + β1UFRt ×DL2012q1,i × FR−12012q1,i + β2FR−1it−1 + β3DLit−1 + νi + εit,(1.38)
where FR−12012q1,i is the inverse of the funding ratio as of 2012q1.
Table 1.4 summarizes the results. P&Is that are more constraint, i.e. have a larger inverse
of their funding ratio, decrease long-term bond holdings to a larger extent: A one standard
deviation increase in the inverse of the funding ratio (0.08), increases the decline in long-term
bond holdings by 25 basis points, which is equivalent to 1.89 billion, or 5.26% of the long-
term bond holdings. P&Is that are more constrained also increase their holdings towards
bonds with maturities between 15 and 25 years to a larger extent than non-constrained ones.
1.5.3 Stock allocation and the regulatory discount curve
The final model implication for the changes in holdings is that P&Is closer to their
solvency constraint allocate more of their assets to stocks at implementation of the UFR. I
15As a robustness check, I have also added mutual funds to estimate (1.36): Mutual funds do not have
liabilities and therefore their liability durations essentially equal zero. Including mutual funds to the sample
with a liability duration forced to zero does not affect the sign and the magnitude of the coefficients.
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Table 1.3. Long-term bond holdings and the regulatory discount curve: This table
presents the results of the main regression described in Equation (1.36): wBit = α+β0UFRt+
β1UFRt ×DL2012q1,i + β2FRit−1 + β3DLit−1 + νi + εit, with UFR equal to 1 as of 2012Q1 and
zero otherwise, DL2012q1,i the duration of the liabilities as of 2012Q1, and controls include
the lagged inverse of the funding ratio and the liability duration. Column (1) and (2) show
the results for bond holdings with a maturity of 30 years or longer, column (3) and (4) for
maturities between 15 and 25 years, and column (5) and (6) for maturities shorter than 15
years. ICL is a dummy that equals one for life insurers and zero otherwise and PF equals one
for pension funds and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p < 0.10,
∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Holdings Holdings Holdings
T ≥ 30 15 ≤ T ≤ 25 T ≤ 15
UFR 0.0115 −0.0361∗∗ 0.0514
(0.0080) (0.0160) (0.0317)
UFR×DL2012q1 −0.0023∗∗∗ −0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗ −0.0014 −0.0028
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0022)
1/Funding ratio 0.0418 0.0431 −0.1371∗∗ −0.1324 0.0335 0.0471
(0.0359) (0.0480) (0.0684) (0.0939) (0.1054) (0.1447)
Liability duration 0.0030∗ 0.0064∗∗∗ 0.0026 0.0029 −0.0085 −0.0219∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0039) (0.0055) (0.0065)
ICL 0.0370∗ 0.0324 −0.0934
(0.0199) (0.0337) (0.0724)
PF 0.0043 0.0187 −0.0448
(0.0273) (0.0432) (0.0899)
Fund FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 2,376 2,376 2,376 2,376 2,376 2,376
R2 0.11 0.61 0.15 0.66 0.16 0.73
use the following difference-in-difference specification to test this hypothesis formally:
wSit = α + β0UFRt + β1UFRt × FR−12012q1,i + β2FRit−1 + νi + εit. (1.39)
Table 1.5 shows that more constrained P&Is increase their stock allocation to a larger
extent. A one standard deviation increase in the inverse of the funding ratio (0.08) increases
the stock allocation with 2.43%, which is equivalent to an average increase of 225 million
that is allocated to stocks.
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Table 1.4. Long-term bond holdings and constraints: This table present the results





it−1+νi+εit, with UFR equal to 1 as of 2012Q1 and zero otherwise,
DL2012q1,i the duration of the liabilities as of 2012Q1, and controls include the lagged inverse
of the funding ratio and the liability duration. Column (1) and (2) show the results for bond
holdings with a maturity of 30 years or longer, column (3) and (4) for maturities between 15
and 25 years, and column (5) and (6) for maturities shorter than 15 years. ICL is a dummy
that equals one for life insurers and zero otherwise and PF equals one for pension funds and
zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Holdings Holdings Holdings
T ≥ 30 15 ≤ T ≤ 25 T ≤ 15
UFR 0.0128 −0.0378∗∗ 0.0599∗
(0.0088) (0.0160) (0.0327)
UFR×DL2012q1× −0.0027∗∗∗ −0.0021∗∗ 0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0040∗∗∗ −0.0023 −0.0037
FR−12012q1,i (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0025) (0.0025)
1/Funding ratio 0.0341 0.0317 −0.1266∗ −0.1090 0.0199 0.0137
(0.0332) (0.0446) (0.0680) (0.0948) (0.1009) (0.1394)
Liability duration 0.0032∗ 0.0065∗∗∗ 0.0025 0.0028 −0.0079 −0.0210∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0038) (0.0054) (0.0064)
ICL 0.0360∗ 0.0325 −0.0944
(0.0200) (0.0336) (0.0720)
PF 0.0028 0.0192 −0.0493
(0.0271) (0.0429) (0.0895)
Fund FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 2,349 2,349 2,349 2,349 2,349 2,349
R2 0.11 0.61 0.15 0.67 0.15 0.72
1.5.4 Derivative positions
The empirical analysis so far uses long-term bond holdings only. However, interest rate
risk is also managed by using derivative contracts, especially for very long-term maturities.
As of the start of 2012, pension funds have to report interest rate derivative positions on an
aggregate level: They report the market value of interest rate derivative contracts broken
down in different types of derivative contracts. Moreover, they report the values of these
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Table 1.5. Stock allocation and the regulatory discount curve: This table present
the results of the regression described in Equation (1.39): wSit = α + β0UFRt + β1UFRt ×
FR−12012q1,i+β2FRit−1+νi+εit, with UFR equal to 1 as of 2012Q1 and zero otherwise, FR
−1
2012q1,i
the inverse of the funding ratio as of 2012Q1, and the control includes the lagged inverse of
the funding ratio. Column (1) and (2) show the results for bond holdings with a maturity of
30 years or longer, column (3) and (4) for maturities between 15 and 25 years, and column
(5) and (6) for maturities shorter than 15 years. ICL is a dummy that equals one for life
insurers and zero otherwise and PF equals one for pension funds and zero otherwise. Robust




UFR× FR−12012q1,i 0.2646∗ 0.3042∗∗
(0.1601) (0.1558)






Fund FE No Yes
Time FE No Yes
N 2,407 2,407
R2 0.16 0.86
positions after a parallel shock in interest rates of +1% (-1%) and +0.5% (-0.5%).16 This
allows me to compute the dollar durations of the derivative positions.17 Because the data on
derivative positions is available for only two quarters prior to the regulatory change, the time
series is not long enough to statistically test if pension funds decreased their interest rate
risk exposure via derivatives as well. However, using the time series of the cross-sectional
average implied duration of the derivative portfolios, I show suggestive evidence that pension
16Unfortunately, insurance companies only started reporting derivative positions at the start of 2016 when
Solvency II was introduced.
17As the majority of interest rate derivative positions consist of swaps, and swaps have a linear pay off
function, I narrow down the analysis to the swap portfolio only.
29
CHAPTER 1. LONG-TERM INVESTORS AND THE YIELD CURVE
funds also substantially decreased their derivative positions after the regulatory change.





V −drt − V +drt
2|dr|
(1.40)
where V −drt (V
+dr
t ) is the value of the derivative portfolio after a negative (positive) change
in interest rates, D$p the dollar duration of the portfolio, and dr the change in interest rates.
Figure 1.4 depicts the cross-sectional average duration implied by the swap portfolio over
time, where the duration is computed as the dollar duration in (1.40) relative to total AUM.
The graph also shows the total balance sheet duration as the sum of the relative implied
duration of the swap portfolio and the duration of the fixed income portfolio multiplied by
the allocation to fixed income. On average, pension funds have a balance sheet duration
equal to 10 years. As the duration of the liabilities equals 18 years on average, this means
that pension funds hedge approximately half of their interest rate risk. Importantly, the
portfolio duration shows a sharp decline at the implementation of the UFR, consistent with
the predictions of the model and the empirical findings for long-term bond holdings.
Figure 1.4. Implied duration of pension funds’ portfolios
This graph shows the relative implied duration of the swap portfolio and the duration of the
total portfolio of pension funds. The (relative) duration of the swap portfolio is determined
as the implied dollar duration of the swaps divided by total pension assets. The duration of
the total portfolio equals the sum of relative implied duration of the swap portfolio and the
duration of the fixed income portfolio times the allocation to fixed income.
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1.6 Bond yields and future excess returns
In this section, I test the empirical predictions of my model for yields and future excess
returns. As opposed to the previous section, I use data on Dutch government bonds holdings
only, because P&Is hold a substantial fraction of their assets in Dutch bonds and as a
result, price effects will be particularly visible for this subset of bonds. I start with the first
prediction: future excess returns are high when the P&I sector as a whole is underfunded.
Then, I estimate the effect of the UFR on yields by using the construction of the UFR that
affects yields at different maturities differently as an exogenous shock to demand. Finally, I
use this construction as an instrument to estimate the effect of yields on Dutch government
bond holdings for various investor types by using the framework of Koijen and Yogo (2019).
1.6.1 Aggregate underfunding and future excess returns
My model predicts that future excess returns are low if the P&I sector is underfunded.
Underfunding means that P&Is have less capital than the minimal required capital. If P&Is
are underfunded, their demand for long-term bonds increases and hence the interest rate risk
that has to be carried by myopic investors decreases, which in turn lowers expected future
returns. To test this hypothesis formally, I determine the aggregate level of underfunding as
the fraction of pension funds that are underfunded relative to the total at the end of a given
quarter. The data are from the website of DNB and cover the period 2007q1-2019q4.18
I use data from Bloomberg on the nominal Dutch yield curve to compute future excess











t . Table 1.6 provides the summary statistics on the annual
excess returns rx
(h)
t+1 for bonds with maturities 10, 20 and 30 years, together with summary
statistics on the instantaneous forward rates fht for h = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
Then, to formally test this model implication, I run the following regression:
rx
(h)





18The data can be found here: https://statistiek.dnb.nl/en/dashboards/pensions/index.aspx.
Because the solvency positions of insurers only go back till 2009, I use data on pension funds alone. Because
the solvency positions of both insurers and pension funds are driven by the same factors, using aggregate
pension fund data alone is sufficient. Robustness checks that use a weighted average of the solvency positions
of pension funds and insurance companies indeed confirm this.
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Table 1.6. Summary statistics Dutch yields: This table presents the means, medians
standard deviations, minimum, and maximum of Dutch zero-coupon government bond yields.
Panel A shows the summary statistics on Dutch yields, where the data is from Bloomberg and
covers the period 2007-2020. Panel B presents the summary statistics on the measures for
aggregate underfunding. All reported numbers are in percentage points, except the fraction
of underfunded pension plans which is in percent. rxht+1 is the excess return for a bond with
maturity h, yht is the yield for a bond with maturity h, f
(h)
t is the instantaneous forward rate
for a bond with maturity h.
mean median std.dev. min max N
Panel A: Dutch zero-coupon government bond yields (%)
rx10t+1 5.31 5.16 6.08 −5.73 18.35 48
rx20t+1 8.11 8.66 13.19 −14.06 41.56 48
rx30t+1 10.37 9.63 19.43 −23.05 61.34 48
y10t − y1t 1.43 1.25 0.84 0.03 3.09 48
f 1t (= y
1
t ) 0.60 0.01 1.56 −0.78 4.65 48
f 2t 1.27 0.72 1.67 −0.79 4.80 48
f 3t 1.70 1.47 1.72 −0.68 4.82 48
f 4t 2.03 1.92 1.68 −0.55 4.55 48
f 5t 2.34 2.45 1.60 −0.33 4.72 48
Panel B : Underfunded pension plans
1. Fraction underfunded (percent) 37 31 24 0 83 48
2. Level underfunded (%) 2.12 0 3.26 0 12.2 48
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where rx
(h)
t+1 is the annual excess bond return from time t to time t + 1 for a bond with
maturity h, UNFt equals the fraction of pension funds that are underfunded at time t, and
xt includes a set of controls.
Because I only observe the fraction of underfunded pension funds at a quarterly frequency,
I estimate the regressions on a quarterly frequency.19 This implies I forecast returns for every
four quarters. I compute standard errors using the Newey and West (1987) standard errors
that allow for serial correlation up to 6 lags. The controls include the term spread, following
Campbell and Shiller (1991), or the first five forward rates, following Cochrane and Piazzesi
(2005).
Table 1.7 shows the results of the forecasting regressions. Figure 1.5 plots the fraction
of underfunded pension funds and the one-year ahead excess return on a 10-year bond. As
the figure shows and the table confirms, a higher fraction of underfunded pension funds is
associated with lower future excess returns. As expected, the effect is stronger for longer
maturity bonds.
The economic magnitude of the effects are substantial. A one standard deviation increase
in the fraction of underfunded pension funds (0.24) decreases the excess future returns with
8.24 percent. Assuming that the change in underfunded pension funds has no effect on
expected returns beyond a year, this corresponds to a decline in contemporaneous 30-year
yields of 27 basis points (see Equation (1.28): 8.24%/30).20 This equals 19 basis points for
a 20-year bond and 12 basis points for a 10-year bond. As a robustness check, Table 1.15
and 1.16 of the Appendix summarize the results if I use the average percentage points
of underfunding and the return on the liabilities as alternative proxies for the degree of
underfunding. The effects using these alternative proxies are similar to the results discussed
here.21
Running a regression of the aggregate allocation to fixed income on the level of underfunding
indeed confirms that the fraction of underfunding increases the allocation to bonds: a
19The literature tends to use monthly data, however results of standard forecasting regressions using the
term spread or forward rates do not substantially change when using a quarterly or a monthly frequency.
20In untabulated regressions, I find that the forecasting power substantially decreases when predicting 5
quarter future excess returns and completely vanishes using 6 quarters or more.
21For the first proxy, the effect of a one standard deviation increase on the 30-year yield equals 32 basis
points, whereas for the second proxy this effect equals 19 basis points. The effect of the second proxy is
smaller because the degree of underfunding is largely determined by both the returns on equity and bonds,
whereas the return on the liabilities is only picking up the latter part.
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one standard deviation increase in the fraction of underfunded pension funds increases the
allocation to fixed income by 1.97%.22
Evidently, running a regression of returns on a proxy for demand does generally not
allow to cleanly identify the causality between demand shocks and asset prices, because
there could be omitted variables that drive demand for bonds and is correlated with the
degree of underfunding. Therefore, I turn to the asset pricing implications of the regulatory
change that uses the construction of the UFR as an exogenous shock to demand next.
Figure 1.5. Future excess returns and underfunded pension plans
This graph shows the one year future excess return and the fraction of underfunded pension
plans or the liability return (rLt =
Lt−Lt−1
Lt−1
). The upper figure shows the excess returns
(percentage points) on the left y-axis and the fraction of underfunded pension plans (percent)
on the right y-axis. The lower figure shows both the excess returns and liability return on
the left y-axis (percentage points).





















22Formally, I run the following regression: wFIt = α + β0UNFt + εt. I find a coefficient of β0 = 0.0821
with a t-stat equal to 3.73 with an R2 = 0.25.
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CHAPTER 1. LONG-TERM INVESTORS AND THE YIELD CURVE
1.6.2 The connection between portfolio holdings and yields
The regulatory change had a significant effect on Dutch long-term bond yields, as already
shown by Greenwood and Vissing-Jorgensen (2018) using event studies. Figure 1.6 shows the
30-20 government bond spread. The spread increased significantly after the announcement
of the UFR, and remained at a higher level thereafter.
Figure 1.6. Government bond yield spreads
This graph shows the spread between 30 year and 20 year Dutch government bonds. The
vertical lines are three days before and after the announcement of the UFR.
Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan









In this section, I connect investors’ portfolio holdings to yields using the asset demand
system developed by Koijen and Yogo (2019). The asset demand system allows me to
compute demand elasticities with respect to price, which, in turn, allow me to study the
importance of various investor types in creating price effects.
Investor i’s investment in Dutch government bonds within maturity bucket m is denoted
by Hit(m), and the investment in the outside asset is denoted by Oit.
23 Because I cannot
observe what investors consider to be the outside asset, I use the 10-year German yield as
proxy for the outside asset. German government bonds are important alternative liability
hedge assets outside of the Netherlands. The results, however, are robust using other proxies
for the outside asset. Furthermore, I assume that holdings of the outside asset move only
due to changes in the German yield.
23The results do not materially change using all bonds outside of the Netherlands as the outside asset.
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where δit(m) = Hit(m)O
−1
it and wit(0) = 1−
∑M=7
m=1 wit(m) equals the fraction invested in the
outside asset. Demand for government bonds with maturity m is a function of bond yields
and characteristics (Koijen et al., 2020):
lnHit(m) = ln δit(m) + lnOit
= α̂i + β0iyt(m) + β
′
1ixt(m) + β2i lnH
2009q2
i (m) + β̂3iy
DE
t + εit(m), (1.43)
in which α̂i = αi + lnOi, β̂3i = β3i + ψi, yt(m) is the average yield for maturity bucket m,
xt(m) includes bond characteristics, H
2009q2
i (m) equals the initial holdings in each maturity
bucket m, and yDEt is the German yield and captures alternative liability hedge opportunities
outside of the Netherlands.
Koijen and Yogo (2019) show that (1.43) is consistent with a model in which investors
have mean-variance preferences over returns, assume that returns follow a factor model, and
assume that both expected returns and factor loadings are affine in a set of characteristics.
The component of demand that is not captured by prices, characteristics, and time-invariant
characteristics, εit(m), is referred to as latent demand.
Safe, (long-term) government bond returns are primarily driven by duration and convexity.
The vector of bond characteristics therefore includes the average duration of the bond in
every maturity bucket and the average convexity, measured as the duration squared. I also
include the average coupons.
In order to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters in (1.43) using OLS one has
to assume that characteristics are exogenous to latent demand. However, positive latent
demand for Dutch government bonds of a particular maturity may result in lower yields.
The demand curves are therefore estimated using an instrumental variable approach. I use
the weights assigned to the UFR as an instrument for changes in demand. Even though
investors may have anticipated the UFR, the determinants of the shape of the UFR such as
its level and the slope were unknown.24
The weights assigned to the UFR for each maturity bucket are summarized in Table 1.14
24https://www.dnb.nl/en/news/news-and-archive/dnbulletin-2012/dnb276012.jsp
37
CHAPTER 1. LONG-TERM INVESTORS AND THE YIELD CURVE
Table 1.8. Instrument for every maturity bucket: This table shows the instrument
for every maturity bucket used for the instrumental variable approach. The instrument
is constructed as the average weight assigned to the UFR for each maturity bucket. An
overview of the weights for separate maturities is given in Table 1.14.
[0, 5] (5, 10] (10, 15] (15, 20] (20, 25] (25, 30] (30,∞)
ξm 0 0 0 0 0.263 0.579 0.910
of the Appendix. The instrumental variable is defined as zt(m) = ξ(m)Dt, where ξ(m)
is the average weight assigned to the UFR for maturity bucket m and Dt equals one after
implementation of the UFR and zero otherwise. The first-stage regression of the instrumental
variable estimator equals:




t + εt(m), (1.44)
The first stage is summarized in column (1) of Table 1.9. The t-statistic equals 4.95 and
is higher than the proposed threshold of 4.05 by Stock and Yogo (2005) for rejecting the null
of weak instruments at the 5 percent level, suggesting that the instrument is not weak. The
coefficient for the instrument equals 0.397, with a standard error of 0.092. A coefficient of
0.435 implies that government bond yields with time-to-maturity between 21 and 25 years
went up with 11 basis points, for time-to-maturities between 26 and 30 years with 25 basis
points, and for time-to-maturities longer than 30 years with 39 basis points. This implies
an increase in the 30-20 year spread of approximately 24 basis points. These estimates are
larger than the estimates found in Greenwood and Vissing-Jorgensen (2018), who find an
increase in the Dutch 30-10 year spread of 15 basis points by conducting an event study
(Figure 1.6). Event studies only capture the immediate decrease in long-term bond holdings
around the announcement of the regulatory change. However, P&Is did not sell everything
at once, but instead spread out the decrease in long-term bond holdings over four quarters
(Figure 1.3).
I estimate the demand curves for banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, pension
funds, and the foreign sector. I first show the results aggregated by investor type as I do not
have investor specific characteristics for all types in my sample that would allow me to take
advantage of cross-sectional heterogeneity within types. The investments of the foreign sector
are defined as the difference between the total amount outstanding minus the holdings by
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the other sectors. The data on total amounts outstanding is from the Dutch State Treasury
Agency.25
Columns 2-6 of Table 1.9 show the estimates of the demand system. P&Is have demand
curves that are upward sloping, which is consistent with my model. Because of duration
mismatch between the assets and the liabilities, a decrease in interest rates decreases the
funding ratio. From (1.16), we observe that a low funding ratio increases the demand for
long-term bonds. Foreign investors prefer shorter duration bonds, whereas P&Is prefer
longer duration bonds, consistent with Section 1.5. Moreover, P&Is prefer bonds with higher
coupons, potentially resulting from the desire to match the cash flows of their liabilities. In all
cases, the initial holdings are positive and statistically significant, meaning that unobserved
time-invariant characteristics explain a substantial part of the holdings.
I can use the demand system to connect prices to elasticity of demand with respect to
price for all investor types (Koijen and Yogo, 2019; Koijen et al., 2020):
∂qit(m)
∂pit(m)




where lowercases are log of variables and Tmt is the average maturity for maturity bucket
m. To compute wit(m), I use the investment in euro area bonds except Dutch ones as the
outside asset.
The demand elasticities with respect to price for each investor type are summarized in
Table 1.11. A demand elasticity close to zero implies that demand is inelastic and a large
value implies that demand is sensitive to the price. Banks have the highest demand elasticity,
followed by mutual funds and the foreign sector. However, the estimate for banks is very
imprecise. Banks are not holding the longest maturity bonds and therefore the instrument
is weak. Consistent with the findings before, demand elasticities are negative for the P&I
sector. The weighted average elasticity equals 2.05 and the weight of each sector is computed
as the average weights of the different investor types in each maturity bucket prior to the
implementation of the UFR. The weights of each sector are summarized in Table 1.10. As
in Koijen et al. (2020), demand elasticities are substantially higher than the estimates for
stock markets, e.g. Chang et al. (2015) find an elasticity close to one. However, the average
weighted price elasticity of demand is lower than measured in Koijen et al. (2020), where the
unit of observation are the holdings of government debt in a particular country. This means
25https://english.dsta.nl
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Table 1.9. Demand system: This table shows the regression results of the demand system







The first column shows the first stage regression for the foreign investors. The instrument
zt(m) equals the weights assigned to the UFR for each maturity bucket m. The controls
xt(m) include the average bond duration, convexity, coupon, and initial bond holdings.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Holdings Holdings Holdings Holdings Holdings
yt(m) Banks Foreign IC MF PF
yt(m) 2.171 1.156
∗∗ −2.639∗∗ 0.531∗∗ −1.640∗∗∗




Duration 0.168∗∗∗ 0.405 −0.730∗∗∗ 0.910∗∗∗ −0.289 0.523∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.568) (0.127) (0.286) (0.296) (0.130)
Convexity −0.006∗∗∗ −0.019 0.019∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.011 −0.014∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.016) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003)
Coupon −0.021 −0.079 −0.267∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.013 0.106∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.092) (0.050) (0.049) (0.015) (0.035)
Initial holdings −0.192∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.129 1.654∗∗∗ 0.895∗∗∗ 0.773∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.089) (0.222) (0.253) (0.122) (0.113)
10-year German yield 1.019∗∗∗ 2.079 −1.409 2.795 −1.366 2.361∗∗
(0.015) (3.544) (0.878) (1.725) (1.930) (0.967)
N 243 209 243 243 243 243
R2 0.98 0.68 0.55 0.28 0.75 0.41
that investors are less price elastic across maturity buckets than they are across countries.
Government bonds issued by (some) countries in the euro area may be closer substitutes
than bonds of different maturities from a balance sheet perspective.
In order to derive pricing effects from the demand system, I can perform a simple back-
of-the-envelope calculation. Pension funds and insurers sold 22 percent of the amount
outstanding of 30-year Dutch government bonds. The weighted average price elasticity of
demand equals 2.05 and thus the price effect equals 22%/2.05 = 10.73%. For a bond with a
maturity of 30 years, this implies an increase in long-term yields of 36 basis points, which is
close to the price effect found for the first stage regression.
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Table 1.10. Weights of investor types in each maturity bucket: This table shows the
weights of the investor types (banks, insurance companies, foreign investors, mutual funds,
and pension funds) at the start of 2012q1. The fraction of foreign investors is determined as
the fraction of total amount outstanding that is not held by one of the Dutch institutions.
The column tot. (tot. long) defines the total fraction that each investor is holding relative
to the total amount outstanding (total amount outstanding maturities exceeding 10 years).
[0, 5] (5, 10] (10, 15] (15, 20] (20, 25] (25, 30] (30,∞) tot. tot.
long
Banks 3 16 2 9 3 4 0 9 4
Foreign investors 90 70 75 52 44 42 49 75 52
Insurers 3 6 12 21 29 30 27 8 24
Mutual funds 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
Pension funds 3 7 10 16 23 23 23 9 19
Table 1.11. Price elasticity of demand: This table shows the price elasticity of demand,
computed as in Equation (1.45). The average, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum
over time are given. Total elasticity is the weighted average elasticity, using the weights of
each sector defined in Table 1.10.
obs. mean std.dev. min max
Banks 209 23.93 25.57 5.67 83.88
Foreign investors 243 4.53 1.89 1.84 11.28
Insurance companies 243 −29.95 31.68 −102.44 −6.93
Mutual funds 243 8.30 6.82 1 22.23
Pension funds 243 −18.61 20.19 −63.63 −3.97
Total 2.05
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1.6.3 Demand curves P&Is including characteristics
My model predicts that the demand for bonds depends primarily on the liability structure
and solvency positions of P&Is. My model predicts that demand for long-term bonds is
higher when liability duration is longer as well as when the funding ratio is low. In this
section, I extend the framework of Koijen and Yogo (2019) by also including two key P&Is
characteristics: the liability duration and the solvency position. In this setting, demand for
government bonds with maturity m becomes a function of bond yields, bond characteristics,
and fund characteristics interacted with bond characteristics:







i (m) + β̂4iy
DE
t + εit(m) (1.46)
where vit includes the liability duration and the solvency position for investor i at time t,
xt(m) includes bond characteristics as defined before, and x1t(m) includes bond duration
and convexity, and αi includes investor fixed effects. Again, I include the initial holdings as
well as the 10-year German yield.
Table 1.12 shows the results for insurers. On average, insurance companies with long
liability durations prefer bonds with long durations, but relatively low convexity. This
means that insurance companies prefer long-term bonds, but not the bonds with the longest
maturities. The UFR creates incentives to hedge the duration of the liabilities, but less so the
convexity of the liabilities, i.e. the cash flows at the very long-end of the maturity spectrum. I
also compute the demand system for insurers with high versus low liability durations and high
and low solvency positions, respectively. Interestingly, insurers with long liability durations
have much stronger upward sloping demand curves than average, whereas insurers with low
liability durations have neither upward nor downward sloping demand curves. Moreover,
insurers with low solvency positions have slightly stronger upward sloping demand curves
than insurers with high solvency positions, again consistent with the predictions of my model.
Table 1.13 shows the results for pension funds. Pension funds with long liability durations
generally have a preference for bonds with long liability durations but lower convexity, as
for insurance companies. There is some evidence that pension funds with high solvency
positions have a stronger preference for bonds with high convexity, consistent with the finding
in Section 1.5 that pension funds with high solvency positions decreased long-term bond
holdings to a smaller extent than the ones with low solvency positions. As opposed to
insurance companies, pension funds with long versus short liability do not differ as much
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Table 1.12. Demand system with insurer characteristics This table shows the results of
the demand system including insurers characteristics (liability duration and solvency ratio)




2i(x1t(m) × vit) + β̂3iyDEt +
αi + εit(m). The first column shows the first stage regression. The instrument zt(m) equals
the weights assigned to the UFR for every maturity bucket m, described in Table 1.8. The
results are reported for all insurers, as well as insurers that are above the 70th percentile
or below the 30th percentile of the liability duration (solvency ratio). The 30th and 70th
percentile are determined in each quarter. Controls include the bond characteristics, the
10-year German yield, and the initial holdings. Robust standard errors are in parentheses;
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Holdings Holdings Holdings Holdings Holdings
yt(m) all high dur low dur high FR low FR
yt(m) −2.432∗∗∗ −3.903∗∗∗ 1.300 −3.138∗∗∗ −3.714∗∗




bond dur × liability dur 0.011∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.020∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.007) (0.012) (0.003) (0.003)
bond convex × liability dur −0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
bond dur × solvency ratio −0.003 0.002 0.019 −0.008 0.075
(0.004) (0.027) (0.012) (0.008) (0.054)
bond convex × solvency ratio 0.000 −0.001 −0.002∗∗ 0.001 −0.002
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 243 3,418 848 1,105 910 1,066
R2 0.98 0.68 0.44 0.68 0.68 0.63
in the slope of their demand curves. Notice, however, that the heterogeneity in liability
durations is much smaller for pension funds than for insurers.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, using holdings data and price data simultaneously, I study changes in
hedging incentives of long-term investors and its effect on asset prices. My findings suggest
that regulation plays an nontrivial role in the demand for long-term bonds which, in turn,
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Table 1.13. Demand system with pension fund characteristics This table shows the
results of the demand system including pension fund characteristics (liability duration and







t + αi + εit(m). The first column shows the first stage regression. The instrument
zt(m) equals the weights assigned to the UFR for every maturity bucket m, described in
Table 1.8. The results are reported for all pension funds, as well as pension funds that
are above the 70th percentile or below the 30th percentile of the liability duration (funding
ratio). The 30th and 70th percentile are determined in each quarter. Controls include the
bond characteristics, the 10-year German yield, and the initial holdings. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses; ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Holdings Holdings Holdings Holdings Holdings
yt(m) all high dur low dur high FR low FR
yt(m) −0.565∗ −1.038 −0.284 −1.844∗∗∗ −1.685∗




bond dur × liability dur 0.007∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.004∗ −0.016∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
bond convex × liability dur −0.0002∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.000 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
bond dur × funding ratio −0.032 0.141 −0.078 −0.217∗∗ 0.080
(0.043) (0.099) (0.076) (0.102) (0.222)
bond convex × funding ratio 0.001 0.008 0.002 0.010∗∗ 0.001
(0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.013)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 243 6,085 1,580 2,115 1,980 1,497
R2 0.98 0.40 0.53 0.38 0.41 0.46
affect the asset prices of these bonds. This has important policy implications as these findings
can be used to design long-term investor regulation in a way that is desirable for the economy
as a whole. In particular, my findings show the relevance of incorporating the regulatory





A Further details on UFR
The UFR was initially discussed as part of the Long-Term Guarantee Assessment (LTGA)
of Solvency II regulation. EIOPA proposed the regulatory discount curve based on the UFR
method first in 2010. There are three important decisions policy makers have to make when
introducing the UFR: the level of the UFR, the point on the curve at which the UFR method
starts, and the interpolation method, or the convergence path. The initial EIOPA proposals
are first discussed in detail.
The UFR was initially set at 4.2%, which is based on 2% expected inflation and 2.2%
historical average of the real short interest rate. The expected inflation rate aligns with the
ECB’s target inflation. The real interest rate is based on a study by Dimson et al. (2002).
The point of curve at which the UFR method starts was set at 20 years and the convergence
period is set at 40 years. The extrapolation method proposed by EIOPA is the Smith-Wilson
technique. The Smith-Wilson technique only uses the forward rates at time-to-maturity 19
to 20 years and the UFR to compute the yield curve.
For pension funds a slight modification was used, namely the market interest rates at
each maturity in combination with the UFR. For pension funds, the convergence is such
that its a weighted average between market interest rates and the UFR. So as opposed to
insurers, not only the forward rate from time-to-maturity 19 to 20 years is used, but the
implied market forward rate for each maturity and the UFR.
B Model derivation







































t ι ≤ 1, (A2)
wSt , w
B
h,t ≥ 0 ∀h, (A3)
The Lagrange equals:




















w′tVart[rt+1]wt + (ξL ◦ at)′Vart[rBt+1](ξL ◦ at)
1
FRt






tι− 1) + δ′twt. (A4)
Taking the derivative with respect to wSt , w
B
t , and νt gives:
∂L(wSt , νt, δSt )
∂wSt
= Et[rSt+1 − rf ]− (γ + λ(FRt ))Vart[rSt+1]wSt + νt + δSt = 0, (A5)
∂L(wBt , νt, δBt )
∂wt
= Et[rBt+1 − rf ]− (γ + λ(FRt ))Vart[rBt+1]wBt − γVart[rBt+1]at
1
FEt
− λ(FRt )Vart[rt+1](ξL ◦ at)
1
FRt
+ νtι = 0, (A6)
∂L(wt, νt, δt)
∂νt
= w′tι− 1 = 0. (A7)
This results in the optimal weights (1.15) and (1.16):
wS∗t =
Et[rSt+1 − rf ] + νt + δSt








Et[rBt+1 − rf ] + νtι+ δBt
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C Tables
Table 1.14. Weights UFR in regulatory discount curve: This table shows the weights
assigned to the UFR to compute the regulatory discount curve. The weights are derived
using the Smith-Wilson technique.
time-to-maturity weight time-to-maturity weight
21 0.086 41 0.903
22 0.186 42 0.914
23 0.274 43 0.923
24 0.351 44 0.932
25 0.420 45 0.940
26 0.481 46 0.947
27 0.536 47 0.954
28 0.584 48 0.960
29 0.628 49 0.965
30 0.666 50 0.970
31 0.701 51 0.970
32 0.732 52 0.978
33 0.760 53 0.982
34 0.785 54 0.985
35 0.808 55 0.988
36 0.828 56 0.990
37 0.846 57 0.993
38 0.863 58 0.995
39 0.878 59 0.997





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Pension Funds and Drivers of Heterogeneous
Investment Strategies1
2.1 Introduction
Defined-benefit pension funds play a pivotal role in society as many people depend on
them for their retirement savings and investments. Globally, 50 percent of all occupational
retirement savings is in defined-benefit pension funds (Willis Towers Watson, 2019). The
investments of these pension funds serve a similar objective, namely to finance the future
liabilities towards their beneficiaries. Therefore, understanding what drives pension funds
to structure their investments in a particular way is important. Even small differences in
investment strategies may lead to large divergences in performance across pension funds
over time. Consequently, these divergences may have a substantial impact on beneficiaries’
purchasing power.2 This is particularly relevant because beneficiaries are typically not free
1This chapter is based on joint work with Dirk Broeders. An earlier version of this paper circulated
under the title ‘Liability-Driven Investors’: First version, September 2019. We thank Aleksandar Andonov,
Jules van Binsbergen, Zvi Bodie, Marie Brière, Esther Eiling, Luo Haoyi, Frank de Jong, Ralph Koijen, Jac
Kragt, Christoph Meinerding, Olivia Mitchell, Theo Nijman, Sofia Ramos, Laurens Swinkels, Patrick Tuijp,
Luis Viceira (EFA discussant), Bas Werker; and seminar participants at the EFA 2020 (Helsinki), Women in
Finance Conference 2019 (Goethe University, Frankfurt), AFBC 2019 (Sydney), PFMC 2019 (Paris), FMA
2019 (New Orleans), De Nederlandsche Bank, Maastricht University, Robeco, and Tilburg University for
very useful comments. Moreover, we are grateful to Jeroen Meringa for gathering the data. We gratefully
acknowledge financial support from Inquire Europe. The expressed views are those of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect the official positions of De Nederlandsche Bank.
2In a defined benefit pension plan, benefits are determined by a formula that takes into account an
employee’s salary and years of service. Many defined benefit plans, however, also contain elements that
depend on the investment returns, such as the cost-of-living adjustment or indexation.
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to choose their own pension fund because it “comes with the job”. Neither can beneficiaries
make individual investment decisions within a defined-benefit pension fund. As a result,
these pension funds operate in an environment where they do not have to compete for
market share as many other institutional investors do, such as mutual funds.
Despite their pivotal role in society, so far only a few studies have analysed the investment
strategies of pension funds. The lack of access to comprehensive and detailed data on this
type of investor is the main reason for the limited number of studies. Exceptions are Rauh
(2009) and Andonov et al. (2017) who study the effects of regulatory incentives on risky asset
allocations for US corporate and public pension plans respectively as well as Anantharaman
and Lee (2014) who link risky asset allocations to the compensation incentives of the top
management in US corporate pension plans.3 Our approach differs from these studies because
we do not focus on regulatory or compensation incentives.
The primary objective of our study is to measure the heterogeneity in investment strategies
across pension funds, the drivers of this heterogeneity, and the effects it has on expected
retirement income. We start with a model that solves a mean-variance optimization problem
of assets minus liabilities and show that the following characteristics affect the investment
decisions of pension funds: liability duration, funding ratio, and risk aversion. In addition
to the model, we show that institutional factors, in particular the pension fund’s size and
type, influence the investment strategies. Nonetheless, these characteristics only explain 36
percent of the heterogeneity in the average returns across pension funds. The heterogeneity
that remains reflects an economically sizeable difference in average annual returns of 0.70-
1.50 percentage points between the pension funds with the highest and those with the lowest
factor exposures. This is equivalent to a difference in expected retirement income of 16-32
percent over a 40-year accrual phase or to an increase in contributions of 19-46 percent to
receive the same retirement income. We show that these differences reflect heterogeneity
in beliefs across pension funds that they partially reveal through their choices of the asset
management firms that they hire to execute their investment strategies. Our findings are
remarkable, because the pension funds in our sample have similar investment objectives, yet
even after controlling for differences in their characteristics they make distinct investment
decisions.
The object of our study is occupational defined-benefit pension funds in the Netherlands.
3Lakonishok et al. (1992), Blake et al. (1999), Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), Tonks (2005), Goyal and
Wahal (2008), and Blake et al. (2013) also examine the investment decisions of pension assets, but the focus
in these studies is on the asset managers hired by the pension funds.
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The Dutch occupational pension system is economically important because it is large in
terms of total assets under management (AUM). In 2018, the AUM equaled approximately
1.4 trillion euros, and the Dutch system represented 53 percent of the total assets of pension
funds in the euro area, (OECD, 2019).4 The proprietary data that we use are the quarterly
returns of asset classes over the period from 1999 to 2017, and the return computations are
based on the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS) as of 2010. The reporting
requirements are mandatory, and the data are therefore free from self-reporting biases.
We study investment strategies through factor exposures. Traditionally, the investment
strategies of pension funds focus on the optimal asset allocations to stocks, bonds, real
estate, and alternative assets (e.g. Campbell and Viceira, 2002). However, the rise of the
global factor literature enables a more granular study of investment strategies within and
across asset classes. This literature shows that factors based on a particular signal perform
robustly across countries and asset classes. Prime examples include momentum and value
(Asness et al., 2013), low beta (Frazzini and Pedersen, 2014), and carry (Koijen et al., 2018).
We use the existing global factors for equities: the market, value, momentum, carry, and low
beta. For fixed income, we construct European factors as the pension funds in our sample
primarily invest in euro-dominated bonds, which confirms the currency bias in Maggiori
et al. (2020). The market factor consists of investment-grade bonds. Next to the market
factor and a credit factor for fixed income, we again use value, momentum, carry, and low
beta factors. With the exception of the market and the credit factors, we refer to factors as
long-short factors.
We analyze the heterogeneity in investment strategies in the following three steps: first,
we measure factor exposures and estimate the cross-sectional average and heterogeneity in
factor exposures for both equity and fixed income portfolios; second, we identify the drivers
of factor exposures; and third, we measure the differences in the implied beliefs on factor
returns. Along these lines we report the following key results.
First, we show that the average pension fund has a stock market beta lower than one and
a fixed income market beta larger than one. Further, for both equities and fixed income the
average pension fund has a positive exposure to low beta but a negative exposure to value
and carry. We also find substantial heterogeneity in both equity and fixed income factor
exposures across pension funds.
Second, we find that pension fund’s characteristics drive the heterogeneity in the factor
4See the infographic in the Internet Appendix (Figure 2.2).
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exposures, which follows our theoretical framework. Consistent with the predictions of our
model we find that pension funds with a low funding ratio, high risk aversion, and long
liability duration have higher exposures to the investment-grade fixed income market factor
but lower exposures to the other factors. The pension funds’ characteristics explain 50
percent of the heterogeneity in the return contribution of the fixed income market factors,
but only 20 percent in case of the long-short factors. Motivated by the academic literature,
we also study the effects of institutional factors, in particular the effects of the pension fund’s
size and type. Size as measured by AUM results in more global investment portfolios but
does not have an effect on the exposures to long-short factors. Corporate pension funds
follow market benchmarks more closely as opposed to industry-wide or professional group
pension funds. However, correcting for these institutional factors does not further reduce
the heterogeneity in average returns across pension funds.
Third, we show that the remaining differences in investment strategies can be attributed
to differences in the implied beliefs on expected returns. We infer these implied beliefs by
using our theoretical framework and show evidence in favor of this conjecture. We then
show that the pension funds reveal these differences in beliefs through their choices of asset
management firms, at least to a reasonable degree. We assess the effect of newly hired asset
management firms and find that these have a statistically and economically sizeable effect
on the factor exposures.
Fourth, we show that regulations and in particular the discount rate, affect investment
strategies. In 2007 a fixed discount rate of 4 percent was replaced by risk-free market interest
rates to determine the present discounted value of accrued benefit obligations. This change
in methodology has led pension funds to increase their exposure to the fixed income market
index and to low beta factors.
Literature review
Our study contributes to the literature on investment behavior in a regulated environment.
Rauh (2009) shows that underfunded corporate defined-benefit pension funds in the US invest
less in equities than do overfunded pension funds. The author states that the incentive of risk
management to avoid costly financial distress dominates the shifting of risk to the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) in pension fund investing. We extend this study by
showing that underfunded pension funds take less risk within an asset class. We find that
within their fixed income portfolio, underfunded pension funds invest more in investment-
grade bonds and take less credit risk. This finding confirms the risk management incentive
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from Rauh (2009). In the Netherlands, no pension guarantee system exists, but underfunded
pension funds may try to shift risks to their sponsors (see Broeders and Chen, 2012).
Employer representatives on a pension fund board may therefore push for risk reduction
to avoid this shift.
Andonov et al. (2017) and Lu et al. (2019) find that US public pension funds increase their
risk-taking in financial markets when interest rates are lower, particularly for underfunded
pension funds. This increase is a way that these public pension funds can artificially support
their funding ratio because they discount pension liabilities against the expected returns
on their assets. This incentive is created through the US GASB guidelines. We add to this
work by analysing the investment behavior in a regulatory environment in which the liability
discount rate is linked to the term structure of market interest rates. This is similar to the
regulatory environment for US and Canadian private pension funds, and some European
pension funds. Our results are therefore more in line with the investment behavior of German
insurance companies that demand more as opposed to less safe long-term bonds when interest
rates are low (Domanski et al., 2017).
Greenwood and Vissing-Jorgensen (2018) show that regulatory changes in the liability
discount rate that link to market interest rates affect the yield curve due to a shock in
demand for long-term bonds from these investors. Our results also support the view that
the liability structure shapes pension funds’ investment behavior, in particular within fixed
income portfolios. Our results show that pension funds prefer safe long-term bonds as well
as securities denominated in euros. More importantly, we extend Greenwood and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2018) by showing the existence of a large heterogeneity in the demand for safe
long-term bonds whereby this demand is larger for pension funds with a low funding ratio,
high risk aversion, or long liability duration.
Our study also contributes to the broad literature that assesses the effect of institutional
investors on asset prices. For example, Coval and Stafford (2007), Gutierrez and Kelley
(2009), and Dasgupta et al. (2011) present evidence that institutional investors contribute to
mispricing. In particular, Edelen et al. (2016) find that institutional investors trade contrary
to anomalies. Our results support this finding because we find many factor exposures to
be negative on average. We conjecture that regulation with respect to the liability discount
rate is one driving force behind the preference for assets in the short leg of the anomaly. For
instance, the exposure to the fixed income value and carry factors decreased substantially
when the fixed liability discount rate was replaced by risk-free market interest rates in 2007.
Dutch and German government bonds resemble the risk-free term structure of interest rates
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better as opposed to Italian and Spanish bonds. Yet, at the same time the former have lower
value and carry ranks. These two forces may contribute to a negative exposure to the value
and carry factors.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides a model to
derive the optimal portfolio weights and factor exposures. A description of the data is given
in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4, we estimate the factor exposures and we analyse their drivers
in Section 2.5. In Section 2.6 we identify the pension funds’ implied beliefs on factor returns.
We show how factor exposures changed when the fixed liability discount rate was replaced
by market interest rates in Section 2.7. Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Motivating model
In this section, we present a model to derive the factor exposures within asset classes
and to explain the heterogeneity across pension funds. Our theoretical framework considers
the derivation of factor exposures from the perspective of a pension fund.5 First, we identify
the optimal portfolio weights for a mean-variance investor who optimizes their surplus, that
is, the value of assets minus that of the liabilities, subject to borrowing and short-sale
constraints. Starting with portfolio weights allows us to closely map the model to the existing
mean-variance portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952) and to include borrowing and short-sale
constraints that are typically applicable to pension funds. Second, we show the implication
of the portfolio weights for factor exposures.
We start with the liability structure. A pension fund i pays benefits Bi,t+h to its
participants in period t + h. These benefits can in practice take any value, but because
we only consider defined-benefit pension funds, we assume that benefits are known at time t.
This assumption is known as the accumulated benefit obligation (ABO). Dutch pension funds
do not guarantee inflation protection and we therefore refrain from indexation policies in our
analysis. We also assume that the pension fund has a large enough number of participants
such that idiosyncratic longevity risk is fully diversified. The present discounted value of all









5This framework distinguishes itself from the literature that considers the perspective of an individual
life-cycle investor as in, for example, Bodie et al. (1992).
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in which rht is the regulatory discount rate as observed at time t for time-to-maturity
h.6 Regulatory discount rates vary widely across jurisdictions. For instance, under the
US Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) guidelines, public pension funds
are partially free to discount their liabilities at the expected rate of return on the assets
(Andonov et al., 2017).7 By contrast, US corporate pension funds use the yield on high-
quality corporate bonds. In our case, pension funds in the Netherlands used a fixed discount
rate of 4 percent until 2007. However, the regulations introduced in 2007 required Dutch
pension funds to use the risk-free term structure of market interest rates based on the euro
swap curve as the discount rate. Finance theory argues that risk-free market interest rates
are indeed the applicable discount for guaranteed pension benefits to exclude arbitrage (e.g.
Brown and Wilcox, 2009; Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2009). The value of the liabilities at time












in which rLi,t+1 is the liability return that is approximated by the return on the risk-free
bonds traded in the market rbt+1 times ψi,t that represents the duration of pension liabilities
over the duration of those bonds. The value of ψi,t is typically larger than one because the
duration of pension liabilities is larger than the average duration of bonds in the market.8







in which wi,t is a vector of portfolio weights that pension fund i chooses at time t, and rt+1
is a vector of returns from t to t + 1. Following Sharpe and Tint (1990a) and Hoevenaars
et al. (2008), we assume that the pension fund has mean-variance preferences over the value
of its assets minus the value of its liabilities, or its surplus. We normalize this surplus by
6Table 2.12 of the Internet Appendix summarizes the symbols that we use in this study.
7New GASB rules distinguish between the discount rate calculations for funded and for unfunded pension
funds.
8We performed a regression of liability returns on factor exposures and found a regression coefficient of
2.2 on the investment-grade fixed income market returns (R2 = 0.76).
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w′i,tιM ≤ c, (2.5)
wi,j,t ≥ 0 ∀j, (2.6)
in which γi captures the pension fund’s i time invariant risk aversion parameter, ιM is a
vector of ones with length M , c is a constant that defines the constraint on the sum of the
weights where typically c = 1 that means the pension fund cannot invest more than its entire
wealth, and wi,j,t the weight in asset j where j = 1, ...,M . Solving (2.4) for the portfolio
weights wi,t results in (see derivation in Appendix A):
w∗i,t =
















i,j,t = 0 ∀j. (2.8)
The subjective expectations of pension fund i about the expected returns is defined by
Ei,t[rt+1]. Because second moments can be estimated more accurately than first moments
(e.g Merton, 1980), we assume that the variance and covariance of the returns are common




λi,t is the Lagrange multiplier for the restriction that w
′
i,tιM = c, and δi,t consists of the
Kuhn-Tucker multipliers for the restriction that the portfolio weights are nonnegative. If the
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The solution in (2.7) shows that the optimal portfolio weights consist of the sum of two
components: a speculative portfolio and a liability hedge portfolio. The Lagrange multiplier
(2.9) ensures that the speculative demand decreases if the hedging demand increases, and
vice versa.
Unfortunately, we do not have full access to the portfolio weights of the individual assets.
In our empirical analysis, we therefore choose an alternative approach and measure factor






In case the factors are long-short factors, it can be further decomposed to:
βk =









in which rk,L is the return on the “long leg” of the factor, and rk,S is the return on the “short
leg” of the factor. Although the pension fund may be restricted to shorting assets, it can
have a positive or a negative exposure to a long-short factor. A positive exposure results
from a higher demand for the long leg compared to that for the short leg of the factor, and
vice versa. To illustrate this point, assume we have a portfolio consisting of value stocks and
growth stocks. The portfolio return equals:
rP = wV r
V + wGr
G, (2.12)
in which wV is the portfolio weight of value stocks and r
V is the corresponding return, and wG
is the portfolio weight of growth stocks and rG is the corresponding return. In this example,
let us assume that the portfolio weight of value stocks exceeds the weight of growth stocks,
so that wV > wG. We now explore the exposure of this portfolio return to the long-short
factor return. The return correlation between the value and growth stocks is less than one,
that is, ρV,G < 1. For a beta neutral factor, we also know that the volatility of the value
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stock is approximately equal to that of the growth stocks, that is, σV ≈ σG. This condition
results in the following factor exposure:
βV−G =
Cov(rP , rV − rG)
Var(rV − rG)
=
(wV − wG)σ2V (1− ρV,G)
Var(rV − rG)
> 0 (2.13)
In other words, a higher portfolio weight for value stocks compared to growth stocks results
in a positive factor exposure to value, and vice versa.
2.2.1 Testable implications
This subsection describes the testable implications that follow from our theoretical framework.
To formulate the predictions, we first summarize the data that we use to empirically test
the model implications.
In our empirical analysis, we use an investment-grade fixed income market index to
represent the return on the set of bonds rbt+1.
9 Further, we use the following factors for fixed
income: credit, value, momentum, carry, and low beta. For equities we use a global market,
European market, value, momentum, carry, and low beta factor.
Pension funds report their funding ratio and liability duration. We cannot observe the
risk aversion parameter directly, but we conjecture that it will be inversely related to the,
so-called “required funding ratio”. This required funding ratio is prescribed by law and
is comparable to the solvency requirements for banks and insurance companies. If a bank
or an insurance company takes more risk, then it will have a higher capital requirement.
Similarly, pension funds that have a large mismatch between assets and liabilities have a
higher required funding ratio. This higher ratio shows a willingness to accept more risk
(Broeders et al., 2020). Thus, we propose the following testable hypotheses:
1. Funding ratio
A low funding ratio increases demand for the investment-grade fixed income market
factor and decreases the overall demand for other factors, and vice versa.
2. Risk aversion
Pension funds with a low risk aversion have larger exposures to factors other than the
investment-grade fixed income market factor, and vice versa. We approximate risk
aversion through the inverse of the required funding ratio.




Pension funds with a long liability duration have a high exposure to the investment-
grade fixed income market factor, but lower overall exposure to the other factors, and
vice versa.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Pension fund returns
For the core of our analysis, we use proprietary quarterly return data on Dutch occupational
pension funds from 1999Q1 through 2017Q4. The prudential supervisor in the Netherlands
collects these data for regulatory purposes. Pension funds report the return on investments
as the time-weighted return that takes into account the buying and selling in the asset class
during the quarter. As of 2010, pension funds used standardized principles to compute the
returns in accordance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS). Pension
funds separately report the overall portfolio return as well as the returns from the equity and
the fixed income portfolios. Total returns are in euros net of transaction costs. The returns
of the equity and fixed income portfolios exclude the returns from derivative positions. The
sample contains 572 distinct pension funds. We correct for pension funds that report the
same returns during consecutive periods. Because these are clearly reporting errors, we
replace the unvaried returns with missing values.
We distinguish between three different types of pension funds: corporate pension funds,
industry-wide pension funds, and professional-group pension funds. Corporate pension funds
execute a pension scheme for a particular company. Industry-wide pension funds organize
pensions for a specific industry or sector; for example, for civil servants or for the care
and welfare sector. These pension funds are typically mandatory, so the collective labor
agreement in this sector prescribes that employers must join this pension fund. Professional-
group pension funds provide pensions for a specific profession, such as veterinarians or
pharmacists. Although corporate and professional-group pension funds are not mandatory,
for historical reasons most employers offer a pension scheme to their employees. The fraction
of the labor force that participates in a pension scheme exceeds 90 percent. The number
of corporate pension funds in the sample is 474, the total number of industry-wide pension
funds equals 88, and the number of professional-group pension funds is 10.
Table 4.1 shows the time series of total AUM for all Dutch pension funds. The AUM
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grew by a factor of 2.6 over the sample period. The AUM increases each year with the
exceptions of a significant drop during the downturn in the stock market following the burst
of the Dot-com bubble in 2002 and following the 2008 financial crisis. A continuous and
significant drop in the total number of pension funds occurs during the sample period. In
2000, the total number of pension funds was 676; it lowered to a total of 200 in 2017. This
drop is in particular due to a large decrease in the number of small corporate pension funds.
Because pension funds cannot go bankrupt, our data does not suffer from a survivorship
bias. Instead, for cost-efficiency reasons, small pension funds may decide to discontinue
their operations and transfer assets and liabilities to an industry-wide pension fund or an
insurance company. Not all pension funds fully report returns each year. The table also
shows the AUM of pension funds that fully report returns and are therefore in our sample.
These pension funds represent on average 93 percent of the AUM of all Dutch pension funds.
Panel A of Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics for pension funds’ equity and fixed
income returns and allocations. We measure excess returns against the 3-month Euribor
rate that we get from the website of the Dutch Central Bank. The equally weighted average
excess return on equities across pension funds and time equals 4.38 percent per year with
a standard deviation of 21.28 percent.10 The negative skewness indicates the equity return
series has relatively strong negative values. The mean excess return on fixed income is 3.89
percent per year with a standard deviation of 10.04 percent. The high kurtosis demonstrates
fat tails and that is, as we show later, due to the large cross-sectional variation in interest
rate hedges. In our analysis, we use equally weighted returns. However, the fact that the
Dutch occupational pension fund sector has a few very large industry-wide pension funds is
well known. Therefore, for comparison reasons, Table 2.2 also presents the value-weighted
statistics for returns. The value-weighted mean excess return for equities equals 4.80 and for
fixed income it equals 3.73 percent.
Table 2.2 also presents the strategic allocations to equity and fixed income, the duration
of the fixed income portfolio, the funding ratio, the required funding ratio, the liability
duration, and the fraction of active participants to total participants (active participants
plus retirees). Pension funds invest on average 31 percent in equities and 59 percent in fixed
income. The average duration of the fixed income portfolio equals 8.2 years with a substantial
standard deviation of 8.7 years that indicates the pension funds vary in the extent to which
they hedge interest rate risk with bonds. The funding ratio on average equals 116 percent,





Table 2.1. Total assets under management and number of pension funds: This
table shows the total asssets under management (AUM) in billion euros and the number of
pension funds (N). The left hand columns present all pension funds in the Netherlands and
the right hand columns all the pension funds that fully report returns and that are used in
our analysis. AUM and N are at the end of each year.
All Full reporting
year AUM N AUM N
1999 463.70 663 418.43 315
2000 480.78 676 453.09 408
2001 471.00 656 445.33 429
2002 429.51 658 405.67 447
2003 489.60 642 463.88 439
2004 529.93 605 510.39 450
2005 610.52 575 576.14 365
2006 657.57 524 604.64 390
2007 683.53 442 665.62 403
2008 576.32 413 557.21 376
2009 663.59 376 632.49 336
2010 746.28 350 729.31 328
2011 802.33 329 784.80 298
2012 897.09 260 753.51 287
2013 937.12 258 845.62 245
2014 1,131.74 247 984.73 228
2015 1,146.66 227 1,005.96 195
2016 1,262.54 216 1,122.37 190
2017 1,224.07 200 1,163.47 175
and the required funding ratio equals 115 percent. The liability duration on average equals
18.6 years, and the fraction of active participants equals 64 percent. The latter indicates
that about a third of the participants is in the retirement phase.
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Table 2.2. Summary statistics: Panel A reports the summary statistics for pension fund
returns, both equally and value weighted. The mean returns and standard deviations of
returns are measured across time and pension funds for 1999Q1-2017Q4. We also report the
means and standard deviations for equity and fixed income allocations (percent), duration
(years), funding ratio (fraction, as of 2007), required funding ratio (fraction, as of 2009),
liability duration (years, as of 2007) and the ratio of actives to total participants (percent)
that are computed from the quarterly reports. Panel B gives the summary statistics for the
factor returns. The returns are annualized and in euros.
Panel A: Pension fund returns and characteristics
Equally weighted mean stdev skewness kurtosis
Excess return equity 4.38 21.28 −0.53 3.51
Excess return fixed income 3.89 10.04 0.37 5.18
Value weighted
Excess return equity 4.80 18.97 −0.45 3.85
Excess return fixed income 3.73 6.91 0.44 5.48
Characteristics
Equity allocation 31.00 9.14
Fixed income allocation 58.76 11.78
Duration fixed income portfolio 8.20 8.71
Funding ratio 1.16 0.16
Required funding ratio 1.15 0.13
Liability duration 18.63 5.53
Fraction of active participants 64.25 24.89
Panel B: Factor returns
mean stdev skewness kurtosis
Euribor 3-month rate 1.94 0.83 0.22 1.76
Excess MSCI World Total Return Index 4.99 17.25 −0.70 3.83
Excess Euro Stoxx 50 Total Return Index 4.07 21.37 −0.32 4.11
Global value stock 4.00 15.81 0.57 11.51
Global momentum stock 5.20 16.88 0.26 6.44
Global carry stock 6.49 6.75 0.17 3.71
Global low beta stock 11.03 11.93 −0.10 6.81
Excess Bloomberg Barclays EuroAgg FI Index 2.55 3.66 −0.39 2.76
Excess Bloomberg Barclays EuroAgg High Yield Index 6.38 14.89 0.42 8.12
Europe value FI 1.17 5.56 −0.27 5.68
Europe momentum FI 1.24 4.54 −0.57 7.89
Europe carry FI 1.84 4.52 0.48 6.46




In this subsection, we turn to the factors that explain the cross-section of returns. To
distinguish between market factors and the other factors, we refer to the latter as long-short
factors. Although controversy exists regarding whether long-short factor returns are rewards
for risk or the result of mispricing, we do not take a stance on the underlying driver of these
factor returns. We simply interpret these factors as diversified passive benchmark returns
that capture patterns in average returns during the sample period we consider.
For the long-short factors we use the four factors that studies have shown to perform
robustly across several asset classes and markets: value, momentum, carry, and low beta.
The value factor for equities is a strategy that goes long in value stocks and short in growth
stocks. As fixed income generally does not have measures of book value, value bonds are
defined as bonds with high positive changes in the 5-year yield or high values for the negative
5-year past returns. Long-term past return measures for value come from de Bondt and
Thaler (1985).11 Momentum is defined in exactly the same way for equities and bonds: the
past 12-month cumulative return that excludes the most recent month’s return (see, e.g.
Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). Carry is defined as an asset’s future return that assumes the
price remains the same. Equity carry is approximately equal to the expected dividend yield
minus the risk-free rate. Bond carry is the return that is earned if the yield curve stays the
same over the next time period. Low beta is also similarly defined for stocks and bonds: low
exposure to the corresponding market index.
Equity factors
We use the excess market return, value return, momentum return, carry return, and low
beta return as factors that explain the pension funds’ equity returns. Dutch pension funds
have European as well as global equity holdings. The fraction of the equity portfolio they
on average allocate to the euro area is 23 percent over the 2007-2017 period; and although
we do not have data on the exposure to the euro area prior to 2007, we expect this fraction
to be higher.12 For instance, Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) show that the fraction of
mutual funds that invests internationally has significantly increased over the last decade.
11For an extended discussion, see Asness et al. (2013).
12Data on investments in the euro and non-euro areas are published on the website of DNB: https:
//statistiek.dnb.nl/en/downloads.
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We therefore include both global and European indices to define the market returns and to
account for the currency bias (Maggiori et al., 2020). For the global market factor, we use
the quarterly MSCI World Total Return Index in euros; for the European market factor, we
use the Euro Stoxx 50 Total Return Index from Bloomberg in euros.13
Given that the majority of equity holdings are global, we use global value factors, global
momentum factors, global carry factors, and global low beta factors to analyse the equity
returns. We take the returns on the value, momentum, and low beta equity factors from the
AQR website. The returns on the carry factor are from Ralph Koijen’s website. Following
the usual factor definitions, the global value and momentum factors are zero-cost, long-short
portfolios in individual stocks in the US, the UK, continental Europe, and Japan (Asness
et al., 2013). The data for carry and low beta include individual stocks from the following
five regions: North America, the UK, continental Europe, Asia, and Australia.
The value, momentum, carry, and low beta returns are all monthly. To match with the
pension funds’ return cycle, we convert the monthly returns to quarterly returns by means
of compounding. We assume pension funds fully hedge currency exposures and convert all
dollar returns into euros.14 The factor returns in euros are the dollar factor returns times the
gross return on the exchange rate (Koijen et al., 2018) in which the exchange rate measures
the number of euros per dollar. For the summary statistics, we furthermore convert quarterly
returns into annual ones.
Panel B of Table 2.2 contains the summary statistics for the factor returns. Within
equities, the low beta factor has the highest annualized return (11.03 percent), while value
has the lowest (4.00 percent). Next to the market factors, momentum is the most volatile
long-short factor over the sample period.
Fixed income factors
Compared to equities, Dutch pension funds invest substantially less globally within their
fixed income portfolios. Measured over the period from 2007 through 2017, they invested
13The Euro Stoxx 50 Total Return Index represents the 50 largest and most liquid stocks in the euro area.
It comprises Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain. The MCSI World index includes the stocks in the Euro Stoxx 50 index.
14The AQR factors are not currency hedged, while the carry factor is fully hedged. Given that currency
only explains a minor part of the returns for equities, our results do not materially change if we assume that
the currency exposure is not hedged.
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on average 87 percent of the fixed income portfolio in the euro area.15 Again, we expect
this fraction to be even larger prior to 2007. A currency bias for euro fixed income is logical
because pension funds’ liabilities are also denominated in euros, and fixed income is mainly
used to hedge liabilities. We therefore use European factors for fixed income, as opposed to
global factors for equities. Because bond returns are largely explained by duration and credit
risk, we use the Bloomberg Barclays Euro Aggregate Bond Index and the Bloomberg Barclays
Euro High Yield Index in euros as the market and credit factors respectively.16 Table 2.2
shows that both the equally and value-weighted excess fixed income returns of pension funds
are above the excess return of the investment-grade fixed income index. Pension funds have
an incentive to invest in bonds with a high duration to match the high duration of their
liabilities. The average duration of the fixed income portfolio equals 8.2 (Table 2.2). As
such, benchmark durations are typically lower than the portfolio duration of pension funds.
An upward-sloping term structure of interest rates therefore (in part) explains the higher
pension fund returns.
As opposed to global, European fixed income long-short factors are not available, so we
construct the value, momentum, carry, and low beta factors following the methods of Asness
et al. (2013), Koijen et al. (2018), and Frazzini and Pedersen (2014). As the purpose of this
study is to gain an insight into the factor exposures of institutional investors rather than the
construction of factor returns themselves, we use the exact definitions of the aforementioned
authors. We include the following European countries in constructing our factors: Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the UK. All these countries have investment-grade ratings over our sample
period. In Appendix B, we describe the exact procedure for how we construct the factors.
For all three factors, we assume the investor fully hedges currency exposures against the
euro. Again, we convert monthly returns to quarterly returns by means of compounding.
In the case of fixed income, carry has the highest annualized return (1.84 percent) followed
by momentum (1.24 percent) and value (1.17). Low beta has a relative low average return
equal to 0.86 percent, which is consistent with the findings in Frazzini and Pedersen (2014)
15Data on investments in the euro and non-euro areas are published on the website of DNB: https:
//statistiek.dnb.nl/en/downloads.
16The Bloomberg Barclays Euro Aggregate Bond Index is a benchmark that measures the investment-
grade, euro-denominated fixed-rate bond market that comprises Treasuries, government-related, corporate,
and securitized fixed-rate bonds with issuers in Europe. The Bloomberg Barclays Euro High Yield Index
measures the market for non-investment grade, fixed-rate corporate bonds with issuers in Europe.
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who do not find a significant average return for the global low beta bond factor. Value has
the highest standard deviation (5.56 percent) followed by momentum (4.54), carry (4.52),
and low beta (4.41). Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of the long-short fixed income factors
over time. The correlation matrix in Table 2.14 of the Internet Appendix also confirms the
well-known stylized fact in the literature of the strikingly high negative correlation between
value and momentum for the European fixed income factors (Asness et al., 2013).
2.4 Factor exposures
In this section, we proceed with the estimation of the (unconditional) factor exposures.
We follow a three-step approach to account for measurement errors in the factor exposures.
We describe this procedure in subsection 2.4.1. In Subsection 2.4.2 we show the implications
of heterogeneity in factor exposures for heterogeneity in average performance across pension
funds. Subsection 2.4.3 performs a variance decomposition to quantify how much of the
cross-sectional differences in average returns are explained by the factors.
2.4.1 Factor exposures
We follow a three-step approach to account for measurement errors in the factor exposures.
These measurement errors stem from the infrequent observations of pension fund returns.
First, we estimate the factor exposures for equity and fixed income returns separately by
using the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) developed by Stephen Ross (Ross, 1976). We
denote equity by a = E and fixed income by a = FI and measure the factor exposures by
regressing the excess returns of pension fund i = 1, . . . , N for asset class a on the excess











i,t, for i = 1, . . . , N, (2.14)
in which rft is our proxy for the risk-free rate: the Euribor 3-month rate, f
a
t is a vector
of factor returns of length K for asset class a, and εai,t is the idiosyncratic error term with
standard deviation σai . For equities, vector f
E
t contains the following six elements: the global
excess market return, the European excess market return, the global value stock return, the
global momentum stock return, the global carry stock return, and the global low beta stock
return. For fixed income, the vector fFIt has the following six elements: the European excess
investment-grade fixed income market return, the European excess high yield fixed income
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Figure 2.1. Long-short factor returns: This figure shows the global (equity) and European
(fixed income) quarterly long-short factor returns over our sample period, 1999Q1-2017Q4.
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return, the European value fixed income return, the European momentum fixed income
return, the European carry fixed income return, and the European low beta fixed income
return. In the remainder of the study, we drop the superscript a to simplify the notations.
In Table 2.15 of the Internet Appendix, we present the results of the estimated betas using
the time-series OLS in detail.
Second, we use a random-coefficient model to estimate the priors for the factor exposures.
The estimated factor exposures that use the time-series OLS suffer from measurement error
because we only observe quarterly returns (Merton, 1980). The cross-sectional mean and
standard deviation may therefore substantially deviate from the true moments. Because the
focus is on the cross-sectional mean and standard deviation of factor exposures, we correct
for this deviation by using a prior on the mean and the variance in the factor exposures
that we derive from a random-coefficients model. Compared to a standard regression model
in which the parameters are fixed to a single value, the random-coefficients model allows
for cross-sectional variation in the parameters. We specify the random-coefficients model as
follows:
ri,t − rft = αi + β′ift + εi,t
= α + β′ft + v
′
ift + ui + εi,t, (2.15)
in which vi is a vector of length L that captures all the random-effect coefficients, and εi,t is
the idiosyncratic error term with variance σi. Furthermore, we assume that L is equal to the
number of factors K; in other words, we allow all factor exposures to vary across pension
funds. The exact procedure for estimating the random-coefficients model is in Internet
Appendix D. We use the regression coefficients of the random coefficients model as the prior
distribution in the analysis. Thus, the prior betas are defined as:
βki ∼ N(β̂k, σ̂2βk) for k = 1, . . . , K and i = 1, . . . , N, (2.16)
in which β̂k is the fixed-effect estimator, and σ̂2
βk
is the variance in the random effect from
Equation (2.15). The variances in the random effects facilitate the testing for the existence
of true heterogeneity in the factor exposures. We find significant average factor exposures
in both the equity and the fixed income portfolios. Similarly, we also find significant cross-
sectional heterogeneity in all factor exposures except for momentum in the fixed income




Third, we derive posterior factor exposures. Following Vasicek (1973), Elton et al. (2003),
and Cosemans et al. (2016), we combine the estimated factor exposures from the time-
series OLS regressions with the prior to obtain the posterior betas. These exposures are

















for k = 1, . . . , K and i = 1, . . . , N, (2.18)
in which β̂ki is the estimated exposure to factor k from the time-series OLS regressions
presented in Equation (2.14) for pension fund i, and se(βki ) is the corresponding standard
error. Equation (2.17) shows that the factor exposures of pension funds with less precise
sample estimates shrink to the prior. The distribution of posterior factor exposures shows
the heterogeneity across pension funds corrected for the measurement error. As a result, the
posterior betas are economically interpretable.
For equities, Table 2.3 shows the average exposures to the world and European market
factors as equaling 0.67 and 0.27 respectively and with standard deviations equaling 0.18
and 0.15. The sum of the market exposures equals 0.94 that indicates the pension funds, on
average, take slightly less systemic risk than the market portfolio. The standard deviations
of the posterior market exposures shrink by about one-half compared to the time series
regressions that indicates that the substantial variation in the market exposures remains
after correcting for the measurement error. The average exposures to value, momentum,
carry, and low beta equal −0.05, −0.04, −0.06, and 0.08, respectively. Average negative
momentum and value exposures for equities are consistent with recent findings for retail
investors in e.g. Luo et al. (2020). The standard deviation in factor exposures for value,
momentum, carry, and low beta are 0.07, 0.04, 0.13, and 0.08, respectively. The standard
deviation in the posterior factor exposures shrinks by two-thirds for value, five-sixths for
momentum, three-fourths for carry, and two-thirds for low beta compared to the time series
regressions. A substantial part of the cross-sectional variation in the factor exposures is thus
the result of measurement error. Yet, the heterogeneity in the factor exposures remains,
especially for value, carry, and low beta.
For fixed income, the average exposure to the investment-grade market factor equals
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1.11. A fixed income market beta larger than one is consistent with our model, because
the duration of the liabilities is much longer compared to the duration of the bond market
index. The cross-sectional standard deviation equals 0.31. The standard deviation of the
posterior market exposure shrinks by one-half compared to the time-series regressions that
indicates the substantial variation in the market exposures remains after correcting for the
measurement error. The average exposures to credit risk, value, momentum, carry, and
low beta are 0.02, −0.16, 0.07, −0.07, and 0.21, respectively. The cross-sectional standard
deviations of credit, value, carry, and low beta equal 0.06, 0.15, 0.09, and 0.18 respectively.
Again, substantial variation in factor exposures from the time series regressions is due to
measurement error, although the heterogeneity in the factor exposures remains. Because we
are not able to detect any variation in the exposure to momentum (Table 2.16), all estimates
shrink to the mean; and the standard deviations obtained from the time-series regressions
are almost all due to measurement error.
2.4.2 Heterogeneity in average excess returns
The variation in the factor exposures that we observe has consequences for the average
excess return differences across pension funds. To determine these differences, we compute
the contribution of each of the factors to the average excess returns. We use the posterior
betas obtained from Equation (2.17). The contribution of each of the factors is then
computed as:
E(rki ) = β̃ki λk for k = 1, . . . , K and i = 1, . . . , N, (2.19)
in which λk is the historical average return for factor k.






pension funds based on the total average excess returns from highest to lowest and split
them in five equally weighted groups. We then disentangle the contribution of each factor to
the average excess returns using (2.19). Table 2.4 summarizes the results for equities, fixed
income, and the total portfolio level.
For equities, we find that taking all factors together, the contribution of the factor
exposures to average excess returns varies between 2.23 and 6.40 percentage points. Pension
funds with the highest average excess returns have a return contribution of the market that
is equal to 4.60 percentage points, while this return contribution for pension funds with
the lowest average excess returns equals 4.11 percentage points. For the long-short factors,
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Table 2.3. Factor exposures: This table displays the cross-sectional means and standard
deviations of the OLS betas from Equation (2.14), the prior betas from Equation (2.15),
and the posterior betas from Equation (2.17). M,W indicates the excess global market index
for equities, M,EU indicates the excess European market index for the corresponding asset
class, HY-EU indicates the excess high yield index for fixed income, VAL, MOM, CARRY,




mean std.dev. mean std.dev. mean std.dev.
β̂M,Wi 0.656 0.297 0.649 0.184 0.668 0.179
β̂M,EUi 0.270 0.311 0.299 0.160 0.273 0.153
β̂V ALi -0.060 0.230 -0.043 0.085 -0.048 0.066
β̂MOMi -0.056 0.244 -0.041 0.048 -0.044 0.041
β̂CARRYi -0.106 0.549 -0.054 0.148 -0.057 0.126
β̂BABi 0.088 0.240 0.087 0.107 0.075 0.082
Panel B: Fixed income
OLS Prior Posterior
mean std.dev. mean std.dev. mean std.dev.
β̂M,EUi 1.139 0.564 1.126 0.485 1.107 0.306
β̂HY,EUi 0.019 0.111 0.024 0.086 0.023 0.061
β̂V ALi -0.146 0.402 -0.208 0.155 -0.158 0.147
β̂MOMi 0.024 0.623 0.071 0.000 0.070 0.007
β̂CARRYi -0.037 0.552 -0.079 0.092 -0.067 0.087
β̂BABi 0.253 0.508 0.271 0.194 0.205 0.176
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the dispersion is much larger for carry and low beta compared to the market. The average
return contribution of the carry factor equals 0.44 percentage points at the highest and
−1.25 percentage points at the lowest percentiles. For low beta, the return contribution
varies between 1.66 and −0.05.
For fixed income, taking both market and long-short factors together, the contribution
of the factor exposures vary between 1.91 and 3.95 percentage points. The variation in the
contributions of market exposures is larger than for equities and varies between 1.99 and 3.82
percentage points. The long-short factors play a subordinate role. The negative contribution
of the long-short factor exposures is due to the typically negative exposure to value and carry
factors.
We now turn to the total portfolio level. The average excess return for the total portfolio
is computed as the sum of the equity average excess return times the equity weight and the
fixed income average excess return times the fixed income weight. All factors taken together,
the contribution to the average returns differs by 2.35 percentage points. In other words,
pension funds with the highest factor exposures versus pension funds with the lowest factor
exposures have a 2.35 percentage point higher average return on the entire portfolio. The
contribution of the market factor has values that vary between 2.74 and 4.04 percentage
points, and the contribution of the long-short factor exposures has values that vary between
−0.53 and 0.51 percentage points.
2.4.3 Variance decomposition
Next, we perform a variance decomposition to quantify how much of the cross-sectional
differences in average excess returns are explained by the factor exposures. We first calculate
the average excess return of each pension fund per asset class using Equation (2.17):
µ̃i = α̃i + β̃
′
iλ for i = 1, . . . , N, (2.20)
in which λ is a vector of historical average factor returns.
Second, we take the cross-sectional covariance of each side with µ̃ that is the vector of
average excess returns with a length that is equal to N . Because Cov(µ̃, µ̃) = Var(µ̃), we














Table 2.4. Heterogeneity of average excess returns: This table shows the distribution
of the average excess return contributions of the market factors, long-short factors, and all
factors, to the total equity returns (Panel A), fixed income returns (Panel B), and overall
portfolio returns (Panel C). The overall portfolio contribution of the market factors (long-
short factors) (all factors) is calculated as the equity weight times the contribution of market
factors (long-short factors) (all factors) for equity, plus the fixed income weight times the
contribution of the market factor (long-short factors) (all factors) for fixed income. We
report the averages within the 0-20th, 20-40th, 40-60th, 60-80th, and 80-100th percentiles.
The last column shows the difference between the 100th-80th and the 0-20th percentile. All
values are percentage points and annualized.
Panel A: Equity
0-20th 20-40th 40-60th 60-80th 80-100th diff
All factors 2.23 3.92 4.66 5.26 6.40 4.17
Global market 3.15 3.49 3.31 3.38 3.32 0.17
EU market 0.96 0.96 1.20 1.17 1.28 0.32
Value -0.31 -0.23 -0.16 -0.15 -0.10 0.21
Momentum -0.28 -0.23 -0.22 -0.20 -0.20 0.07
Carry -1.25 -0.61 -0.33 -0.08 0.44 1.69
Low beta -0.05 0.55 0.87 1.14 1.66 1.71
Panel B: Fixed income
0-20th 20-40th 40-60th 60-80th 80-100th diff
All factors 1.91 2.61 2.93 3.29 3.95 2.04
Market 1.99 2.53 2.76 3.10 3.82 1.83
High yield 0.07 0.11 0.19 0.23 0.14 0.07
Value -0.18 -0.12 -0.17 -0.22 -0.24 -0.06
Momentum 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.00
Carry -0.17 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 -0.09 0.08
Low beta 0.12 0.11 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.13
Panel C: Overall portfolio
0-20th 20-40th 40-60th 60-80th 80-100th diff
All factors 2.21 3.02 3.51 3.93 4.56 2.35
Market factors 2.74 3.24 3.46 3.78 4.04 1.31
Long-short factors -0.53 -0.21 0.05 0.15 0.51 1.04
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in which µ̃ and β̃k
′
λk are both vectors of length N .
Table 2.5 shows the results for both equity and fixed income returns. The exposures
to the global and European market returns explain 14.05 and 5.41 percent of the variation
in average equity excess returns, respectively. For the long-short factors, the ones with the
most explanatory power are carry and low beta, and they respectively explain 40.15 and
41.22 percent of the variation in average excess returns. Value explains 3.67 of the variation
in average excess returns and momentum 2.58 percent. This finding is consistent with the
highest return contribution heterogeneity found for the carry and low beta factors. Alpha
has negative explanatory power for average excess returns, which means that the pension
funds with a high alpha have slightly lower average excess returns.
For fixed income, the European investment-grade market return explains 71.32 percent of
the variation in average excess returns, and the high yield return explains 2.79 percent. Low
beta, value, and carry explain 4.83, 1.53, and 6.48 of the variation in average excess returns.
Consistent with the absence of true heterogeneity across momentum exposures, momentum
has negligible explanation power. Alpha has positive explanatory power for average excess
returns equal to 13.28 percent.
Table 2.5. Variance decomposition: This table shows how much of the variance in
estimated average excess returns µ̃ is explained by the alpha and the factor exposures for
equities and fixed income presented in Equation (2.21). We calculate the average return per
asset class of each pension fund using µ̃i = α̃i + β̃
′
iλ in which λ is the average factor return.
All values are percentages.
Variance contribution
Equity Fixed income
α −7.08 α 13.28
Global market 14.05 Market 71.32
EU market 5.41 High yield 2.79
Value 3.67 Value 1.53
Momentum 2.58 Momentum −0.22
Carry 40.15 Carry 6.48
Low beta 41.22 Low beta 4.83
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2.5 Drivers of factor exposures
The previous section shows that there is substantial heterogeneity in the factor exposures
across pension funds. In this section, we analyse the drivers behind these factor exposures.
We have two groups of drivers. The first group are the pension funds’ characteristics from
our theoretical framework in Section 2.2. This group includes the funding ratio, risk aversion,
and liability duration.17 The second group consists of institutional factors, in particular the
pension fund’s size and type.
We perform a panel data regression of the funding ratio, the risk aversion, the liability





1ft × Fi,t−1 + δ′2ft × γi,t−1 + δ′3ft ×Di,t−1 + δ′4ft × AUMi,t−1
+ δ′5ft × Typei + εi,t, (2.22)
in which Fi,t−1 is the funding ratio of pension fund i at time t−1, γit−1 is the risk aversion of
pension fund i at time t− 1, Di,t−1 is the liability duration for pension fund i at time t− 1,
AUMit−1 is the AUM for pension fund i at time t− 1 for the corresponding asset class, and
Typei is the pension fund type. We demean FRit−1, γit−1, Dit−1, and AUMit−1 such that δ0
can be interpreted as the average (industry-wide) pension fund.
2.5.1 Pension funds’ characteristics
Funding ratio
Our theoretical framework predicts that pension funds with a low funding ratio should
have a high exposure to the fixed income market factor, and vice versa. Moreover, the lower
the funding ratio, the less room for the speculative portfolio if the borrowing constraint is
binding. Hence, we predict that on average, lower exposures will exist to factors other than
the fixed income market factor for pension funds with low funding ratios, and vice versa.
For equities, we find that pension funds with a high funding ratio do not have different
equity factor exposures (Table 2.6). For fixed income, we find that pension funds with a
high funding ratio have less exposure to the market factor and more exposure to the credit
17In this study, we focus on factor exposures. In the Internet Appendix we show that the predictions from
our theoretical framework also empirically hold for the allocation to equity and fixed income (Table 2.17).
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and carry factor. A one standard deviation increase in the funding ratio (0.16) decreases
the exposure to the market factor by 0.18 and increases the exposure to the credit factor by
0.02 and the carry factor by 0.07. Overall, these findings are consistent with our theoretical
framework: pension funds with a low funding ratio invest more in investment-grade fixed
income securities that correlate positively with their liabilities, while they have a lower
aggregate exposure to the other factors.
Andonov et al. (2017) find the opposite result for US public pension funds. This difference
is driven by regulation: The discount rate of US public pension links to the expected returns
on assets, while Dutch pension funds have to use a discount rate that links to market interest
rates. The incentive to invest in risky assets to artificially improve the funding status of US
public pension funds therefore does not apply to Dutch pension funds. A discount rate based
on market interest rates is widely used and is the standard for US private pension funds,
Canadian, and other European pension funds.
Risk aversion
We use the inverse of the required funding ratio as an implicit measure of the risk aversion
in which γ ∝ 1/RFR, as described in Section 2.2. Our theoretical framework predicts that
pension funds with a higher risk aversion coefficient should have a higher exposure to the fixed
income market factor and lower exposure to the other factors. For equities, an increase of one
standard deviation in the proxy for risk aversion (0.04) slightly decreases the exposure to the
global market factor by 0.01. For fixed income, a higher risk aversion coefficient increases
the exposure to the market factor substantially and the exposure to momentum slightly.
An increase of one standard deviation in the implicit risk aversion coefficient increases the
exposure to the market factor by 0.39 and to momentum by 0.04. On the other hand, a higher
implicit risk aversion coefficient decreases the exposure to the credit factor, value, carry, and
low beta. An increase of one standard deviation in the implicit measure of the risk aversion
coefficient decreases the exposure to the credit factor by 0.03, value by 0.04, carry by 0.15,
and low beta by 0.07. Overall, these findings are consistent with our theoretical framework:
pension funds with a higher risk aversion coefficient have a higher exposure to safe assets
and less exposure to assets that are uncorrelated with their liabilities.18
18The relation between the required funding ratio and asset allocation decisions is mechanical: a higher
allocation to equities increases the required funding ratio. However, within asset classes there is no such
relation. Pension funds that for instance invest more in risky equities (i.e., high beta stocks) do not experience
a higher required funding ratio.
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Liability duration
Our theoretical framework predicts that pension funds with a long liability duration
should have a higher exposure to the fixed income market factor and lower exposures to the
other factors, and vice versa. For equities, pension funds with a long liability duration have a
higher exposure to the global market index that is approximately offset by a lower exposure
to the European market index. Moreover, a one standard deviation increase in the liability
duration decreases the exposure to low beta by 0.02. For fixed income, pension funds with a
long liability duration have a larger exposure to the market factor and a lower exposure to
the credit factor. An increase of one standard deviation in the liability duration increases the
exposure to the market factor by 0.40 and decreases the exposure to credit by 0.03. Pension
funds with a long liability duration also have lower exposure to value and carry. An increase
of one standard deviation in the liability duration decreases the exposure to value and carry
by 0.05 and 0.14. Again, these findings are consistent with our theoretical framework. We
find similar results when using the ratio of active participants relative to the retirees as a
proxy for the liability duration (Table 2.18 in the Internet Appendix).
2.5.2 Institutional factors
Size
Size might affect market and long-short factor exposures for two competing reasons. First,
large pension funds generally have economies of scale and therefore can bring more expertise
to their investment process. As a result, we predict that large pension funds will invest in
a more globally and sophisticated manner. Second, due to the price effect of large trades –
see, for example, Easley and O’Hara (1987) – pension funds with a substantial AUM in a
specific asset class are constrained and might choose to implement factor investing on a low
scale relative to pension funds with a lower AUM. The results are in Table 2.7. For equities,
size has a positive and significant effect on the exposure to the excess global market return,
and a negative and significant effect on the exposure to the excess European market return.
A pension fund that is 10 times larger has a 0.06 higher exposure to the global market and a
0.05 lower exposure to the European market. This finding confirms earlier conjectures that
large pension funds have the means to diversify their equity investments more globally than
small pension funds. Size does not affect the other factor exposures. These results thus do
not confirm the conjecture that large pension funds might be constrained in implementing
factor strategies.
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Table 2.6. Effect of pension fund’s characteristics on factor exposures: This table
shows the coefficient estimates of Equation (2.22): We regress the pension funds’ excess
returns on the factor returns and the factor returns interacted with the funding ratio, the risk
aversion coefficient that we represent with the inverse of the required funding ratio, and the
liability duration during the period from 2009Q1-2017Q4. We control in both specifications
for the model parameters included in Table 2.7. Standard errors are in parentheses and
clustered at the pension fund level; ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Panel A: Equity
average funding ratio risk aversion liability duration
βM,W 0.646*** -0.0012 -0.302* 0.0042***
[0.0144] [0.0538] [0.1757] [0.0013]
βM,EU 0.289*** 0.0445 0.0052 -0.0032**
[0.0209] [0.0459] [0.1806] [0.0013]
βV AL 0.041 -0.107 0.2520 0.0017
[0.0299] [0.0977] [0.3615] [0.0025]
βMOM -0.0668*** -0.0363 0.1300 -0.0012
[0.0231] [0.0645] [0.2218] [0.0015]
βCARRY 0.0193 0.0836 -0.3960 0.001
[0.0219] [0.1253] [0.3019] [0.0020]
βBAB 0.132*** 0.0451 0.0068 -0.0041**
[0.0203] [0.0603] [0.2308] [0.0018]
obs. 8,774 adj. R-sq. 0.863
Panel B: Fixed income
average funding ratio risk aversion liability duration
βM,EU 2.193*** -1.123*** 9.755*** 0.0736***
[0.1579] [0.2414] [1.4087] [0.0161]
βHY,EU -0.0272* 0.107*** -0.749*** -0.0058***
[0.0157] [0.0345] [0.1570] [0.0013]
βV AL -0.121*** -0.0036 -0.965* -0.0084*
[0.0464] [0.0919] [0.5134] [0.0048]
βMOM 0.0636* -0.0685 1.016*** -0.0002
[0.0338] [0.0617] [0.3225] [0.0031]
βCARRY -0.667*** 0.4270** -3.732*** -0.0255**
[0.1024] [0.1767] [0.9643] [0.0108]
βBAB -0.170** 0.1680 -1.699** -0.0129
[0.0763] [0.1306] [0.7453] [0.0084]
obs. 8,856 adj. R-sq. 0.574
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Pension fund type
Differences in the organizational structure across pension funds might also affect factor
exposures. One important difference is that listed companies have to report on the status
of their pension funds in their own financial disclosures. Also the risk of the pension fund
may be reflected in the risk profile of the company (Jin et al., 2006). This is not the case
for the sponsors of an industry-wide pension fund or a professional-group pension fund.
Corporate pension funds may therefore be less willing to take risk or to deviate from market
benchmarks. In Table 2.7 we use industry-wide pension funds as a reference group. We
observe that the only notable difference between corporate pension funds and industry-wide
pension funds is that they have a higher exposure to the global market equity index. This
is consistent with corporate pension funds following benchmarks more closely as opposed to
the industry-wide pension funds.
2.6 Heterogeneity in beliefs
So far, we have seen that pension fund’s characteristics and institutional factors drive
factor exposures. In this section, we first show that these do not fully explain investment
strategies and that there still remains significant heterogeneity in the factor exposures. We
then explain the remaining heterogeneity from implied beliefs in the factor returns. We also
show that these beliefs (partially) reveal themselves via the choice of the asset management
firm.
2.6.1 Remaining heterogeneity in factor exposures
Consistent with our theoretical framework, the previous section shows that part of the
heterogeneity results from differences in the pension fund characteristics. The theoretical
framework shows, and the empirical analysis confirms, that the relative weight of the liability
hedge portfolio increases if the funding ratio is low, when the risk aversion is high and when
the liability duration is long. In this section, we adjust the posterior betas for each pension
fund such that the liability hedge demand is equal across pension funds and compute the
heterogeneity in performance with the adjusted exposures.
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Table 2.7. Effect of institutional factors on factor exposures: We regress the pension
funds’ excess returns on the factor returns and the factor returns interacted with the log
AUM (size) and the pension fund type (base group: industry pension funds, other groups:
corporate and professional group pension funds) during the period from 2009Q1-2017Q4. We
control in both specifications for the model parameters included in Table 2.6. Panel A shows
the results for equities and Panel B for fixed income. Standard errors are in parentheses and
clustered at the pension fund level; ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Panel A: Equity
average size corporate professional
βM,W 0.646*** 0.0558*** 0.0590*** 0.0285
[0.0144] [0.0085] [0.0156] [0.0236]
βM,EU 0.289*** -0.0506*** -0.0301 -0.0161
[0.0209] [0.0084] [0.0210] [0.0261]
βV AL 0.041 -0.0127 -0.0098 0.0271
[0.0299] [0.0154] [0.0310] [0.0433]
βMOM -0.0668*** -0.0084 0.0199 0.0283
[0.0231] [0.0111] [0.0230] [0.0361]
βCARRY 0.0193 0.0004 -0.0196 -0.0626*
[0.0219] [0.0130] [0.0229] [0.0361]
βBAB 0.132*** -0.0057 -0.0326* 0.0052
[0.0203] [0.0110] [0.0177] [0.0324]
obs. 8,774 adj. R-sq. 0.863
Panel B: Fixed income
average size corporate professional
βM,EU 2.193*** 0.1170 -0.0422 -0.3200
[0.1579] [0.0960] [0.1828] [0.2920]
βHY,EU -0.0272* 0.0125 -0.0067 0.001
[0.0157] [0.0099] [0.0176] [0.0317]
βV AL -0.121*** -0.0366 -0.0644 0.0914
[0.0464] [0.0295] [0.0543] [0.1125]
βMOM 0.0636* -0.0162 -0.0675* -0.0019
[0.0338] [0.0194] [0.0384] [0.0724]
βCARRY -0.667*** -0.0566 0.1810 0.1180
[0.1024] [0.0635] [0.1204] [0.1955]
βBAB -0.170** 0.0138 0.1350 0.1420
[0.0763] [0.0469] [0.0894] [0.1629]
obs. 8,856 adj. R-sq. 0.574
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Formally, we adjust the posterior betas of each pension fund as follows:
β̃kadj,i = β̃
k
i − δ̂k1 × Fi − δ̂k2 × γi − δ̂k3 ×Di for k = 1, . . . , K and i = 1, . . . , N.
(2.23)
Because the time series averages Fi, γi, and Di are defined relative to the cross-sectional





0) when the funding ratio, risk aversion, or liability duration is higher than average, and vice
versa. We do the same for the institutional factors. The heterogeneity that remains is
unexplained by the pension fund characteristics or institutional drivers.
We redo the analysis from Section 2.4 (subsection 2.4.2) and Table 2.8 summarizes the
results. In Panel A, we present the unadjusted excess returns. Pension funds with the highest
factor exposures versus pension funds with the lowest factor exposures have a higher average
return by 2.35 percentage points on the entire portfolio. Of this difference, 1.30 percentage
points are driven by market factors and 1.05 by long-short factors. In Panel B, we correct
the excess returns for the pension fund characteristics. The return difference between the
top and bottom percentiles is 1.50 percentage points. The contribution of the market factors
varies from 3.22 to 3.91 percent, and the contribution of long-short factors varies between
−0.25 and 0.56 percent. A total return difference of 1.50 percentage points that cannot
be explained by the pension fund characteristics is an economically sizable effect. A lower
annual return by 1.50 percentage points decreases the expected retirement income by 32
percent over a 40-year accrual phase or increases contributions by 46 percent to get the same
income.
The heterogeneity in the average excess returns remains the same in Panel C if we also
adjust the factor exposures for institutional factors in the same way as in (2.23). Because
pension funds do not differ substantially in their aggregate equity market exposure, Panels
B and C show that the differences in the pension fund characteristics account for roughly 50
percent of the heterogeneity in the return contribution of the fixed income market factors.
The pension fund characteristics only explain 20 percent of the heterogeneity in the return
contribution of the long-short factors.
Finally, in Panel D we redo the analysis for a subsample of pension funds that are in the
sample for at least 24 quarters to further reduce the effect of the measurement error. For
this group of pension funds, we find a difference in average excess returns of 1.16 percentage
points, and this is equivalent to a difference in expected retirement income of 24 percent.
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Controversy about the performance of long-short factors exists. However, excluding long-
short factors all together, we still find an unexplained difference in the average annual returns
of roughly 70 basis points, which is equivalent to a difference in expected retirement income
of 16 percent.
2.6.2 Implied beliefs on expected factor returns
The substantial heterogeneity in the average excess returns that is left after the correction
for differences in the pension fund characteristics and institutional drivers may also indicate
that pension funds differ in their beliefs about factor returns, particularly so for equities. To
show this heterogeneity we identify the pension funds’ unconditional implied beliefs about
expected (excess) factor returns. To do so, we apply the method as described in Shumway
et al. (2011). In their work, they assume that fund managers choose portfolio weights such
that they maximize their expected returns over a benchmark while minimizing the tracking
error volatility. They find true beliefs to be:
µi ≈ γiδiΣi(wi − qi)− λ1 for i = 1, . . . , N, (2.24)
in which Σi is the variance-covariance matrix of returns that is estimated with historical
return data and is therefore similar across managers (Σi = Σ), wi are the portfolio weights,
qi are the benchmark portfolio weights, γi is the risk aversion parameter of fund manager i,
δi is the total precision of fund manager i, and λ is the Lagrange multiplier of the borrowing
constraint. The total precision parameter measures the informedness of the fund manager
about future returns and is the sum of two parts δi = τ
−1 +τ−1i , in which τ
−1 is the precision
of the prior on expected returns, and τ−1i is the precision of a signal about the expected
returns of fund manager i.
The true beliefs are an affine function of the implied beliefs in which the ith fund
manager’s implied beliefs about the expected returns, µ̂i, are derived in Shumway et al.
(2011) as follows:
µ̂i = Σi(wi − qi) for i = 1, . . . , N. (2.25)
We can apply this framework to our model in Section 2.2. Because we cannot observe all
the parameters required to identify the true beliefs, we assume reasonable parameter values
to get estimates of the implied beliefs on the expected factor returns. The results that
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Table 2.8. Remaining heterogeneity of average excess returns: This table shows
the distribution of the average excess return contributions of market factors, long-short
factors, and all factors to the overall portfolio returns for unadjusted returns (Panel A),
returns corrected for the pension fund characteristics (Panel B), and corrected for both the
pension fund characteristics and the institutional factors (Panel C). Panel D uses the same
specification as Panel C but for pension funds that are at least 24 quarters in the sample.
The overall portfolio contribution of the market factors (long-short factors) (all factors) is
calculated as the equity weight times the contribution of market factors (long-short factors)
(all factors) for equity, plus the fixed income weight times the contribution of the market
factor (long-short factors) (all factors) for fixed income. We report the averages within
the 0-20th, 20-40th, 40-60th, 60-80th, and 80-100th percentiles. The last column shows the
difference between the 80th-100th and the 0-20th percentile. All values are percentage points
and annualized.
Panel A: Unadjusted returns
0-20th 20-40th 40-60th 60-80th 80-100th diff.
All factors 2.21 3.02 3.51 3.93 4.56 2.35
Market factors 2.74 3.24 3.46 3.78 4.04 1.30
Long-short factors -0.53 -0.21 0.05 0.15 0.51 1.04
Panel B: Returns corrected for pension fund characteristics
0-20th 20-40th 40-60th 60-80th 80-100th diff.
All factors 2.97 3.36 3.65 4.05 4.47 1.50
Market factors 3.22 3.57 3.54 3.82 3.91 0.69
Long-short factors -0.25 -0.20 0.10 0.23 0.56 0.81
Panel C: Returns corrected for pension fund characteristics and institutional factors
0-20th 20-40th 40-60th 60-80th 80-100th diff.
All factors 3.15 3.58 3.86 4.30 4.65 1.50
Market factors 3.39 3.78 3.73 4.05 4.07 0.68
Long-short factors -0.24 -0.21 0.13 0.25 0.58 0.82
Panel D: Subsample of pension funds
0-20th 20-40th 40-60th 60-80th 80-100th diff.
All factors 2.95 3.42 3.55 3.85 4.11 1.16
Market factors 3.21 3.48 3.60 3.81 3.94 0.73
Long-short factors -0.26 -0.07 -0.04 0.04 0.17 0.43
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follow should therefore be interpreted as approximations of the true beliefs in which we are
particularly interested in the magnitude of differences in the expected returns across pension
funds.
As in Shumway et al. (2011), to measure implied beliefs, we refrain from private signals
and set τ−1i = 0. We also assume that pension funds have the same overall precision in the
prior equal to τ = 1. Together with the assumption of no private signals (τ−1i = 0), we
have δi = 1. A precision in the prior equal to τ = 1 means that pension funds have a prior
p(µ0) that is normally distributed with a mean µ and a variance-covariance Σ, that are, for
instance, based on historical returns:
p(µ0) ∼ N(µ,Σ). (2.26)
For the benchmark factor exposures qi, we assume an exposure of one to the global market
factor and a zero exposure for all the other factors for equities. For fixed income, we assume
an exposure of one to the investment-grade fixed income market factor and zero to all other
factors. These weights corresponds to a passive investor who follows the benchmark exactly.
Using our model in Section 2.2 in an unconditional setting and applying the above
assumptions to (2.24), we can derive the implied beliefs about the expected factor returns
for pension fund i as:
Êi[rt+1] = γiVar[rt+1](βi − qi)− γiCov[rbt+1ιN , rt+1]ψiιNF−1i for i = 1, . . . , N.
(2.27)
As opposed to Shumway et al. (2011), we do not get rid of γi when estimating the implied
beliefs as we do have information about the risk aversion coefficient of pension funds.
Additionally, compared to (2.25), we correct implied beliefs for the liability hedge demand
of pension funds.
As we are interested in the unconditional expectation of returns, we take the average
funding ratio over the sample period as the estimate for Fi. We apply the same method
for the liability duration and divide it by the typical duration of the fixed income market
index of seven years to compute ψi. We represent γi with γi ≈ 6 × 1RFRi in which RFRi
indicates the average required funding ratio for pension fund i. As the average required
funding ratio equals 1.15, γi = 6 × 11.15 = 5 means that there is a risk aversion parameter
of five for the average pension fund. Because we are particularly interested in the cross-
sectional heterogeneity in implied beliefs across pension funds, the precise magnitude of the
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average risk aversion coefficient is of less importance.
Table 2.9 shows the results for the annualized implied beliefs (2.27) on the expected factor
returns and conditional on all pension funds having the same informedness. For equities, a
median pension fund has positive implied beliefs about the European market factor (1.10
percentage points), while they are slightly negative for the global market factor (−0.12
percentage points). This is consistent with a home/currency bias to European countries. For
value and low beta, pension funds have positive implied beliefs, while they are negative for
momentum and carry. The median implied belief for the value factor equals 0.41 percentage
points and equals −0.40 percentage points for momentum, −0.21 for carry, and 0.39 for
low beta. This belief means that pension funds on average expect a higher return on value
and on low beta of 0.80 percentage points compared to momentum. There is substantial
heterogeneity in the implied beliefs about the expected factor returns. For instance, the
pension funds with the most pessimistic views on value expect a negative return of 0.34
percentage points on top of the benchmark return, while pension funds with the most
optimistic views expect a positive return of 1.30 percentage points.
For fixed income, the median implied beliefs on the investment-grade market factor equals
−0.03 percentage points. The heterogeneity in the implied beliefs for the market factor is
limited and indicates that when correcting for the hedging demand, pension funds disagree
far less about the expected returns on the market factor. For the credit factor, the implied
beliefs equal on average −0.19 and have substantial heterogeneity across pension funds.
They range from −1.18 to 0.49 percentage points. For the value factor, the implied beliefs
equal −0.46, 0.28 for momentum, −0.27 for carry, and 0.45 for low beta. The greatest
heterogeneity in the implied beliefs on the expected long-short factor returns exists for low
beta in which pension funds with the most pessimistic views on low beta expect a return of
zero percentage points, while pension funds with the most optimistic views expect a positive
return of 0.81 percentage points, both are on top of the benchmark return.
Other choices for the benchmark exposures qi may also come to mind, such as the average
factor exposures across pension funds. However, the different choices of the benchmark factor
exposures result in a shifted distribution to either the right or left from the one in Table 2.9
but does not affect the cross-sectional heterogeneity across pension funds.
2.6.3 The effect via the choice of asset management firms
We next address the question of whether the differences in implied beliefs are intentional
choices by the pension funds. We hypothesize that if beliefs are intentional, then they will
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Table 2.9. Implied beliefs on expected factor returns: Panel A gives the statistics
of the implied beliefs on the expected factor returns for equities, and Panel B shows the
results for fixed income. Column 1 shows the historical mean of the factor returns over our
sample period, and columns 2-6 show the implied beliefs on top of the benchmark return.
The results are derived from Equation (2.27). Panel A shows the results for equities and
Panel B for fixed income. We report the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles. All
values are percentage points and annualized.
Panel A: Equity
mean 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Benchmark return 4.99
Global market index 4.99 -1.53 -0.79 -0.12 0.12 0.71
European market index 4.07 -0.18 0.00 1.10 1.86 2.70
Value 4.00 -0.34 0.00 0.41 0.85 1.30
Momentum 5.20 -1.01 -0.70 -0.40 0.00 0.06
Carry 6.49 -0.55 -0.40 -0.21 0.00 0.00
Low beta 11.03 -0.15 0.00 0.39 0.75 1.11
Panel B: Fixed income
mean 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Benchmark return 2.55
Global market index 2.55 -0.33 -0.19 -0.03 0.02 0.17
High yield 6.38 -1.18 -0.78 -0.19 0.08 0.49
Value 1.17 -0.71 -0.59 -0.46 -0.16 0.00
Momentum 1.24 0.00 0.11 0.28 0.39 0.47
Carry 1.84 -0.41 -0.34 -0.27 -0.14 0.00
Low beta 0.86 0.00 0.11 0.45 0.66 0.81
show up in the mandates that pension funds give to external asset management firms.
Pension funds do not necessarily manage assets themselves. In fact, most Dutch pension
funds delegate the implementation of their investment strategy to for-profit asset management
firms through asset management mandates (e.g. Binsbergen et al., 2008; Blake et al., 2013).
Although the information on these mandates is scarce, pension funds do report each quarter
the name of the asset management firm that executes at least 30 percent of the total AUM on
behalf of the pension fund.19 These firm names are available for the period from 2009 through
19For confidentiality reasons, we cannot disclose the names of the asset management firms.
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2017 and facilitate the analyzation of the effect that the choice of the asset management firm
has on factor exposures. Furthermore, to extend the supervision data, we manually check
the asset management firm as reported in pension funds’ annual reports. Some pension funds
report multiple asset management firms (roughly 15 percent of the sample). Because we do
not observe in either the supervision data or the annual reports the fraction of assets managed
by each of those asset management firms, we are not able to clearly identify the changes due
to these firms. Thus, apart from the pension funds that have multiple asset management
firms, we can now identify whether pension funds switch from one asset management firm
to another and in which quarter.
We have two important reasons to look at changes in asset management firms as opposed
to those contracted by the pension fund at a specific point in time. First of all, looking
at these changes rules out the possibility that we will find effects simply because the asset
management firm correlates with unobservable time-invariant pension fund characteristics.
Second, pension funds are likely to hire a new asset management firm if they want to
implement a change in their beliefs. In the process of contracting a new asset management
firm, pension funds typically do a “search” that is supported by specialised consultants (e.g.
Del Guercio and Tkac, 2002; Goyal and Wahal, 2008). Once an asset management firm is
selected the mandate is agreed upon according to the preferences of the pension fund.
We focus on asset management firms that were newly hired by at least two pension funds
during 2009Q2-2017Q4. A new hire means that we observe a different asset management firm
from one quarter to the other. These observations result in a total of 10 asset management
firms that gained new business from 59 Dutch pension funds of the 350 pension funds that
are in our sample over the period from 2009Q2-2017Q4, which is equivalent to 17 percent of





1(ft × AM′i,t−1)ι10 + εi,t, (2.28)
in which AMi,t−1 is a vector of length 10 and equals 1 for each quarter that the corresponding
asset management firm is hired by pension fund i after 2009Q1 and zero otherwise; ι10 is a
vector of ones with length 10.
Table 2.10 shows the results for this regression and indicates that changing asset management
firms has an effect on factor exposures in a substantial amount of cases. For equities, pension
20For confidentiality reasons, we cannot disclose the names of the asset management firms.
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funds that contract asset management firms 3, 4, 5, and 6 get a significantly higher exposure
to the global market index. Therefore, it is likely that these asset management firms are
deliberately hired to implement a more global allocation to equities. Other pension funds
hire asset management firm 9 to lower their global equity allocation and to increase their
allocation of European equities. Pension funds switching to asset management firm 1 result
in higher low beta exposures. Pension funds that hire asset management firm 8 obtain
negative carry exposures, while the ones that hire asset management firms 2, 6, and 8 obtain
negative low beta exposures. The economic magnitudes of these changes are substantial. For
instance, pension funds that hire asset management firm 1 have an exposure of 0.17 to low
beta compared to an average exposure across all pension funds of 0.06. For fixed income, we
find that hiring asset management firms 5, 6, and 7 result in lower exposures to the market
index. For high yield, asset management firms 5 and 6 result in a substantially higher credit
exposure: 0.26 and 0.37 compared to the average of −0.04. Pension funds that hire asset
management firms 3, 7, or 8 have higher value exposures. Asset management firms 3, 6, and
8 result in lower carry exposures.
During the sample period, 59 pension funds switch to one of the ten asset management
firms, so we do not have a large power for statistical significance. Despite this, we still
find statistical significant, and economically sizeable, effects of asset management firms on
some of the factor exposures. We therefore argue that these findings support the idea that
factor exposures are at least to a reasonable degree driven by choices about beliefs made by
pension funds. Pension funds may change asset management firms for multiple reasons, such
as low (excess) returns delivered by the old asset management firm, a change in strategic
asset allocation, or a change in beliefs. In most cases pension funds that switch to a new
asset management firm will select one that can execute the pension funds’ investment policy.
And at least a fraction of pension funds will change asset management firms because they
have a change in beliefs. This is indeed supported by our analysis. This is furthermore
consistent with the findings in Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) who show that quantitative
performance variables have a much lower explanatory power in explaining flows for pension
fund managers as opposed to mutual fund managers. Importantly, they argue that pension
funds regularly change asset management firms because they fail to stay within the guidelines
of the investment mandate, regardless of their performance.
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Table 2.10. Effect of asset management firm changes on factor exposures: This table
shows the coefficient estimates of Equation (2.28): We regress the pension funds’ excess
returns on the factor returns and the factor returns interacted with the changes in asset
management firms (AM1-AM10) during the period from 2009Q2-2017Q4. Panel A shows
the results for equities and Panel B for fixed income. Standard errors are in parentheses and
clustered at the pension fund level; ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Panel A: Equity
average AM1 AM2 AM3 AM4 AM5
βM,W 0.711*** -0.055 -0.168 0.0890** 0.122** 0.101**
[0.0063] [0.0492] [0.1094] [0.0352] [0.0546] [0.0478]
βM,EU 0.242*** -0.0075 0.330*** -0.0367 -0.169*** -0.126***
[0.0057] [0.0377] [0.1176] [0.0321] [0.0458] [0.0436]
βV AL 0.0311** -0.0474 -0.260* -0.0095 -0.218** 0.0871
[0.0123] [0.0728] [0.1547] [0.0515] [0.0952] [0.0991]
βMOM -0.0552*** -0.0112 0.139 0.0168 -0.222*** 0.0047
[0.0076] [0.0506] [0.1320] [0.0419] [0.0708] [0.0690]
βCARRY 0.0271*** -0.0298 0.218 -0.0388 0.0092 -0.144
[0.0090] [0.0689] [0.1615] [0.0352] [0.0803] [0.1003]
βBAB 0.0551*** 0.110** -0.432*** -0.0336 0.0029 0.0687
[0.0144] [0.0550] [0.1655] [0.0330] [0.0530] [0.0965]
AM6 AM7 AM8 AM9 AM10
βM,W 0.132*** -0.0465 0.0585 -0.201*** -0.0727
[0.0427] [0.0862] [0.0415] [0.0448] [0.0772]
βM,EU -0.141*** -0.0734 -0.0098 0.196*** 0.0901
[0.0351] [0.0617] [0.0339] [0.0401] [0.0688]
βV AL -0.0247 -0.175 -0.0069 0.00053 -0.1120
[0.0659] [0.1138] [0.0623] [0.0953] [0.0995]
βMOM -0.0801* -0.101 -0.00486 -0.0185 -0.001
[0.0418] [0.0953] [0.0420] [0.0626] [0.0823]
βCARRY -0.0263 0.0037 -0.0948** 0.0208 0.126
[0.0544] [0.1218] [0.0460] [0.0698] [0.1010]
βBAB -0.0917** 0.137 -0.109** 0.0607 -0.0452
[0.0383] [0.1159] [0.0510] [0.0711] [0.1030]
obs. 9,319 adj. R-sq. 0.867
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Panel B: Fixed income
average AM1 AM2 AM3 AM4 AM5
βM,EU 2.183*** -0.21 -0.787 0.702 0.778 -0.795***
[0.0550] [0.3366] [2.2588] [0.5028] [0.7524] [0.1811]
βHY,EU -0.0444*** -0.0351 0.506 -0.124 -0.111 0.306***
[0.0064] [0.0813] [0.7004] [0.1872] [0.2772] [0.0778]
βV AL -0.175*** 0.0537 -0.764 0.273** 0.39 0.104
[0.0197] [0.1203] [1.1188] [0.1146] [0.3567] [0.0893]
βMOM 0.0285** -0.0906 -0.081 0.250* -0.0806 0.118
[0.0120] [0.0722] [0.3436] [0.1394] [0.1747] [0.1375]
βCARRY -0.486*** 0.125 0.828 -0.948*** -0.236 -0.126
[0.0374] [0.1967] [1.2438] [0.2721] [0.4979] [0.1491]
βBAB -0.0585** 0.303 0.761 -0.378* 0.644 0.117
[0.0278] [0.2233] [0.8373] [0.2253] [0.4971] [0.1055]
AM6 AM7 AM8 AM9 AM10
βM,EU -0.816** -1.055*** 0.983 1.102 1.084
[0.3786] [0.3360] [0.7955] [0.7147] [0.9558]
βHY,EU 0.416*** 0.12 -0.236 -0.197 -0.144
[0.1514] [0.0967] [0.2169] [0.2181] [0.2972]
βV AL 0.125 0.200*** 0.486** 0.203 0.00876
[0.0970] [0.0727] [0.2178] [0.2409] [0.3613]
βMOM 0.0168 -0.0704 0.0525 0.195 0.112
[0.0838] [0.0795] [0.1485] [0.1746] [0.2104]
βCARRY -0.356* 0.229 -0.870* -0.695 -0.263
[0.1984] [0.1834] [0.4476] [0.4285] [0.5508]
βBAB -0.32 -0.182 -0.453 -0.136 -0.268
[0.1958] [0.1712] [0.3198] [0.3482] [0.4591]
obs. 9,435 adj. R-sq. 0.534
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2.7 Effect of the liability discount rate on factor exposures
Pension funds operate in a highly regulated environment; therefore, we find that regulations
affect pension fund investment strategies. Halfway through our sample period, pension
funds in the Netherlands experienced an important change with the introduction of risk-
based regulation in 2007. The main elements of this framework include the marked-to-
market valuation of assets and liabilities and a risk-based minimum required funding ratio.
For pension funds, one of the key channels through which regulations affect investment
strategies is the liability discount rate (Andonov et al., 2017). Before 2007, pension funds
in the Netherlands used a fixed rate of 4 percent to discount liabilities. Under such a
discount rule, liabilities artificially contain no interest rate risk. The fixed discount rate
was replaced by the full term structure of market interest rates in 2007. Consequently, the
present value of liabilities fluctuates significantly with changes in the market interest rates.
Furthermore, before 2007 there were no risk-based minimum funding requirements. This lack
changed in 2007 and since then the risk-based funding requirement has been implemented.
This requirement is derived from a well-known value-at-risk (VaR) concept, whereby risk is
measured as the mismatch between the assets and liabilities. Pension funds’ investment
strategies affect the funding requirement. Pension funds that better match assets and
liabilities through investing more in long-term bonds, have a lower required funding ratio,
and vice versa.
To show the effect of these regulatory changes, we split the sample period in two and
identify the factor exposures prior to and after 2007. Table 2.11 shows the results. We
observe a large change in the exposure to the Euro fixed income market index. Prior to
2007, pension funds had an average exposure to the market of 1.02. After 2007 this average
exposure increased to 1.23 that reflected that they allocated more to long-term bonds. This
finding is consistent with our theoretical framework, because liability hedge demand was
nonexistent from a regulatory perspective prior to 2007 but became apparent after 2007.
We also observe a decrease in the exposure to the value and carry factors for fixed income.
Dutch and German government bonds resemble the risk-free term structure of interest rates
better as opposed to Italian and Spanish bonds. Yet, at the same time the former have lower
value and carry ranks.21 These two forces may contribute to a negative exposure to the value
and carry factors. For equities, we observe a small shift from global to European stocks.
21We obtain these ranks from the construction of the European fixed income factors.
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This way pension funds may reduce the exchange rate risk and lower the risk-based funding
requirement. Another striking consequence of the change in regulation is the increase to
the low beta factor for both equities and fixed income. Because of risk-based regulations,
pension funds may aim to decrease the downside risk of their portfolios by investing more in
low beta assets. Changes in long-short factor exposures may also result from developments
and insights in the literature on factors. We however leave those channels for future research.
2.8 Conclusion
In this study, we provide detailed insight into the investment strategies of defined-benefit
pension funds that represent a large fraction of the European market for pension funds’ assets.
We measure investment strategies through factor exposures within equity and fixed income
portfolios. Factor exposures are key to understanding the heterogeneity in the performance
and investment strategies of liability-driven investors. We analyse two groups of drivers that
influence factor exposures: pension funds’ characteristics and institutional factors. These
drivers only partially explain investment strategies across pension funds. We attribute
the remaining heterogeneity to differences in implied beliefs about factor returns. These
differences partially appear through the pension funds’ choice of asset management firms to
execute their investment policy.
Our results have important policy implications. We suggest that liability-driven investors
can use the approach in this study for strategic investment decision-making. Our approach
makes a distinction between a liability hedge demand and a speculative demand, that we
measure through factor exposures. While the liabilities of a defined benefit pension fund can
be measured objectively, a crucial part in the investment strategy is to form beliefs that drive
the speculative demand. These are subjective in nature and require careful consideration
and decision-making by a pension fund’s board of trustees. Further, liability-driven investors
should explain this strategy in a clear and transparent way to their stakeholders. This is
particularly important because beneficiaries are typically not free to choose their own pension
fund as it comes with the job. The exit costs to leave a pension fund if a beneficiary is
dissatisfied with the investment strategy are prohibitively high. Employees would need to
change jobs to change pension funds and retirees cannot change pension funds whatsoever.
Therefore an import fiduciary duty rests on liability-driven investors to invest in the best
interest of their beneficiaries.
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Table 2.11. Factor exposures before and after a change in regulations: This table
displays the cross-sectional means and standard deviations of the posterior betas from
Equation (2.17) estimated for the period prior to 2007 and the period thereafter. The last
column shows the difference between the average posterior betas in the two subsamples and
the significance of the difference is based on a t-test; ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Panel A shows the results for equities and Panel B for fixed income. M,W indicates the
excess global market index for equities, M,EU indicates the excess European market index
for the corresponding asset class, HY-EU indicates the excess high yield index for fixed
income, VAL, MOM, CARRY, and BAB indicate the value, momentum, carry, and low beta
factor for the corresponding asset class.
Panel A: Equity
full prior 2007 after 2007
mean std.dev. mean std.dev. mean std.dev. diff. after - prior
β̂M,Wi 0.668 0.179 0.676 0.208 0.645 0.207 −0.031
β̂M,EUi 0.273 0.153 0.228 0.165 0.296 0.170 0.068
∗∗∗
β̂V ALi -0.048 0.066 -0.064 0.071 -0.036 0.093 0.029
∗∗∗
β̂MOMi -0.044 0.041 -0.057 0.060 -0.041 0.056 0.016
∗∗∗
β̂CARRYi -0.057 0.126 -0.193 0.400 0.010 0.073 0.203
∗∗∗
β̂BABi 0.075 0.082 0.031 0.071 0.132 0.113 0.101
∗∗∗
Panel B: Fixed income
full prior 2007 after 2007
mean std.dev. mean std.dev. mean std.dev. diff. after - prior
β̂M,EUi 1.107 0.306 1.021 0.115 1.232 0.377 0.211
∗∗∗
β̂HY,EUi 0.023 0.061 0.017 0.008 0.023 0.096 0.006
β̂V ALi -0.158 0.147 -0.013 0.008 -0.242 0.181 -0.229
∗∗∗
β̂MOMi 0.070 0.007 -0.029 0.004 0.070 0.004 0.099
∗∗∗
β̂CARRYi -0.067 0.087 0.033 0.024 -0.060 0.128 -0.092
∗∗∗
β̂BABi 0.205 0.176 0.033 0.034 0.299 0.213 0.266
∗∗∗
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2.9 Appendix
A Model derivation

















w′i,tιM ≤ c, (A2)
wi,j,t ≥ 0 ∀j, (A3)











Li,t, and the funding ratio equals Fi,t = Ai,t/Li,t.
The Lagrange of this optimization problem equals:


















i,tιM − c) + δ′i,twi,t. (A4)
Taking the derivative with respect to wi,t and λi,t gives:
∂L(wi,t, λi,t)
∂wi,t
= Ei,t[rt+1]− γiVari,t[rt+1]wi,t + γiCovt[rbt+1ιM , rt+1]ψi,tιMF−1i,t
+ λi,tιM + δi,t = 0, (A5)
∂L(wi,t, λi,t)
∂λi,t
= w′i,tιM − c = 0. (A6)
This results in the optimal weights (2.7):
w∗i,t =





























B Fixed income factors
Fixed income returns
The universe of European government bond securities that we analyze consists of Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the UK. We use constant maturity, zero-coupon bond yields from Bloomberg
for all countries on a monthly basis from 1994 to 2017. We complement the missing data
points prior to 1998 with zero coupon bond yields from Jonathan Wright’s webpage for
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. We use the Libor counterpart in each country
as a proxy for the risk-free rate. The corresponding Bloomberg ticker numbers are listed in
Table 2.13 in the Internet Appendix E. All included countries had investment-grade credit
ratings over the entire sample period by Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor’s.
We start by deriving the bond returns. Following Koijen et al. (2018), we calculate the








in which yi,t is the T = 10-year zero-coupon bond for country i = 1, . . . , J , and r
f
it is the




(1 + yi,t+τ )T−τ
, (A8)
where we find yi,t+τ by linear interpolation. The return on a fully-collateralized, currency-
hedged, one-month futures contract equals:
rsyni,t =
((1 + rfi,t)(1 + yi,t)T










in which ei,t is the time t exchange rate in euros per unit of foreign currency i. Furthermore,
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the correction term for the exchange rate equals one for all countries in the euro area (Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain).
Factors
We construct value, momentum, carry, and low beta factors for the fixed income portfolios
which are zero-cost long-short portfolios that use all the government bonds specified before.
For any security i = 1, . . . , J at time t with signal Sit (value, momentum, carry, or low beta),
we weight securities in proportion to their cross-sectional rank based on the signal minus the




rank(Sit)/J), where S ∈ (value, momentum, carry, low beta).
(A10)
The weights across all securities sum to zero and represent a dollar-neutral long-short
portfolio. The scalar ct ensures the overall portfolio is scaled one-dollar long and one-dollar
short.
The signals are as follows. As in Asness et al. (2013), we define value as the 5-year change
in the 10-year yield (5-year 4y). For momentum, we use the standard measure, namely, the
return over the past 12 months but skip the most recent month. The signal for carry is









To construct the low beta factor, we estimate the betas as in Frazzini and Pedersen





in which σ̂i and σ̂m are the estimated volatilities for the bond and the market, and ρ̂ is
their correlation. We estimate the volatilities and correlations with 1- and 5-year windows
respectively. The market is defined as the average return of all bonds in our sample. To
reduce the effect of outliers, we follow Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) and shrink the time
series estimate of beta to one: β̃i = 0.6× β̂i + 0.4× 1.
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it , where S ∈ (value, momentum, carry). (A13)











t ), where S ∈ (low beta), (A14)


















t . The weights
wLt−1 (wHt−1) equal the absolute weights of the long portfolio (short portfolio).










Figure 2.2. Total assets in million EUR in funded and private pension plans (OECD, 2019).
D Random-Coefficients Model
We make the following assumptions when estimating the regression in Equation (2.15):
1. αi = α + ui and ui ∼ N(0, σ2α)
2. βi = β + vi and vi ∼ N(0, G), where




for j = k
σβkβj for j 6= k
(A15)
3. {εit}N,Ti,t=1 ⊥⊥ {ui}Ni=1 ⊥⊥ {vi}Ni=1.
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In almost all cases, we assume independence across the random effects of the factor
exposures, that is, σβkβj = 0, except for the two market factors for equities. Because the
Euro Stoxx 50 index is a subset of the MSCI World Index, a higher exposure to the Euro
Stoxx 50 Index directly indicates a lower exposure to the MSCI World Index, and vice
versa.22
The random-coefficients model is estimated using maximum likelihood. We show the
derivation here for equities. The procedure works in the same way for fixed income, except
that we allow for no correlations between the random coefficients.
To derive the likelihood, we start with writing Equation (2.15) in vector notation:23
rei = αιT + β
′f + v′if + ui + εi, (A16)
in which rei is the T × 1 vector of excess returns for fund i, f is the T × k matrix of factor











, and ui is the
random intercept.
The T × 1 vector of errors εi is assumed to be multivariate normal with a mean zero and
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0 0 0 σ2βK ιT ι
′
T 0
0 0 0 0 σ2ε IT

. (A17)
The error term: v1i f
1 + ...+ vKi f
K + ui + εi has a T × T variance-covariance matrix











+σ2ε IT . (A18)
22We perform a simulation test to ensure the high correlation between the MSCI World Index and the
Euro Stoxx 50 Index does not cause multicollinearity problems. We simulate returns consisting of a mix
between the MSCI World Index, the Euro Stoxx 50 Index, and an error term. We then regress the simulated
returns on the MSCI World Index and the Euro Stoxx 50 index. We find the exact coefficients with high
precision (i.e., low standard errors) that we imposed for the simulated returns.
23Here we assume all pension funds have the same T . For pension funds with different T , the T should
be replaced by Ti.
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ε |rei ) = −
1
2
{T log(2π)+log |V |+(rei−αιT−β′f)′V −1(rei−αιT−β′f)}.
(A19)
Then, the total log-likelihood equals:
L(α, β, σ2α, σ
2




ε |re) = −
1
2




(rei − αιT − β′f)′V −1(rei − αιT − β′f)}. (A20)
We now turn to a detailed description of the estimation results described in Table 2.16.
We begin by analyzing the results for equities. The exposure to the global market factor
equals 0.65, and the exposure to the European factor equals 0.30. Both are statistically
significant. The positive and significant exposure to the excess European market return
displays the existence of a currency bias; that is, Dutch pension funds on average tend to
invest more in Europe relative to the global market portfolio. Additionally, sizable cross-
sectional variation exists in pension funds’ market betas. The exposure to the global market
factor varies between 0.28 and 1.02, and the exposure to the European market factor varies
between −0.02 and 0.62. Pension funds on average have significantly negative exposures to
value (−0.04), momentum (−0.04), and carry (−0.05). Significant cross-sectional variation
exists in all three factor exposures. The highest cross-sectional standard deviation equals
0.15 for the carry factor that indicates the range of factor exposures is between −0.35 and
0.24. The exposure to value varies between −0.21 and 0.13, and between −0.14 and 0.05
for momentum. Pension funds on average have a significantly positive exposure to the low
beta factor that is equal to 0.09. Again, we find significant and substantial cross-sectional
variation in the low beta exposure that ranges from −0.13 to 0.30.
In case of fixed income, pension funds have an average (significant) exposure to the
investment-grade market factor that is equal to 1.13. The cross-sectional variation ranges
from 0.16 to 2.10. For the fixed income factors we find that pension funds, on average, have
a negative exposure to value (−0.21) and carry (−0.08), a positive exposure to momentum
(0.07), and a strong positive exposure to low beta (0.27). The exposure to value varies
between −0.52 and 0.10, between −0.27 and 0.11 for carry, and between −0.12 and 0.66
for low beta. The cross-sectional heterogeneity is significant at the 1 percent level for the
market factors, value, and low beta, and at the 5 percent level for carry. We are unable to
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statistically detect significant cross-sectional variation in momentum exposures based on the
random-coefficients model.
For equities, we also find cross-sectional variation in alphas, or the part of the return
that is not explained by the factors. The standard deviation equals 0.0028, and the alphas
vary between −0.0064 and 0.0048 on a quarterly basis. For fixed income we do not observe
statistically significant variation in the alphas. This finding indicates that pension funds
are unable to outperform each other consistently. However, even if pension funds slightly
vary in their alphas, our sample might not have enough observations to say something
statistically meaningful about the alphas. This finding is expected, because first moments




Table 2.12. Glossary of symbols: This table summarizes the main symbols in this study.
Symbol Description
A Asset value
AM Vector of asset management firms




K Total number of factors
L Present discounted value of future pension benefits
M Total number of assets
N Total number of pension funds
RFR Required funding ratio
Type Pension fund type
fat Vector of factor returns for asset class a
r Vector of asset returns
ra Pension fund return for asset class a
rb Return on the risk-free bonds traded in the market
re Pension fund excess return (relative to short-term risk-free rate)
rf Short-term risk-free rate
rh Regulatory discount rate for time-to-maturity h
rL Liability return
w Vector of portfolio weights
q Benchmark factor exposures
se(βki ) Standard error of the time-series OLS factor exposures for factor k
v Vector of random-effect coefficients
βa Vector of factor exposures for asset class a
β̂k Fixed-effect estimator for factor k (prior mean)
β̃k Posterior factor exposure for factor k
β̂ki Time-series OLS factor exposures for factor k
β̃kadj Posterior factor exposures adjusted for pension fund characteristics
γ Risk aversion coefficient
δ Kuhn-Tucker multipliers for the short-sale constraints
ι Vector of ones
λ Lagrange multiplier for the borrowing constraint
λk Historical average return for factor k
µ Expected (excess) returns
Σ Variance-covariance matrix of returns
σ̂2
βk
Variance estimator of the random effects for factor k (prior variance)
σ̃2
βk
Posterior variance for factor k
ψ Duration of the liabilities over the duration of the risk-free bonds
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Table 2.13. Bloomberg ticker list: The Bloomberg ticker numbers used to construct the
European fixed income factors described in Appendix B. The x in each ticker number should
be replaced by the corresponding maturity: x=10 years, x=09 years, and x=03 months; and
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Table 2.15. OLS factor exposures: This table displays the cross-sectional mean and
standard deviation of the estimated betas from the time-series regression presented in
Equation (2.14). The cross-sectional mean and standard deviation of the R-squared from the
time-series regressions are also provided. 10%-level and 5%-level sign. indicate the number
of pension funds for which the corresponding factor is statistically different from zero at
the 5% and 10% significance level, respectively, by using the Newey-West adjusted standard
errors. M,W indicates the excess global market index for equities, M,EU indicates the excess
European market index for the corresponding asset class, HY-EU indicates the excess high
yield index for fixed income, VAL, MOM, CARRY, and BAB indicate the value, momentum,
carry, and low beta factor for the corresponding asset class.
Equity returns
mean std.dev. 5%-level sign. 10%-level sign.
β̂M,Wi 0.656 0.297 531 537
β̂M,EUi 0.270 0.311 429 455
β̂V ALi −0.060 0.230 131 182
β̂MOMi −0.056 0.244 143 192
β̂CARRYi −0.106 0.549 139 196
β̂BABi 0.088 0.240 221 269
R2 0.928 0.092
Fixed income returns
mean std.dev. 5%-level sign. 10%-level sign.
β̂M,EUi 1.139 0.564 553 559
β̂HY,EUi 0.019 0.111 206 256
β̂V ALi −0.146 0.402 218 274
β̂MOMi 0.024 0.623 93 119
β̂CARRYi −0.037 0.552 101 132




Table 2.16. Prior factor exposures: This table shows the coefficient estimates and
corresponding standard errors for the random-coefficients model in Equation (2.15) that
is used as a prior to compute the posterior betas. The estimates α̂ and β̂k indicate the fixed
effects, and σ̂2α, and σ̂
2
k indicate the random effects of the random-coefficients model. M,W
indicates the excess global market index for equities, M,EU indicates the excess European
market index for the corresponding asset class, HY-EU indicates the excess high yield index
for fixed income, VAL, MOM, CARRY, and BAB indicate the value, momentum, carry,
and low beta factor for the corresponding asset class. Standard errors are clustered at the
pension fund level; ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗p < 0.01. The significance for each random
coefficient is determined by performing a LR-test. The LR-test compares the full random-
coefficients model with a random-coefficients model that assumes the factor exposure of
interest to be fixed.
Equity returns Fixed income returns
Coefficient std. error Coefficient std. error
α̂ −0.001∗∗ 0.0003 α̂ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0002
β̂M,W 0.649∗∗∗ 0.0096 β̂M,EU 1.126∗∗∗ 0.0226
β̂M,EU 0.299∗∗∗ 0.0083 β̂HY,EU 0.024∗∗∗ 0.0046
β̂V AL −0.043∗∗∗ 0.0051 β̂V AL −0.208∗∗∗ 0.0093
β̂MOM −0.041∗∗∗ 0.0042 β̂MOM 0.071∗∗∗ 0.0081
β̂CARRY −0.054∗∗∗ 0.0102 β̂CARRY −0.079∗∗∗ 0.0122
β̂BAB 0.087∗∗∗ 0.0063 β̂BAB 0.271∗∗∗ 0.0117
σ̂2α 0.00001
∗ 0.0000 σ̂2α 0.0000005 0.0000
σ̂2M,W 0.0338
∗∗∗ 0.0049 σ̂2M,EU 0.235
∗∗∗ 0.0904
σ̂2M,EU 0.0256
∗∗∗ 0.0043 σ̂2HY,EU 0.007
∗∗∗ 0.0012
σ̂2V AL 0.0073
∗∗∗ 0.0026 σ̂2V AL 0.024
∗∗∗ 0.0052
σ̂2MOM 0.0023
∗∗∗ 0.0011 σ̂2MOM 0.001 0.0028
σ̂2CARRY 0.0218
∗∗∗ 0.0057 σ̂2CARRY 0.009
∗∗ 0.0068
σ̂2BAB 0.0115
∗∗∗ 0.0029 σ̂2BAB 0.038
∗∗∗ 0.0204
σ̂M,WM,EU −0.0259∗∗∗ 0.0042
Wald chi2(6) 47,345 Wald chi2(6) 4,192
obs. 25,434 obs. 25,839
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Table 2.17. Effect of model parameters on the equity allocation: This table shows the
coefficient estimates of a regression of the equity allocation on pension fund characteristics
from 2009Q1-2017Q4. The equity allocation is computed as the total AUM in equities
divided by the total AUM in fixed income and equities. The pension fund characteristics
are the funding ratio, the risk aversion coefficient that we represent with the inverse of the
required funding ratio, and the liability duration. Standard errors are in parentheses and
clustered at the pension fund level; ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Equity allocation
Funding ratio 0.0756*** 0.0748*** 0.0772***
[0.0106] [0.0106] [0.0106]
Risk aversion -1.865*** -1.866*** -1.853***
[0.0401] [0.0391] [0.0397]








Constant 0.360*** 0.360*** 0.367***
[0.0013] [0.0013] [0.0030]
time FE No Yes Yes
obs. 8,648 8,648 8,648
adj. R-squared 0.246 0.275 0.277
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Table 2.18. Impact of pension fund’s characteristics on factor exposures - proxy:
We regress the pension funds’ excess returns on the factor returns and the factor returns
interacted with the funding ratio, the risk aversion coefficient that we represent with the
inverse of the required funding ratio, and the ratio of actives relative to total participants
during the period from 2009Q1-2017Q4, where the total equals the active participants and
the retirees. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the pension fund level;
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Panel A: Equity returns
average funding ratio risk aversion % active participants
βM,W 0.713*** -0.0166 -0.482*** 0.0243
[0.0061] [0.0513] [0.1683] [0.0266]
βM,EU 0.253*** 0.0518 0.208 -0.0027
[0.0063] [0.0437] [0.1644] [0.0256]
βV AL 0.0263** -0.0583 0.477 0.0616
[0.0116] [0.0929] [0.3415] [0.0482]
βMOM -0.0487*** -0.0064 0.274 0.001
[0.0080] [0.0599] [0.2059] [0.0330]
βCARRY 0.0165* 0.0794 -0.385 0.0053
[0.0091] [0.1146] [0.2909] [0.0427]
βBAB 0.0838*** 0.0275 -0.0616 -0.0744**
[0.0153] [0.0569] [0.2126] [0.0330]
obs. 8,851 adj. R-sq. 0.860
Panel B: Fixed income returns
average funding ratio risk-aversion % active participants
βM,EU 2.204*** -0.977*** 9.394*** 1.561***
[0.0505] [0.2358] [1.3144] [0.2362]
βHY,EU -0.0371*** 0.0714* -0.776*** -0.130***
[0.0065] [0.0424] [0.1504] [0.0267]
βV AL -0.157*** 0.0261 -0.682 -0.0426
[0.0187] [0.0893] [0.4933] [0.0789]
βMOM 0.015 -0.0351 1.081*** 0.0749
[0.0118] [0.0606] [0.3158] [0.0518]
βCARRY -0.557*** 0.360** -3.770*** -0.733***
[0.0341] [0.1709] [0.9128] [0.1582]
βBAB -0.0821*** 0.142 -1.964*** -0.406***
[0.0260] [0.1220] [0.7088] [0.1205]
obs. 8,954 adj. R-sq. 0.558 109
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The Liquidity Premium Across Asset Classes1
3.1 Introduction
Illiquid assets increasingly have a role in investors’ portfolios. The illiquid assets of large
US endowment funds comprised 55% of the total portfolios in 2015 (Dimmock et al., 2019).
Moreover, the seven largest pension funds in the world have increased their average allocations
of illiquid assets from 4% in 1997 to 25% in 2017 (Willis Towers Watson, 2019). One potential
reason for investing in illiquid assets is to capture liquidity premiums (OECD, 2014; Watson,
2019). In other words, investing in illiquid assets might compensate the investor for bearing
this cost. Yet, there is no consensus in the empirical literature that justifies which asset
classes should have first-order liquidity premiums. In this study, we aim to give more
guidance to its opposing findings by modeling illiquid assets and heterogeneous investor
types in four different asset classes: private equity, real estate, corporate bonds, and stocks.
Studies have either modeled illiquidity as proportional transactions costs, for example,
Constantinides (1986); Vayanos (1998), or as the inability to trade illiquid assets for random
time periods, for example, Ang et al. (2014). We combine these two dimensions of illiquidity
here for two reasons. First, several asset classes show both aspects of illiquidity simultaneously.
For instance, traders of corporate bonds face transaction costs, yet sometimes specific bonds
1This chapter is based on joint work with Bas Werker. We thank Jules van Binsbergen, Marie Brière,
Dirk Broeders, Joost Driessen, Esther Eiling, Frank de Jong, Ralph Koijen, Olivia Mitchell, Theo Nijman,
Antoon Pelsser, Patrick Tuijp, seminar participants at Tilburg University, the Wharton School, Maastricht
University, Netspar Pension Day, Ortec Finance Canada, Ortec Finance Rotterdam, Achmea Investment
Management, Robeco, and conference participants of the Market Microstructure & High Frequency Data
Stevanovich Center University of Chicago, SoFiE, and the International Pension Workshop for very useful
comments. Kristy gratefully acknowledges financial support from Instituut Gak.
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may not trade for several days. Similarly, selling real estate may take several years, and
it obviously carries transaction costs as well. Second, combining both sources of illiquidity
allows us to capture the heterogeneity across asset classes by adjusting the prominence of
both effects.
We solve for liquidity premiums in a partial equilibrium power utility framework. We
propose that the cost of illiquidity involves two aspects: suboptimal asset allocation and
suboptimal consumption. If the cost of liquidating the illiquid asset is too high and the
investor prefers not to trade the illiquid asset, or the illiquid asset cannot be traded at
all; then the illiquidity leads to suboptimal portfolio allocations. Yet, deviating from the
optimal asset allocation generally only leads to small utility costs (Constantinides, 1986).
At the same time, illiquidity may hamper the possibility of smoothing consumption after
negative wealth shocks. If the investor is unable to sell the illiquid asset or only at high costs,
they may face an even stronger negative consumption shock compared to the case where the
illiquid asset can always be traded without costs. Shocks to consumption generally carry a
high utility cost and hence illiquidity does generate first-order liquidity premiums.
Our model’s flexibility allows us to quantify the magnitude of the liquidity premium in
four markets. This flexibility is important as the effects of liquidity highly depend on the
characteristics of illiquid assets such as the frequencies of trade and potential income returns
on illiquid assets as well as the characteristics of the investor types that operate in those
markets. For each asset classes we calculate the premium different investor types are willing
to pay for the illiquid asset to become liquid. We find that this willingness-to-pay is larger
for short-term investors, investors who face substantial liquidity shocks, and investors who
desire to allocate over 60% of their wealth to illiquid assets if that same asset would otherwise
be liquid. Thus, in equilibrium, the liquidity premiums depend on the relative prevalence
of different investor types. For instance, Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Longstaff (2003),
and Chen et al. (2020) find investor heterogeneity in which short-term investors hold liquid
assets and long-term investors hold illiquid assets. The heterogeneity in investor types across
asset classes enables us to relate to the empirical evidence about liquidity premiums for each
market.
We make several contributions. Even though private equity is the most illiquid asset that
we analyze, we find an average annual liquidity premium no larger than 5-15 basis points.
Private equity investors have to lockup their money for long periods of time; and mainly for
that reason, only long-term investors are present in this market: approximately 20% is held
by endowments and 60% by pension funds (Harris et al., 2014). For these investors illiquidity
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is unlikely to substantially harm investors’ consumption patterns. Moreover, the non-trading
period is typically fixed at 10 years, so by and large investors know when the position will
be liquidated. For direct real estate, we find an average annual liquidity premium equal
to 15-35 basis points. Direct real estate can often not be traded for a substantial amount
of time, the timing of the trading opportunities are uncertain, and the transaction costs
are high. Yet, the threat of illiquidity is dampened because of the liquid return component
(rents) of real estate investments and the large share of long-term investors in this market.
We find the largest liquidity premiums for stocks and corporate bonds; the average annual
liquidity premium for corporate bonds equals 30-50 basis points. For corporate bonds, the
transaction costs are small, but uncertainty in trading opportunities and its high price of
risk amplify liquidity premiums. For stocks we find an average annual liquidity premium
equal to 20-45 basis points. Even though stocks trade very often, liquidity premiums do not
disappear: short-term investors are the largest group of investors in these markets (84%),
and they demand first-order liquidity premiums even at relatively low transaction costs.
A potential shortcoming of our approach is that we are not able to model investors’
preferences perfectly. However, we make two assumptions that are more likely to overestimate
rather than to underestimate the liquidity premium. First, we assume that the investors
cannot borrow against the illiquid assets. This caveat may be a realistic assumption for some
asset classes, but not in others. For instance, real estate investors are typically able to borrow
a substantial amount using the property as collateral. However, taking this borrowing into
account decreases liquidity premiums because the investors can partially undo the illiquidity
of the asset. Second, we allow for liquidity shocks as large as 50% of the investors’ total
wealth. Even though larger wealth shocks are in practice possible, our model shows that
investors avoid risky assets all together if faced with such shocks. As a result, large liquidity
shocks do not necessarily amplify liquidity premiums.
Our study contributes to the empirical literature on liquidity premiums. The early
empirical literature found significant effects of illiquidity on stock prices. For instance,
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) show that a 1%
higher transaction cost means a 1.5% to 2% higher expected return for stocks. Yet, some
recent studies have challenged the empirical evidence for liquidity premiums in stocks.2 For
instance, Ben-Rephael et al. (2015) show that liquidity premiums have become insignificant
2Note that we refer here to the level of the liquidity premium. There are also studies on the liquidity
risk premium, for example, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003).
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in recent decades for public US equities, except for very small stocks. Our findings show that
a 1% higher transaction cost means a 0.20-0.45% higher expected return for stocks, which is
substantially lower than the estimates from the early literature and more in favor with the
recent evidence of a small liquidity premium for stocks. First-order liquidity premiums also
exist for corporate bonds (e.g. Chen et al., 2007; Bao et al., 2011; Bongaerts et al., 2017). In
particular, Bongaerts et al. (2017) find an average (level) liquidity premium equal to 0.54%
for corporate bonds that carry 0.52% transaction costs. Yet, Palhares and Richardson (2019)
find only limited evidence for liquidity premiums for corporate bonds after using illiquidity-
factor portfolios, that is, a strategy that goes long in illiquid bonds and short in the liquid
ones. Our model indicates that liquidity premiums are below, yet fairly close to the estimates
in Bongaerts et al. (2017). However, in our model the liquidity premium is not only driven
by transaction costs but also by the inability to trade corporate bonds for several weeks.
This may mean that empirical estimates indirectly incorporate the inability to trade as part
of the liquidity premium.
Similarly, for private equity there is no clear consensus regarding the existence of a
liquidity premium, although the evidence is more indirect. Franzoni et al. (2012) report
no out-performance of private equity relative to public equity, while Harris et al. (2014)
finds a substantial out-performance of 3% annually. Our findings point in the direction of
second-order liquidity premiums for private equity. Finally, opposing indirect evidence also
exists for real estate investments. Qian and Liu (2012) find a somewhat higher expected
return for direct compared to indirect real estate, while Ang et al. (2013a) find comparable
performance for direct and indirect real estate investments. Our range of model implied
liquidity premiums for real estate is consistent with the dearth of empirical evidence for
liquidity premiums in real estate markets.
Our study also contributes to the theoretical literature on liquidity premiums. The
early theoretical literature did not find evidence for the existence of liquidity premiums.
Constantinides (1986) and Vayanos (1998) show that transaction costs only have a second-
order effect on prices, that is, a 1% higher transaction cost increases the liquidity premiums
by only roughly 10 basis points per year. After their work, a great deal of literature was
developed that studies illiquidity or transactions costs by using assumptions more in line
with real-world investment problems. This work finds that illiquidity can have first-order
effects on prices. For instance, theoretical work from Huang (2003) and Gârleanu (2009) show
that illiquidity may arise when investors face borrowing constraints. Jang et al. (2007) add
return predictability to the investor’s problem in a market with transactions costs and find
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a slight increase in liquidity premiums. Lynch and Tan (2011) solve a model that comprises
labor income, wealth shocks, return predictability, and transaction costs and are able to
generate liquidity premiums for stocks in the same order of magnitude as the early empirical
literature. The main goal of these studies is to understand the mechanism behind the effect
of illiquidity in equilibrium. By contrast, we focus on explaining the observed variation in
the magnitude of the liquidity premium for different asset classes using heterogeneity in the
illiquidity source and investors’ preferences.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: Section 3.2 shows the theoretical
framework of the model and describes the corresponding optimal strategies and the partial
equilibrium implications for the liquidity premiums. We link our theoretical findings to the
empirical literature on liquidity premiums in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Optimal consumption and investment with illiquid
assets
In this section, we model illiquidity as the inability to trade an asset frequently and by
the cost that occurs when trading. This is formalized in Section 3.2.1. In Section 3.2.2
we describe the optimization problem of the investor and the solution of this optimization
problem is presented in Section 3.2.3. Section 3.2.4 shows how we derive model implied
liquidity premiums and Section 3.2.5 reveals magnitudes of model implied liquidity premiums
depending on different parameter values.
3.2.1 Financial market
The financial market consists of three assets: a risk-free asset B, a liquid risky asset S, and
an illiquid risky asset denoted by X. The risk-free asset has a constant (annual) rate of
return rf . The liquid risky asset earns a nominal return r
S
t over the period (t − 1, t], while
we denote the nominal return on the illiquid asset over the same period by rXt . All returns
are continuously compounded. Further, we assume that the price of the illiquid asset is
observed, even though it cannot be traded every period.
The prices of risk of the liquid and illiquid assets are denoted by λS and λX , respectively.
Their volatilities are similarly denoted by σS and σX ; their correlation by ρSX . The returns
rSt and r
X
t are jointly normally distributed:
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The differences between the liquid and the illiquid risky asset are the trading opportunities
and transaction costs. While the investor can always trade the liquid risky asset S at no cost,
the illiquid asset X can only be traded at random points in time and at a cost. We denote
the trading indicator for time t with 1pt and interpret 1
p
t = 1 as the trading opportunity that
arises for illiquid asset X, while 1pt = 0 indicates that the illiquid asset cannot be traded
that period. We assume throughout that the trading indicators are i.i.d. Bernoulli random
variables with trading probability p = P{1pt = 1}. If a trading opportunity occurs (1
p
t = 1)
and the investor decides to trade, then the proportional transaction costs φ must be paid,
0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. We allow for two types of return components on the illiquid asset: income return
and capital gains. That is, we separate rXt into a liquid part dt (income return) and an
illiquid part rXt − dt (capital gains).
3.2.2 The investors’ consumption and investment problem
The investor has an investment horizon equal to T . We assume that the illiquid asset can
be traded (and thus liquidated) against transaction costs φ at the final date T . Notice that
under the assumption that the illiquid asset might not be liquidated at T , the liquidity
premiums are amplified. We do not consider this because, in that case, the investor is better
off postponing the liquidation of the illiquid asset until a trading opportunity arises. We
introduce the following notation to distinguish liquid and illiquid wealth. We denote liquid
wealth as available at time t by Wt. This wealth consists of investments in both the risk-free
asset B and the risky liquid asset S. The value of the investment in the illiquid asset at time
t is denoted by Xt. Therefore, total wealth equals Wt +Xt.
Furthermore, we assume that the investor may face a liquidity shock Lt that is assumed to
be fraction lt of the previous period’s total wealth Wt−1+Xt−1. The liquidity shock indicator
is denoted by 1st and follows an i.i.d. Bernoulli process with probability q = P{1st = 1}.
Various causes of such a liquidity shock arise. For individual investors, examples are health
care costs, unforeseen expenditures, or extreme weather events. For institutional investors
a possible cause for liquidity shocks are margin calls on derivative positions. For long-term
investors, such as pension funds and life insurers, shocks to the mortality rate can increase
the temporary need for liquidity.
We denote the fraction of liquid wealth Wt that is invested in the liquid risky asset S by
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θt, and 1−θt is invested in the risk-free asset B. Consumption at time t is denoted by Ct and
must be financed with liquid wealth Wt. Preferences are represented by a standard constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) expected utility function with risk-aversion parameter γ.
Illiquid wealth Xt can only be converted into liquid wealth (and, if desired, immediately
consumed) if a trading opportunity arises, that is, if 1pt = 1. We denote the transfer from
liquid to illiquid wealth by4Xt. Thus, 4Xt > 0 means that at time t, an additional amount
4Xt of the illiquid asset is bought, and thus liquid wealth Wt decreases by 4Xt + φ|4X|.
If no trading opportunity arises, then 1pt = 0; and we automatically have 4Xt = 0.
The investor optimizes its utility of a stream of consumption levels Ct over a horizon










where β denotes the time-preference discount factor, and γ > 1 is the risk-aversion parameter.
The investor faces two budget constraints: one for liquid wealth Wt and one for illiquid
wealth Xt. Formally, we have:
Wt = (Wt−1 −4Xt−1 − φ|4Xt−1| − Ct−1)
(
exp(rf ) + θt−1
[
exp(rSt )− exp(rf )
])
+ (Xt−1 +4Xt−1) exp(dt)− Lt (3.3)





We assume that the investor cannot borrow against the illiquid investments. The effect
of illiquidity would be strongly reduced if this borrowing was possible, as the investor could
always undo the illiquidity by borrowing against the illiquid asset if needed. Thus, we impose:
Ct ≤ Wt, t = 0, . . . , T. (3.5)
The optimal consumption problem can now be stated as follows:












subject to the budget constraints (3.3) and (3.4) and the borrowing constraint (3.5). Moreover,
when 1pt = 0, we must have 4Xt = 0.
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The decision variables θt, 4Xt, and Ct are non-anticipative. Formally, {θt,4Xt, Ct} are





To summarize, illiquidity limits the investor’s consumption and investment decisions in
three ways compared to the case where the illiquid asset is fully liquid, that is, the two risky
asset Merton case (Merton, 1969): the inability to trade the illiquid assets for uncertain
periods of time; transaction costs of the illiquid asset when a trading opportunity arises; and
the investor cannot borrow against the illiquid assets. All three assumptions are important
characteristics of (most) illiquid assets.
3.2.3 Optimal strategies
Because of incomplete markets, the optimization in Problem 3.2.1 cannot be solved analytically,
so we resort to numerical methods. For these, the numerical complexity is well-known to
strongly increase with the dimension of the endogenous state variables. In the formulation
of Problem 3.2.1 there are two: Wt and Xt. Yet, in line with Ang et al. (2014), a simple
transformation leads to a partly analytical result due to the homogeneity of the CRRA utility
function we consider, see Theorem 3.2.2 below.
More precisely, we consider as endogenous state variables the total wealth Wt + Xt and





With this reparametrization we define the value function using the Bellman principle as:





+ EtVt+1(Wt+1 +Xt+1, ξt+1), (3.8)
with the boundary condition at time T given by:
VT (WT +XT , ξT ) = β




The boundary condition means that we assume that all assets can be traded (and thus
liquidated) at time T against transaction costs φ. With the above introduced change of
variables, that is, the pair (Wt, Xt) is replaced by the pair (Wt + Xt, ξt), then the solution
to the investor’s problem satisfies the following theorem.
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Theorem 3.2.2. There are time-dependent (deterministic) functions αt, θt, and Ht such
that the optimal solution {C∗t ,4X∗t , θ∗t } to Problem 3.2.1 can be written as:




Ht (ξt) , (3.10)
C∗t = αt(ξt) (Wt +Xt) , (3.11)
θ∗t = θt (ξt) , (3.12)
ξ∗t = arg min
ξt
Ht(ξt). (3.13)
The proof of Theorem 3.2.2 is provided in Appendix A. Moreover, the optimal investment
decision concerning illiquid wealth, that is, 4X∗t , is determined by the choice ξ∗t ; but only
when trading is allowed, that is, when 1pt = 1:
4X∗t =
(ξ∗t − ξt)(Wt +Xt) if 1
p
t = 1
0 if 1pt = 0,
(3.14)
where ξ∗t = ξt if the transaction costs do not outweigh the benefit of rebalancing back to the
optimal illiquid asset allocation ξ∗t .
The advantage of Theorem 3.2.2 is that the dependence of the value function on total
wealth Wt + Xt is known analytically. The fact that the value function is proportional to
(Wt +Xt)
1−γ simplifies the numerical optimization to a one dimensional grid search over ξt
only. Details are provided in Appendix B.
We posit that the function Ht(ξt) can be viewed as a penalty function which is minimized
at the optimal fraction of total wealth invested in the illiquid asset ξ∗t . If the investor is able
to trade the illiquid asset at time t, then they will rebalance their portfolio towards the
optimal ratio of illiquid wealth to total wealth ξ∗t , if the decrease in the penalty function
is sufficient to outweigh the transaction cost φ. Thus, in line with Constantinides (1986),
there is a no trading region where the investor will not rebalance their portfolio. We depict
the no trading region in Appendix C. As opposed to Constantinides (1986), the no trading
region in our model is not symmetric and the upper bound is more stringent than the lower
bound; an over-investment in the illiquid asset relative to the optimal amount may prevent
the investor from smoothing consumption due to the borrowing constraints and/or potential
liquidity shocks. In order to avoid these states of the world, they rebalance back to the
optimal illiquid asset allocation more quickly as opposed to under investing in the illiquid
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asset.
Theorem 3.2.2 furthermore indicates that the optimal consumption choice and the optimal
investment strategy in the liquid risky asset depend on the fraction of total wealth invested
in the illiquid asset ξt. If illiquid wealth is substantial relative to liquid wealth, for instance
after a liquidity shock Lt occurs; then the investor might have to cut their consumption
relative to the case where the illiquid asset can always be traded. Moreover, to compensate
for the increased risk exposure that results from the high fraction invested in illiquid wealth,
the investor reduces their allocation to the liquid risky asset. The optimal consumption and
asset allocation decisions are depicted in Appendix C.
3.2.4 Willingness to pay for liquidity: theory
To understand why liquidity premiums exist in some asset classes but not in others, we
analyze the willingness to pay for liquidity. We define the investor’s willingness to pay δt as
the decrease in the expected return on the illiquid asset over period t that they are willing to
pay to convert the illiquid asset into a liquid one. In other words, δt is the compensation the
investor demands for holding the illiquid asset. To formalize the willingness to pay, denote
the value function for Problem 3.2.1 by assuming that the asset X is actually also liquid by
V LIQt (Wt +Xt). In other words, we solve Problem 3.2.1 subject to the budget constraints
(3.3) and (3.4), where p = 1, φ = 0. This value function factorizes as:





for a deterministic constant HLIQt , where H
LIQ
t no longer depends on ξt as the illiquid asset
is tradeable as well.
The value function V LIQt depends on the expected return rf + λXσX − 0.5σ2X of asset X.
Subtracting δt from this expected return leads to a (lower) value function that we denote by
V LIQt (Wt +Xt|δt). We then define the willingness to pay as that value of δt that solves:
V LIQt (Wt +Xt|δt) = Vt (Wt +Xt, ξt) . (3.16)
Given (3.10) and (3.15), we can find δt by solving:
HLIQt (δt) = Ht(ξt), (3.17)
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where HLIQt (δt) denotes the value function when the illiquid asset is actually liquid at a
risk premium reduced by δt. This willingness to pay depends on the actual allocation to
the illiquid asset: ξt. To determine the liquidity premium, we assume that an investor with
horizon T chooses the optimal allocation to the illiquid asset when entering the investment,
so the actual allocation at time t = 0 equals ξTt=0 = ξ
T,∗
t=0.
3.2.5 Willingness to pay for liquidity: comparative statics
In this subsection we show how the model implied liquidity premiums depend on different
parameter values. We use a range of realistic parameter values and show how the results
change depending on the assumptions.3 With respect to the investor’s preferences we assume
the investor faces a liquidity shock with probability q = 10% equal to l = 20% of the previous
period’s total wealth, (i.e., the liquidity shock occurs on average once in 10 years), has a risk-
aversion parameter equal to γ = 5 and the time-preference discount factor equals β = 0.91.4
With respect to the financial market, we assume the liquid asset has a price of risk λS = 38%
and volatility σS = 18.5%, and the risk-free rate is rf = 2%. These parameter values result
in an optimal risky asset allocation of approximately 40% and a risk-free bond allocation of
60%.
The parameter values of the illiquid asset are set equal to the parameter values of the
liquid risky asset: λX = 38% and σX = 18.5%. In this way, we isolate the effect of illiquidity
instead of relying on a higher Sharpe ratio for the illiquid asset. In line with this reasoning,
we also assume no correlation between the liquid and illiquid risky assets in the baseline
model; ρSX = 0. We also assume no income return for the illiquid assets, that is, dt = 0.
For the illiquidity parameters, we assume that the investor can trade the illiquid asset on
average once in two years, or in other words p = 50%. If the investor decides to trade the
illiquid asset when a trading opportunity arises, then the proportional transactions costs
equal φ = 1%. At the final date, the investor has to pay transaction costs φ = 1% in all
states of the world. Table 3.1 summarizes the parameter values.
3In the next section, when linking our model to empirical evidence on liquidity premiums in different
asset classes, we motivate the choice of the parameter values more thoroughly.
4A lower value for the time-preference discount factor has a negligible effect on liquidity premiums.
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Table 3.1. Parameter values
This table summarizes the parameter values of our baseline model.
Parameters Symbol Value
Liquidity shock l 20%
Probability liquidity shock q 10%
Risk aversion parameter γ 5
Time-preference discount factor β 0.91
Risk-free rate rf 2%
Price of risk liquid risky asset λS 38%
Volatility liquid risky asset σS 18.5%
Price of risk illiquid asset λX 38%
Volatility illiquid asset σX 18.5%
Correlation coefficient ρ 0
Income return d 0
Trading probability illiquid asset p 50%
Transaction costs illiquid asset φ 1%
Liquidity premium and investment horizon
Perhaps the most straightforward, but nevertheless important result, is that the willingness
to pay depends on the investment horizon. Figure 3.1 shows that the shorter the investor’s
investment horizon amplifies the liquidity premium. Illiquidity is typically a bigger threat
for short-term investors as they want to consume or payout a large part of their total wealth
compared to long-term investors. Under the baseline parameters, the liquidity premium
demanded by the short-term investors (T = 1) equals 42 basis points, while this premium
converges to only a few basis points as the horizon T becomes large.
Liquidity premium and trading opportunities
Higher trading opportunities decrease the willingness to pay for illiquidity. Figure 3.2 shows
that for the short-term investors (T = 2) the liquidity premium equals 32 basis points if
the investor is unable to trade the illiquid asset before the final date and decreases to 20
basis points when the probability of trading is high.5 For long-term investors (T = 10),
the liquidity premium equals 13 basis points if the investor is unable to trade the illiquid
5Because the transaction costs of investors with a horizon equal to T = 1 are the only component of
illiquidity that affects liquidity premiums, we typically refer in the comparative statistics to the short-term
investor as the investor with a horizon equal to T = 2 instead of T = 1 years.
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Figure 3.1. The liquidity premium as a function of the investment horizon
This graph shows the liquidity premium as a function of the investment horizon T that assumes the following
parameter values: the risk-aversion parameter γ = 5, the time-preference discount factor β = 0.91, a liquidity
shock l = 20% with probability q = 10%, the return on the risk-free rate rf = 2%, the average return on
the liquid and illiquid risky asset µS = µX = 9%, the volatility of the liquid and illiquid risky asset
σS = σX = 18.5%, the correlation coefficient ρSX = 0, the income return d = 0, the trading probability of
the illiquid asset p = 50%, and the transactions costs φ = 1%.
























asset before the final date and converges to zero if the probability of trading is high. The
relation between the trading probability and the liquidity premium is approximately linear
for the short-term investors but decreases exponentially for the long-term investor. The
short-term investor knows for sure that they are able to trade in two periods from now on,
so the trading probability only affects trading one period from now. However, the inability
to trade lengthens with a lower trading probability for the long-term investor. As a result,
the probability of scenarios where illiquid wealth grows too fast relative to liquid wealth
increases more rapidly at low trading probabilities for the long-term investor compared to
the short-term investor.
Liquidity premium and transaction costs
Figure 3.3 shows that rising transaction costs increase the willingness to pay for both short-
term (T = 2) and long-term (T = 10) investors. Nevertheless, the increase is much more
substantial for the short-term investor, such that a 1 percentage point increase in transaction
costs increases the liquidity premium demanded by approximately 18 basis points. Short-
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Figure 3.2. The liquidity premium as a function of the trading probability
This graph shows the liquidity premium as a function of the trading probability p for the investor at horizons
T = 2 and T = 10 that assumes the following parameter values: the risk-aversion parameter γ = 5, the
time-preference discount factor β = 0.91, a liquidity shock l = 20% with probability q = 10%, the return
on the risk-free rate rf = 2%, the average return on the liquid and illiquid risky asset µS = µX = 9%, the
volatility of the liquid and illiquid risky asset σS = σX = 18.5%, the correlation coefficient ρSX = 0, the
income return d = 0, and the transactions costs φ = 1%.
























term investors always liquidate their illiquid wealth two periods from now, and they can only
do so at cost φ. Long-term investors only liquidate their illiquid wealth at proportional cost
φ if the realized illiquid asset allocation is too far from the optimal level. As a result, the
liquidity premium increases by 2 basis points when transaction costs increase by 1 percentage
points. This increase confirms earlier results from Constantinides (1986), where the investor
has an infinite horizon and transactions costs endogenously decrease their trading frequency.
The larger the transaction costs, the larger the investor’s no-trading region. As the investor’s
value function is insensitive to some deviations from the optimal (non-transaction) portfolio
allocation, the transaction costs lead to second-order effects on prices.
Liquidity premium and liquidity shocks
Figure 3.4 shows that the liquidity premium is hump-shaped in the level of the liquidity
shock. This hump-shaped relation means that the liquidity premium is amplified when the
level of the liquidity shock increases up to a shock of l = 70% for the short-term investors
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Figure 3.3. The liquidity premium as a function of the transaction costs
This graph shows the liquidity premium as a function of the transaction costs φ for the investor at horizons
T = 2 and T = 10 that assumes the following parameter values: the risk-aversion parameter γ = 5, the
time-preference discount factor β = 0.91, a liquidity shock l = 20% with probability q = 10%, the return
on the risk-free rate rf = 2%, the average return on the liquid and illiquid risky asset µS = µX = 9%, the
volatility of the liquid and illiquid risky asset σS = σX = 18.5%, the correlation coefficient ρSX = 0, the
income return d = 0, and the trading probability of the illiquid asset p = 50%.

























and l = 50% for the long-term investors, but decreases again for larger shocks.6 Because a
liquidity shock can only be financed out of liquid wealth, a shock increases the probability
that liquid wealth becomes insufficient to fulfill consumption needs. In order to prevent
these states of the world, the investor reduces their optimal allocation to the illiquid asset
substantially as compared to the liquid case. However, when the liquidity shock gets too
severe, the allocation to the illiquid asset if it where fully liquid also gets closer to zero. Such
large liquidity shocks make risky assets unattractive also in the fully liquid case, and as a
result, liquidity premiums drop.
Liquidity premium and income return
The liquidity premium is also hump-shaped in the level of income return. On the one hand,
the income return on the illiquid asset may diverge the optimal fraction allocated to liquid
6We find a similar hump-shaped relation between the liquidity premium and the probability of a liquidity
shock. Also, the turning point of the hump-shaped pattern depends on the choice of the other parameter
values.
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Figure 3.4. The liquidity premium as a function of the level liquidity shock
This graph shows the liquidity premium as a function of the level liquidity shock l for the investor at horizon
T = 2 and T = 10 that assumes the following parameter values: the risk-aversion parameter γ = 5, the
time-preference discount factor β = 0.91, a probability liquidity shock q = 10%, the return on the risk-free
rate rf = 2%, the average return on the liquid and illiquid risky asset µS = µX = 9%, the volatility of
the liquid and illiquid risky asset σS = σX = 18.5%, the correlation coefficient ρSX = 0, the income return
d = 0, the trading probability of the illiquid asset p = 50%, and the transactions costs φ = 1%.


























versus illiquid wealth. On the other hand, the income return on the illiquid asset can be used
to smooth consumption and dampen the effect of liquidity shocks. Figure 3.5 shows both
effects. The liquidity premium increases when the level of the income return increases up to
d = 3% for the short-term investors and d = 4% for the long-term investors, but decreases
again thereafter.7
Liquidity premium and price of risk
Figure 3.6 shows that a higher price of risk strongly amplifies liquidity premiums. A higher
price of risk increases the illiquid asset’s attractiveness so that the optimal fraction of wealth
allocated to it increases in case the illiquid asset becomes fully liquid. The higher the fraction
of total wealth that the investor optimally wants to invest in the illiquid asset, the stronger
the threat of illiquidity. Because the investor cannot borrow against the illiquid asset and to
remain able to smooth consumption, the gap between the optimal allocation to the illiquid
7The turning point of the hump-shaped pattern depends on the choice of the other parameter values.
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Figure 3.5. The liquidity premium as a function of income return
This graph shows the liquidity premium as a function of the income return d for the investor at horizon
T = 2 and T = 10 that assumes the following parameter values: the risk-aversion parameter γ = 5, the
time-preference discount factor β = 0.91, a liquidity shock l = 20% with probability q = 10%, the return
on the risk-free rate rf = 2%, the average return on the liquid and illiquid risky asset µS = µX = 9%, the
volatility of the liquid and illiquid risky asset σS = σX = 18.5%, the correlation coefficient ρSX = 0, the
trading probability of the illiquid asset p = 50%, and the transactions costs φ = 1%.
























asset compared to when it is fully liquid widens as the illiquid asset becomes more attractive.
These findings are consistent with Kahl et al. (2003) and Longstaff (2003) who show that the
welfare effects of illiquidity are much larger when more wealth is tied up in the illiquid asset.
For the long-term investor, illiquidity starts to pose a challenge for the investor’s portfolio
when the price of risk exceeds 0.55, which is equivalent to a 60% allocation to the illiquid
asset.
Further, the threat of illiquidity gets more severe for the long-term investors as opposed to
short-term ones at very high prices of risk. The reason is that the short-term investors know
for sure that they will be able to liquidate illiquid wealth in two years and can therefore
allocate a substantial amount to the illiquid asset. However, for the long-term investors
there is uncertainty in the next trading opportunity. A substantial allocation to the illiquid
asset therefore increases the likelihood of scenarios of insufficient liquid wealth to smooth
consumption due to liquidity shocks or the poor performance of liquid relative to illiquid
wealth.
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Figure 3.6. The liquidity premium as a function of the price of risk
This graph shows the liquidity premium as a function of the price of risk of the illiquid asset for the investor
at horizon T = 2 and T = 10 that assumes the following parameter values: the risk-aversion parameter
γ = 5, the time-preference discount factor β = 0.91, a liquidity shock l = 20% with probability q = 10%, the
return on the risk-free rate rf = 2%, the average return on the liquid risky asset µS = 9%, the volatility of
the liquid risky asset σS = 18.5%, the correlation coefficient ρSX = 0, the income return d = 0, the trading
probability of the illiquid asset p = 50%, and the transactions costs φ = 1%.























3.3 Liquidity premium in four asset classes
Next, we link our theoretical findings to the empirical evidence for liquidity premiums in
several asset classes. Section 3.3.1 describes the implications of our theoretical findings in an
equilibrium setting. In subsequent sections we relate these findings to the empirical evidence
for liquidity premiums in four asset classes. The asset classes we consider are: private equity,
real estate, corporate bonds, and stocks. We focus on US markets.
3.3.1 Implications equilibrium
So far we have analyzed the willingness to pay for a single investor. The next question
to ask is: what does the willingness to pay mean for the liquidity premium in a general
equilibrium setting? Under market clearing conditions the total amount of illiquid assets in
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The N individual investors will demand illiquid assets depending on the illiquidity source,
their preferences, and their total wealth. The liquidity premium in each asset class will
subsequently depend on the composition of their investors. Suppose all investors in a
certain asset class have low liquidity needs, then a positive liquidity premium would generate
excessive demand for the illiquid asset and therefore push down the liquidity premium. In
that case, the liquidity premium will converge to zero in equilibrium. On the other hand,
if liquidity matters for a substantial portion of the investors, the demand for those who are
less liquidity constrained might not be enough to push down the liquidity premium.
To quantify the liquidity premium demanded by different types of investors for each
asset class, we choose parameter values representative of that asset class. Throughout, we
assume that the liquid risky asset S represents a liquid stock index. We use the annualized
mean and the standard deviation of the S&P500 Index to model the diversified liquid stock
index. Calibrated over the last 25 years, the average return is µS = 11.3% and the standard
deviation σS = 17.8%. Moreover, we use as the risk-free rate the annualized 1-year Treasury
yield over the last 25 years that gives us rf = 2.8%. Appendix D provides details on the
indexes.
The preferences of investors in each market are less well-known, as researchers only
have a very rough idea about investors’ investment horizons and their liquidity needs that
are usually represented as holdings periods (e.g. Atkins and Dyl, 1997) or investors’ funding
constraints (e.g. Chen et al., 2020). These measures are generally incomplete as these proxies
do not measure other liquidity risks such as margin calls on derivative positions or rare
disasters that investors potentially face. For this reason, we provide qualitative indicators
of investors’ preferences for each asset class. The main goal of this section is therefore not
to model investors perfectly but to give a rough indication of the average preferences of the
investors in each market.
Despite this drawback, we argue that our findings can be interpreted as upper bounds
on the liquidity premiums. We make two assumptions that are more likely to overestimate
rather than to underestimate the liquidity premium. First, we assume that the investors
cannot borrow against the illiquid assets. This constraint may be a realistic assumption
for some asset classes but not for others. For instance, real estate investors are typically
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able to borrow a substantial amount using the property as collateral. However, taking this
borrowing into account decreases liquidity premiums because the investors can partially
undo the illiquidity of the asset. Second, we allow for liquidity shocks as large as 50% of
the investors’ total wealth. Even though larger wealth shocks are in practice possible, our
model shows that investors avoid risky assets all together if faced with such shocks. As a
result, large liquidity shocks do not necessarily have a positive effect on liquidity premiums
(Figure 3.4).
3.3.2 Private equity
The evidence on liquidity premiums in private equity markets is mixed, mostly because
there is only indirect evidence of the potential existence or non-existence of liquidity premiums.
For instance, Franzoni et al. (2012) show that adding a liquidity risk factor to the traditional
three-factor model of Fama and French leads to an alpha that is statistically insignificant
from zero. This is indirect evidence of no liquidity (level) premium. By contrast, Harris et al.
(2014) find an out-performance of private equity versus the S&P500 Index of 3% annually.
They use the compensation for illiquidity as a potential explanation for this out-performance.
Here we find an average liquidity premium of around 5-15 basis points on an annual basis
when using both calibrated parameters values and realistic assumptions about investors’
preferences.
To assess the liquidity premium for private equity, we specify model parameters such
that the illiquid asset has properties similar to private equity investments. We use the
mean and standard deviation of the S&P500 Index to model the liquid counterpart of the
illiquid private equity investment in our model, as the S&P500 Index is generally taken as the
benchmark for private equity, see, for example, Franzoni et al. (2012) and Harris et al. (2014).
This benchmark means that µX = 11.3% and σX = 17.8%. We do not take a stance on the
correlation between private equity and the S&P500 Index. The performance of private equity
varies substantially across private equity investments, as noted by Phalippou and Gottschalg
(2009) for example, and as a result the correlation coefficient varies across the specifications
as well. Nevertheless, Ang et al. (2014) show a correlation between the S&P500 and private
equity of 0.63, S&P500 and buyouts of 0.27, and the S&P500 and venture capital of 0.57. We
therefore analyze the results for the correlation coefficients of ρSX = 0.25 and ρSX = 0.60.
Private equity investments have two distinctive features. First, private equity contracts
generally run for 10 years, and trading is unusual before a contract expires (Metrick and
Yasuda, 2010). Therefore, we set p = 0 over the first 10 years of the investment horizon.
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Second, private equity usually involves capital commitment agreements. The investor agrees
to provide a preset amount of capital over the first three to five years of the project. Yet,
the capital commitment is preset, so we treat it as an upfront investment in our model. We
furthermore assume that the transaction cost at exiting the contract is φ = 1%. A study
by Dechert and Preqin (2011) shows that transaction fees at completion of a private equity
contract vary between 0.84%-1.25% depending on the size of the private equity investment.
Turning to investors’ preferences in the private equity market, we posit that they likely
have a low demand for liquidity, as the lock-up period of private equity is long and known
beforehand. Unfortunately, as opposed to stocks and bonds, there is no public holdings
data available for private equity. However, Harris et al. (2014) report that for the Burgiss
database that covers $1 trillion of committed capital to private equity over 20% is held by
endowment funds and 60% by pension funds. Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) also report
endowments and pension funds as the main investors in private equity for the Thomson
Venture Economics database. These findings support the assumption that only long-term
investors are present in private equity markets. We then assess the liquidity premium for
long-term investors who face different liquidity shocks.
Table 3.2 shows that liquidity premiums are lower for a positive correlation between the
liquid and illiquid assets. The reasoning is that the effect of illiquidity is smaller because of
lower diversification benefits when the correlation coefficient is larger. The liquidity shock,
as shown before, amplifies liquidity premiums. Nevertheless, taking the results of Table 3.2
together indicates an average liquidity premium for private equity of 5-15 basis points only.
Our findings therefore point in the direction of second-order liquidity premiums for private
equity.
3.3.3 Real estate
Similar mixed evidence exists for liquidity premiums in real estate markets. Qian and Liu
(2012) show that a 10% increase in their illiquidity measure decreases the contemporaneous
real estate prices by 0.3 − 0.5% and increases future returns by 25 basis points over the
next quarter. On the other hand, Ang et al. (2013a) show comparable performance of
direct and indirect real estate investments that indicates no liquidity premium. We find an
average liquidity premium of 15-35 basis points on an annual basis by using both calibrated
parameters values and realistic assumptions about the investors’ preferences.
To model a direct investment in real estate, we use the first two moments of the S&P US
REIT Index to model the liquid counterpart of a direct real estate investment. We calibrate
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Table 3.2. Liquidity premiums for private equity
This table shows the liquidity premium in basis points for investors who face liquidity shock l
and the correlation coefficient equal to ρSX . Further, we use the following parameter values:
investment horizon T = 10, risk-aversion parameter γ = 5, time-preference discount factor
β = 0.91, return on the risk-free rate rf = 2.8%, average and standard deviation of the
return on the liquid risky asset µS = 11.3% and σS = 17.8%, average and standard deviation
of the return on the illiquid asset µX = 11.3% and σX = 17.8%, the income return d = 0, the







the annualized average return on the REIT index as µX = 12.22% and the corresponding
standard deviation as σX = 18.31%. The correlation coefficient between the liquid and
illiquid assets is calibrated as the correlation between the S&P500 Index and S&P US REIT
Index, which equals ρSX = 0.4.
The return on real estate includes both the income return and capital gains. The income
return refers to the rent on properties, so the real estate returns are partially liquid. Following
Hardin III et al. (2002) we assume that the income return or rent payments explain the
majority of the total investment returns for REITs. In the model, we therefore set the
income return equal to d = µX−rf . The volatility is instead largely defined by the volatility
in the capital gains, and we therefore assume that the volatility relates to volatility in capital
gains only.8
To describe the illiquidity parameters for real estate, we point out that the transaction
costs consist of various main components: registration costs, legal fees, and sales and transfer
taxes. On average, the total transaction costs lie in the range of 5%−8%, and we therefore set
transaction costs equal to φ = 6% (Ommeren, 2008). The typical time between transactions
for residential housing is 4-5 years and 8-11 years for institutional real estate, see, for example,
Hansen (1998) and Miller et al. (2011). We thus assume trading probabilities p in the range
8The last two assumptions lead to similar results if we slightly alter them, that is, the findings are robust
to a 1% higher or lower income return and/or a positive volatility for the income return.
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of 10% − 20%. Unfortunately, we are not aware of public holdings data on real estate.
However, pension funds are large investors in real estate markets worldwide (Willis Towers
Watson, 2019). We therefore conjecture that the majority of investors are either medium
term (T = 5) or long term (T = 10). We again assess the liquidity premium for various
liquidity shocks.
Table 3.3 shows the model implied liquidity premiums for real estate. The liquidity
premium for real estate is diminished mainly by the large share of long-term investors and
the large income return component of the real estate returns (Figure 3.1 and 3.5). The
substantial transaction costs increase the no trading region resulting in similar liquidity
premiums demanded for various magnitudes of the liquidity shock. Taking the average of
Table 3.3, we find a liquidity premium equal to 15-35 basis points over the past 25 years.
Our range of model implied liquidity premiums is consistent with the dearth of empirical
evidence for liquidity premiums in real estate markets.
Table 3.3. Liquidity premiums for real estate
This table shows the liquidity premium in basis points demanded by investors at horizon T
that face liquidity shock l and trading probability p. Further, we use the following parameter
values: risk-aversion parameter γ = 5, time-preference discount factor β = 0.91, return on
the risk-free rate rf = 2.8%, average and standard deviation of the return on the liquid risky
asset µS = 11.3% and σS = 17.8%, average and standard deviation of the return on the
illiquid asset µX = 12.2% and σX = 18.3%, the correlation coefficient ρSX = 0.4, the income
return d = 9.4%, and the transaction costs φ = 6%.
Investment horizon T = 5 Investment horizon T = 10
Trading probability p
10% 20% 10% 20%
Liquidity shock l
0.0 33 31 14 13
0.2 34 32 15 14
0.5 38 35 19 18
3.3.4 Corporate bonds
In the corporate bond market, several studies have found empirical evidence for a first-
order level liquidity premium (e.g. Chen et al., 2007; Bao et al., 2011; Bongaerts et al.,
2017). In particular, Bongaerts et al. (2017) show that transaction costs of 0.54% lead to
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a 0.56% liquidity level premium. Yet, Palhares and Richardson (2019) find only limited
evidence for liquidity premiums of corporate bonds using illiquidity-factor portfolios. We
find an average annual liquidity premium around 30-50 basis points by using both calibrated
parameter values and realistic assumptions about the investors’ preferences.
To assess the liquidity premiums of corporate bonds we again choose parameter values
representative of the US corporate bond market. We use the first two moments of the
Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate Bond Index to model the liquid counterpart of corporate
bonds. We calibrate the annualized average return as µX = 7.0% and the corresponding
standard deviation as σX = 6.6%. We calibrate the correlation coefficient as the correlation
between the Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate Bond Index and the S&P500 Index, which
equals ρSX = 0.35. Finally, we assume fixed coupon payments, and as for real estate, we
assume that the income return equals d = µX − rf .
Turning to the illiquidity parameters, we see that Bongaerts et al. (2017) find average
transaction costs for corporate bonds of 0.52% that range between 0.46% and 0.58% from
the most liquid to the least liquid corporate bond. As the spread in transaction costs is
rather low, we analyze the liquidity premium for transaction costs equal to φ = 0.46% and
φ = 0.58%. Corporate bonds are not traded as often as public equities, but the period
between trades differs across bonds. For instance, Bao et al. (2011) show an annualized
turnover of corporate bonds that varies between 25%-35% and Bongaerts et al. (2017) show
that 15% to 25% of corporate bonds are not traded in a given week. We translate these no
trading periods in trading probabilities that vary between 92% and 95% that means trades
occur on average once a month to once every two weeks, so we set p = 0.935.9
Table 3.4 reveals that the liquidity premium demanded by short- and long-term investors
are relatively close to each other. This result is driven by the high price of risk of corporate
bonds (λX = 0.64): Figure 3.6 shows that for this price of risk the liquidity premium
demanded by short and long-term investors gets close to each other. A high price of risk
also leads to a liquidity premium that is decreasing in the liquidity shock: a liquidity shock
decreases the optimal allocation to the illiquid asset if it where fully liquid, diminishing the
threat of illiquidity (Figure 3.4).
The Financial Accounts of the United States (Fed, 2020) reports the holdings of several
asset classes within the US by investor type. We define long-term investors as the insurance
companies, pension funds, and the government. The short-term investors are the banks,
9The results are in the same order of magnitude using p = 0.92 or p = 0.95 instead.
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broker-dealers, households, and mutual funds. The Fed (2020) reports that for 2019, 38%
of corporate bonds were held by long-term investors, (26% by insurance companies, 11%
by pension funds, and 1% by the government), and 34% by short-term investors (7% by
households, 5% by banks, 1% by broker-dealers, and 21% by mutual funds that include
ETFs). The remaining 28% of the holdings are unspecified. Assuming that the distribution
over long- and short-term investors is similar for the unspecified holdings, this assumption
means that 53% of the corporate bonds are held by long-term investors and 47% by short-
term investors. Taking the weighted average between short- and long-term investors, we
expect a liquidity premium equal to 30-50 basis points over the past 25 years. This finding
is below, yet fairly close to the empirical estimates found in Bongaerts et al. (2017). This
may mean that empirical estimates indirectly incorporate the inability to trade as part of
the liquidity premium.
Table 3.4. Liquidity premiums for corporate bonds
This table shows the liquidity premium in basis points demanded by investors at horizon T
that face liquidity shock l and transaction costs φ. Further, we use the following parameter
values: risk-aversion parameter γ = 5, time-preference discount factor β = 0.91, return on
the risk-free rate rf = 2.8%, average and standard deviation of the return on the liquid risky
asset µS = 11.3% and σS = 17.8%, average and standard deviation of the return on the
illiquid asset µX = 7.0% and σX = 6.6%, the correlation coefficient ρSX = 0.35, the income
return d = 4.2%, and the trading probability of the illiquid asset p = 0.935.
Investment horizon T = 1 Investment horizon T = 10
Transaction costs φ
0.46% 0.58% 0.46% 0.58%
Liquidity shock l
0.0 51 56 46 51
0.2 40 46 29 33
0.5 29 32 25 26
3.3.5 Stocks
Several early studies have reported significant liquidity premiums for US equities. For
instance, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) find that a 1% increase in the bid-ask spread
increased the expected return by 2.4% per year. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) also show a
liquidity premium of 4.5% for the most illiquid stocks versus the most liquid stocks. Ben-
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Rephael et al. (2015) have challenged the existence of the liquidity premium in US stocks.
They show that the liquidity premium almost disappeared over the 1997-2008 period due to
lower transaction costs. For instance, for stocks listed on the NYSE, the liquidity premium
for an average liquid stock was 16 basis points per month in the period from 1964-1974 but
was in fact zero for the period from 1997-2008. The liquidity premium only survived for
very small stocks. We find an average liquidity premium of 20-45 basis points on an annual
basis using both calibrated parameters values and realistic assumptions about the investors’
preferences.
For our model we again use the first two moments of the S&P500 Index to model the
liquid counterpart of the illiquid stock, so µX = 11.3% and σX = 17.8%. Equity asset classes,
such as small-growth stocks, value stocks, and mid cap stocks are highly correlated with the
US stock market. For instance, the correlation between small-growth stocks and the S&P500
Index is approximately 0.9. We therefore set the correlation coefficient equal to ρSX = 0.9.
Given the improved liquidity of US equities, we assume that the trading probability equals
p = 100%; in other words, the investor can always trade the illiquid stock. The transaction
costs for stocks range from 0.25% for the most liquid stocks to 8% for the least liquid stocks
(Beber et al., 2020). The average transaction costs across 25 liquidity sorted portfolios equals
1.14%. We therefore assess the liquidity premium for transaction costs equal to 0.30%, 1%,
4%, and 8%.
Table 3.5 shows that the short-term investors demand substantially higher liquidity
premiums than long-term investors, consistent with Figure 3.3. The liquidity premium
demanded by short-term investors is bounded, because the short-term investors do not invest
in the illiquid asset at all when transaction costs exceed 2%.10
The Fed (2020) reports that for 2019, 13% of US corporate equity is held by long-term
investors (2% by insurance companies and 11% by pension funds), and 70% by short-term
investors (38% by households, 4% by non-financial corporations, and 28% by mutual funds
(including ETFs)). The remaining 17% of the holdings are unspecified. Assuming that the
distribution over long- and short-term investors is similar for the unspecified holdings, this
assumption means that 16% of the equities are held by long-term investors and 84% by the
short-term investors. Given the average transaction costs equal to 1.14% and taking the
weighted average between short and long-term investors, we expect liquidity premiums for
stocks to be 20-45 basis points on average over the past 25 years. Our findings are therefore
10Recall that our model does not allow the investors to short the illiquid asset.
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substantially lower than the estimates from the early literature and more in favor with the
recent evidence of a small liquidity premium for stocks.
Table 3.5. Liquidity premiums for stocks
This table shows the liquidity premium in basis points demanded by investors at horizon T
that face liquidity shock l, and transaction costs φ. Further, we use the following parameter
values: risk-aversion parameter γ = 5, time-preference discount factor β = 0.91, return on
the risk-free rate rf = 2.8%, average and standard deviation of the return on the liquid risky
asset µS = 11.3% and σS = 17.8%, average and standard deviation of the return on the
illiquid asset µX = 11.3% and σX = 17.8%, the correlation coefficient ρSX = 0.9, the income
return d = 0, and the trading probability of the illiquid asset p = 1.
Panel A: Investment horizon T = 1 Transaction costs φ
0.30% 1% 4% 8%
Liquidity shock l
0.0 15 48 105 105
0.2 11 37 98 98
0.5 6 20 85 85
Panel B: Investment horizon T = 10 Transaction costs φ
0.30% 1% 4% 8%
Liquidity shock l
0.0 0 1 4 7
0.2 0.5 2 7 13
0.5 0 0.5 1 2
3.4 Conclusion
In this study, we investigate the liquidity premium demanded by different investor types.
The cost of illiquidity may be twofold: suboptimal asset allocation and suboptimal consumption
smoothing. We show that only the illiquidity that results in suboptimal consumption
smoothing is able to generate a substantial liquidity premium, while the illiquidity that
leads to suboptimal asset allocations does not. From this we conclude that, in equilibrium,
the liquidity premiums depend on the source of illiquidity and the relative prevalence of
investor types in the market. This heterogeneity across asset classes enables us to relate to
the empirical evidence about the liquidity premiums in those markets.
We make several contributions. First, although private equity is the most illiquid asset
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that we analyze, we only find a liquidity premium of 5-15 basis points that point in the
direction of second-order liquidity premiums for this market. Private equity investors have
to lockup their money for a long period of time, and mainly for that reason only long-term
investors are present in this market. For these investors illiquidity is unlikely to substantially
harm their consumption patterns. Moreover, the non-trading period is fixed so that investors
know by and large when the position is liquidated. Second, for direct real estate we find
an average liquidity premium of 15-35 basis points. Direct real estate can often not be
traded for a substantial amount of time, and the timing of the trading opportunities are
uncertain. Yet, the liquidity premium substantially dampens because of the large share of
long-term investors and the liquid return component (rents) in real estate markets. This
finding is consistent with the scare empirical evidence on liquidity premiums for real estate
markets. Third, the average liquidity premium for corporate bonds equals 30-50 basis points.
This finding gets close to the majority of the empirical literature on liquidity premiums for
corporate bonds. Finally, for stocks we find an average liquidity premium of 20-45 basis
points. This finding is in line with the recent literature that shows a diminishing liquidity




A Proof of optimal consumption and investment strategies
Proof of Theorem 3.2.2. Instead of the endogenous variables (Wt, Xt), we use the pair (Wt+
Xt, ξt) as endogenous state variables. That is, we write:
Ct = αt(Wt +Xt, ξt)(Wt +Xt),
θt = θt(Wt +Xt, ξt).
Now, rewrite the evolution of total wealth Wt +Xt using budget constraints (3.3)-(3.4) as:
Wt +Xt = (Wt−1 +Xt−1)
× [(1− ξt−1 − αt−1 − φ|4ξt−1|)×
(
exp(rf ) + θt−1(exp(r
S
t )− exp(rf ))
)










(1− ξt−1 − αt−1 − φ|4ξt−1|)×
(
exp(rf ) + θt−1(exp(r
S
t )− exp(rf ))
)





where 4ξt−1 = ξ∗t−1 − ξt−1.
The proof is by backward induction. At the final horizon t = T , the claim is obviously
correct with αT ≡ 1 and HT ≡ (1 − φξT )1−γ. At time T , θT is irrelevant. Now, for the
induction argument, assume that (3.10)-(3.13) holds at time t. Then, we need to show that
(3.10)-(3.13) also holds at time t− 1. From the value function (3.8), evaluated at time t− 1
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α1−γt−1 + βEt−1[{(1− ξt−1 − αt−1 − φ|4ξt−1|)×(
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At time t− 1, the penalty function Ht−1(ξt−1) equals
Ht−1(ξt−1) = α
1−γ
t−1 + βEt−1[{(1− ξt−1 − αt−1 − φ|4ξt−1|)
×
(
exp(rf ) + θt−1(exp(r
S
t )− exp(rf ))
)





Therefore, the function Ht−1(ξt−1) is a function of t − 1 and ξt−1 only and hence (3.10)
from (3.10)-(3.13) hold for all t. We continue with proving (3.11)-(3.12) at time t− 1. The
first-order conditions of the decision variables αt−1 and θt−1 equal:











+ Et−1Vt(Wt +Xt, ξt), (A6)
where αUC∗t−1 is the solution if the investor were unconstrained, i.e. when constraint (3.5)
does not bind. Because we assume that the investor cannot borrow against the illiquid asset
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the constrained solution becomes:
αC∗t−1 =
αUC∗t−1 if αUC∗t−1 ≤ 1− ξt−11− ξt−1 if αUC∗t−1 > 1− ξt−1 (A7)
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exp(rSt )− exp(rf )
)
] = 0. (A9)
To see that both α∗t−1 and θ
∗
t−1 depend only on ξt−1, we solve (A8) and (A9) and substitute
(A1) into (A8) and (A9), we get:
∂Vt−1
∂αt−1
= α−γt−1 + βEt−1[{(1− ξt−1 − αt−1 − φ|4ξt−1|)(exp(rf ) + θt−1(exp(rSt )− exp(rf )))













= Et−1[{(1− ξt−1 − αt−1 − φ|4ξt−1|)(exp(rf ) + θt−1(exp(rSt )− exp(rf ))) + ξt−1 exp(dt)















The first-order conditions (A10) and (A11) depend only on time t − 1 and the fraction
invested in the illiquid asset ξt−1. In this way, the optimal consumption and the fraction
invested in the liquid risky assets can indeed be written as in (3.11) and (3.12), so (3.11)-
(3.12) from (3.10)-(3.13) holds for all t. We finish the proof by showing that (3.13) also holds
at time t−1. When a trading opportunity arises at t−1, the investor chooses ξt−1 such that
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the value function at t− 1 is optimized:
ξ∗t−1 = arg max
ξt−1











This appendix provides an outline of the numerical method to solve the baseline model.
First, we describe the sequence of making decisions. Second, we explain the numerical
solution technique to solve for the decision variables.
Sequence of decision making
Figure B depicts the sequence of making decisions. The endogenous variables, liquid
wealth Wt and illiquid wealth Xt, are defined as total wealth before consumption, liquidity
shocks, and returns earned in period (t, t+ 1]. Based on the actual fraction allocated to the
illiquid asset ξt, the investor chooses the optimal fraction of total wealth to be consumed in
period (t, t + 1], αt(ξt), and the optimal allocation towards the liquid risky asset, θt(ξt). If





t ). Further, by the assumption Xt ≥ 0 and the inability to borrow against the illiquid
asset, the possible values for ξt are restricted to the interval [0, 1].
t














The baseline model is solved by means of backward induction, where we start solving
the problem at the final date t = T and solve the model backwards for each period until
arriving at time t = 0. At the final horizon t = T , we have αT ≡ 1 and HT ≡ (1− φξT )1−γ.
To solve for ξ∗T−1, αt(ξT−1) and θt(ξT−1), we construct a grid for ξT−1 ∈ [0, 1]. We simulate
M = 100, 000 trajectories for the exogenous state variables, the returns on the liquid and
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illiquid risky asset in the periods (T − 1, T ], RST , and RXT from a multi-normal distribution
with means and variance-covariance matrix, as described in Section 3.2.1. We also simulate
M = 100, 000 trajectories for the liquidity shock LT from a Bernoulli distribution as described
in Section 3.2.2.
For each grid point by using a nonlinear least squares, we solve the first order conditions
with respect to consumption (A10) and the allocation towards the liquid risky asset (A11)
by using HT (ξT ) ≡ (1− φξT )1−γ, RST , RXT , and lT to find αT−1(ξT−1) and θT−1(ξT−1). Then
we are able to compute HT−1(ξT−1) and solve for ξ
∗
T−1 = arg minξT−1 HT−1 (ξT−1) with the
corresponding consumption level αT−1(ξ
∗
T−1) and the allocation to the liquid risky asset
θT−1(ξ
∗
T−1). This gives us the optimal solution at time T − 1.
We then solve for the optimal solution at time T − 2 in the same way, except that we
also simulate M = 100, 000 trajectories for the trading probability pT−1 from a Bernoulli
distribution as described in Section 3.2.2. In the scenarios the investor is able to trade
(1pT−1 = 1), we use HT−1(ξ
∗
T−1) and in the scenarios the investor is unable to trade (1
p
T−1 =




T−1, and lT−1 we find αT−2(ξT−2) and
θT−2(ξT−2). We again compute HT−2(ξT−2) and solve for ξ
∗
T−2 = arg minξT−2 HT−2 (ξT−2)
with the corresponding consumption level αT−2(ξ
∗
T−2) and the allocation to the liquid risky
asset θT−2(ξ
∗
T−2). We can continue this approach until we arrive at t = 0.
C Optimal consumption and asset allocation baseline model
This appendix shows the optimal consumption pattern and asset allocation decisions
for the baseline model described in Section 3.2. Both consumption (Figure 3.7) and the
allocation to the liquid risky assets (Figure 3.8) are functions of the investment horizon
and the fraction invested in the illiquid asset, as derived in Theorem 3.2.2. These graphs
show that the larger the actual allocation to illiquid assets, the lower the consumption and
allocation to the liquid risky asset. The optimal allocation to the illiquid asset is in Figure 3.9
and found by minimizing the penalty function Ht(ξt) (Theorem 3.2.2). We compare this
allocation to the case where the illiquid asset is fully liquid, that is, the two risky asset
Merton case (Merton, 1969). The shorter the investment horizon, the lower the optimal
allocation to the illiquid asset relative to the Merton case.
The no-trade region induced by transaction costs is in Figure 3.10. As long as the illiquid
asset allocation is within the no-trade region, that is, the area within the two dashed lines,
the investor does not trade if a trading opportunity arises, while the investor re-balances back
to the optimal allocation when outside of the no-trade region. Compared to Constantinides
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(1986), the upper bound of the no-trading region is lower in our model; an over-investment
in the illiquid asset relative to the optimal amount may prevent the investor from smoothing
consumption due to the borrowing constraints and/or potential liquidity shocks. In order to
avoid these states of the world, they re-balance back to the optimal illiquid asset allocation
more quickly as opposed to under-investment in the illiquid asset.
Figures
Figure 3.7. Optimal consumption
This graph shows the optimal consumption as a function of the investment horizon T and fraction invested
in the illiquid asset that uses the following parameter values: the risk-aversion parameter γ = 5, the time-
preference discount factor β = 0.91, a liquidity shock l = 20% with probability q = 10%, the return on the
risk-free rate rf = 2%, the average return on the liquid and illiquid risky asset µS = µX = 9%, the volatility
of the liquid and illiquid risky asset σS = σX = 18.5%, the correlation coefficient ρSX = 0, income return
d = 0, the trading probability of the illiquid asset p = 50%, and the transactions costs φ = 1%.
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Figure 3.8. Optimal liquid risky asset allocation
This graph shows the optimal liquid risky asset allocation as a function of the investment horizon T and
fraction invested in the illiquid asset that uses the following parameter values: the risk-aversion parameter
γ = 5, the time-preference discount factor β = 0.91, a liquidity shock l = 20% with probability q = 10%, the
return on the risk-free rate rf = 2%, the average return on the liquid and illiquid risky asset µS = µX = 9%,
the volatility of the liquid and illiquid risky asset σS = σX = 18.5%, the correlation coefficient ρSX = 0,
the income return d = 0, the trading probability of the illiquid asset p = 50%, and the transactions costs
φ = 1%.
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Figure 3.9. Optimal illiquid asset allocation
This graph shows the optimal illiquid asset allocation as a function of the investment horizon T that uses the
following parameter values: the risk-aversion parameter γ = 5, the time-preference discount factor β = 0.91,
a liquidity shock l = 20% with probability q = 10%, the return on the risk-free rate rf = 2%, the average
return on the liquid and illiquid risky asset µS = µX = 9%, the volatility of the liquid and illiquid risky asset
σS = σX = 18.5%, the correlation coefficient ρSX = 0, the income return d = 0, the trading probability of
the illiquid asset p = 50%, and the transactions costs φ = 1%.
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Figure 3.10. No-trading region
This graph shows the no-trading region of the investor with an investment horizon T = 10 that uses the
following parameter values: the risk-aversion parameter γ = 5, the time-preference discount factor β = 0.91,
a liquidity shock l = 20% with probability q = 10%, the return on the risk-free rate rf = 2%, the average
return on the liquid and illiquid risky asset µS = µX = 9%, the volatility of the liquid and illiquid risky
asset σS = σX = 18.5%, the correlation coefficient ρSX = 0, the income d = 0, the trading probability of the
illiquid asset p = 50%, and the transactions costs φ = 1%.

























Here we list the market indexes used to calibrate the four different asset classes: private
equity, real estate, corporate bonds, and stocks.
Table 3.6. Market Indexes calibration
This table lists the indexes used to calibrate the four different asset classes described in
Section 3.3 as well as the source for the risk-free rate.
Risk-free rate 1-year Treasury yield
Stocks S&P500 Index
The index includes 500 leading companies publicly traded in the US
stock market.
Corporate bonds Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate Bond Index
The index measures the investment grade, fixed-rate taxable corporate
bond market. It includes USD denominated securities publicly issued by
US and non-US industrial, utility and financial issuers.
Real estate S&P United States REIT Index
The index includes the invest-able universe of publicly traded real estate
investment trusts domiciled in the US.




Pension Fund’s Illiquid Assets Allocation under
Liquidity and Capital Requirements1
4.1 Introduction
Pension funds are important investors in illiquid asset classes such as real estate, mortgages,
private equity, hedge funds, and infrastructure. The annual OECD survey of large pension
funds reveals an average illiquid assets allocation of 15 percent in 34 countries.2 According
to the 2018 Willis Towers Watson Global Pension Asset Study the 7 largest pension markets
in the world (Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, and US) have
increased their average illiquid assets allocation from 4 percent in 1997 to 25 percent in 2017.3
Illiquid assets may offer pension plans benefits in terms of a liquidity premium e.g., Sadka
(2010), Franzoni et al. (2012), and Qian and Liu (2012), portfolio diversification (Jacobs
et al., 2014) and liability hedging (Hoevenaars et al., 2008). Their long investment horizon
1This chapter is based on joint work with Dirk Broeders and Bas Werker and published in the Journal
of Pension Economics and Finance. We thank two anonymous referees, editor Stephen Dimmock, Jules
van Binsbergen, Bart Bos, Lisanne Cock, Pieter van Foreest, Rob van den Goorbergh, Janko Gorter, Leo
de Haan, Frank de Jong, Theo Nijman, Arco van Oord, Marco Teunissen, Marno Verbeek, Manon ten
Voorde, Sweder van Wijnbergen, participants of seminars at Achmea Investment Management, APG, Basel
University, Cardano, DNB, EPFIF, Fidelity, ICPM, Maastricht University, Ortec Finance, Robeco and
conference participants of the INPARR Seminar Consistency Amid Complextity: Navigating the Future of
Pensions (OECD, Paris) and the International Pension Workshop (Netspar, Leiden) for very useful comments.
Moreover, we are grateful to David Keijzer and Jeroen Meringa for the data gathering process. Kristy




CHAPTER 4. ILLIQUID ASSETS: LIQUIDITY AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
makes pension funds well placed to invest in illiquid asset classes (Attig et al., 2012).
Several papers study investment risk-taking by pension funds, e.g. Sharpe (1976), Jin
et al. (2006), Rauh (2009), An et al. (2013), and Andonov et al. (2017). These papers
typically focus on the allocation to risk-free assets (such as government bonds) on the one
hand versus risky assets (such as equities) on the other hand. In this paper we address the
investment policy of pension funds regarding illiquid asset classes. So far, little is known
about the factors that influence how much they invest in illiquid asset classes. The main
purpose of this paper is to show how liquidity and capital requirements affect the appetite
of pension funds towards investing in illiquid assets. Several papers provide indeed evidence
that regulations have a significant impact on pension fund’s investment decisions, e.g., Sias
(2004), An et al. (2013), and Andonov et al. (2017). We, therefore, build our paper on a
theoretical model of liquidity and capital requirements. Based on that model we link pension
funds’ characteristics to their investments in illiquid assets. We test this in an empirical study
using unique and unbiased data on Dutch pension funds.
First, we assess the aggregate illiquid assets allocation as a fraction of the risky assets
allocation, following the typical top-down decision-making process of a pension fund. Second,
we study the implications for the following illiquid asset classes separately: real estate,
mortgages, private equity, and hedge funds. While we do the empirical analysis on defined
benefit pension plans in this paper, our theoretical framework also applies to different types
of institutional investors. For instance, insurers with guaranteed products take into account
both liquidity and capital requirements in choosing their optimal asset allocation (Niedrig,
2015). Also banks are exposed to liquidity and capital requirements in their asset allocation
decision (Khan et al., 2017).
The liquidity requirements of pension funds consist of two components: short-term pension
payments and collateral requirements following margin calls on derivative contracts. The
cash required for pension payments over the next year is well predictable. However, the
cash needed for collateral requirements is much less predictable. If the market value of a
derivative contract declines, a pension fund must transfer cash or highly liquid short-term
bonds to a margin account in order to limit the risk the counterparty faces. Margining on
derivatives can become quite substantial, especially during financial crises.
We also consider capital requirements as a source of variation in illiquid assets holdings
by pension funds. Regulations often require defined benefit plans to have sufficient capital
150
4.1. INTRODUCTION
to manage the risks they are exposed to, such as financial market risks and longevity risk.4
In choosing its strategic asset allocation, a pension fund optimizes the trade-offs between
different risk factors for a given level of required capital. As a result, a pension fund may be
constrained to increase their exposure to illiquid assets. If a certain risk factor consumes a
larger part of the available capital, less capital remains to be allocated to illiquid assets.
Liquidity and capital requirements interact in two ways. First, they interact through the
liability duration as a measure of a pension fund’s average investment horizon. On the one
hand, a pension fund with a high liability duration is less liquidity constrained as it will have
to pay less pensions in the short-term. This allows for a higher allocation to illiquid assets.
On the other hand, a high liability duration also implies more exposure to interest rate risk
through the present value of its liabilities. This restricts the opportunity to invest in illiquid
assets as more of the available capital is required for interest rate risk. Second, liquidity
and capital requirements also interact through derivatives. For instance, hedging interest
rate risk increases the liquidity requirement as a result of higher collateral requirements.
However, by hedging interest rate risk, a pension fund frees up capital to invest more in
illiquid assets. Our theoretical model in Section 4.2 precisely disentangles these effects.
We empirically test the predictions from our theoretical model using the investment
decisions of Dutch occupational pension funds from 2012 to 2017. The Dutch pension system
is particularly well suited to study the effect of liquidity and capital requirements on the
illiquid assets allocation for multiple reasons. First, Dutch pension funds have mandatory
reporting requirements to the prudential supervisor, De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB). This
gives us unbiased data. Second, the Dutch pension system is large in terms of size. The
total assets under management (AUM) of Dutch pension funds’ is approximately 1.3 trillion
euro or 1.5 times the GDP of the Netherlands. Third, Dutch pension funds do not face
quantitative investment restrictions. Regulation allows them to invest in any asset class
in any country, as long as a pension fund complies with the capital requirements and the
well-known prudent person principle. Dutch pension funds invest in a broad range of asset
classes. In fact, over two-thirds of them invest in illiquid assets. Fourth, Dutch pension
funds mainly have defined benefit pension liabilities. This means that they have a clear
asset-liability perspective in making strategic investment decisions. Liabilities are valued
marked-to-market by discounting accrued benefits against the prevailing term structure of
4In Section 4.2.2 we explain that a pension fund’s capital is the difference between the market value of
assets and liabilities. The term capital requirements is synonymous to funding requirements.
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market interest rates. As a result, we can analyze the impact of liability interest rate risk
on the illiquid assets allocation.
In short, these are our key findings. First, in line with our theoretical framework, we
find a hump-shaped impact of liability duration on the fraction of risky assets invested in
illiquid assets. Up to 18 years, liability duration positively affects this allocation. For higher
durations the effect reverses. Second, we do not find evidence that interest rate risk hedging
impacts the fraction of risky assets allocated to illiquid assets. Currency risk hedging, by
contrast, creates the opportunity to allocate more to illiquid assets. A one standard deviation
increase in currency risk hedging leads to an increase in the fraction of risky assets allocated
to illiquid assets of approximately 0.71 percentage points. This implies a relative increase
in the fraction of risky assets allocated to illiquid assets of 5.5 percent. Third, we find
that, next to liability duration, also other pension fund characteristics impact strategic asset
allocation decisions. Size positively affects the fraction of risky assets allocated to illiquid
assets, which is in line with Andonov (2014) and Dyck and Pomorski (2016). A pension fund
that is ten times larger in terms of assets under management has a 7.4 percentage points
higher fraction of risky assets allocated to illiquid assets. Furthermore, corporate pension
funds invest 7.6 percentage points less in illiquid assets as fraction of risky assets compared
to industry-wide and professional group pension funds. Finally, pension funds with a lower
funding ratio invest a larger fraction of risky assets in illiquid assets, supporting the results
found in Basak and Shapiro (2001). A one standard deviation decrease in the funding ratio
increases the fraction of risky assets allocated to illiquid assets by 0.89 percentage points.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 explains the liquidity and
capital requirements of pension funds and in which way these requirements affect the illiquid
assets allocation in a theoretical framework. The data description is given in Section 4.3.
The model and results are discussed in Section 4.4. The robustness check is in Section 4.5.
Section 4.6 describes the implications of our theoretical framework for pension funds in
different regulatory frameworks and Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Illiquid assets allocation: theory
A key responsibility of a pension fund is to optimize the asset allocation given its liability
structure. This is known as Asset Liability Management (ALM). Here, we focus on a specific
part of the ALM process: the strategic allocation to illiquid assets. For our theoretical
framework the focus is on the aggregate illiquid assets allocation. In the empirical section
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we, however, also consider individual illiquid asset classes.
In deriving their strategic allocation to illiquid asset classes, pension funds assess the
benefits and costs imposed by these investments. Important drivers of the investment
decision are the risk-return trade-offs, the portfolio diversification benefits, and the ability of
illiquid assets to hedge liability risk. Other drivers of investment decisions are constraints.
We focus on liquidity and capital requirements and conjecture that these impact investment
decisions. We, therefore, first formally introduce the liquidity and capital requirements.
Next, we show in a theoretical model how the two requirements interact and affect investment
decisions.
4.2.1 Liquidity requirements
A pension fund must have sufficient liquidity available to fulfill its immediate obligations.
Liquidity requirements consist mainly of two components: short-term pension payments
and collateral requirements on interest rate and currency derivatives. The cash required
for pension payments in the foreseeable future is generally well predictable. The number of
retirees and their benefits are known. However, the cash needed for collateral requirements,
is much less predictable. If the market value of a derivative declines, the pension fund is
required to transfer cash or highly liquid short-term bonds to a margin account. Margining on
derivatives can become quite substantial, especially during financial crises. Pension payments
can be seen as the expected liquidity requirement, whereas collateral requirements present
liquidity risk. Liquidity problems arise when a pension fund lacks the resources to fulfill its
immediate obligations.5
An investor facing liquidity risk should reduce the allocation to illiquid assets in order
to avoid states of the world in which it would be short liquidity. Theoretical studies from
for instance Gârleanu (2009) and Ang et al. (2014) show this formally. From a theoretical
perspective we, therefore, predict that higher liquidity requirements restrict investments in
illiquid assets. We will now discuss liquidity requirements in more detail.
5Salary payments to pension fund’s staff, administrative expenses and investment costs are also sources
that require short-term liquidity, but are generally small compared to the size of the pension fund and
therefore outside the scope of this paper.
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Liquidity requirement for pension payments
We start with the short-term pension payments and denote these by LRP . We define this
as the ratio of pension payments in the first year to the present value of total liabilities. To
formalise this, suppose we have an homogeneous group of participants with mortality rate
λ that receive annual pension payments of A at the beginning of each year. The pension
payments in year t are then given by
A exp(−λt). (4.1)





A exp(−(r + λ)t)dt = A
r + λ
. (4.2)




= r + λ. (4.3)















Equation (4.5) has an intuitive interpretation. The liability duration is the weighted
average time to maturity of all pension payments. In other words, it measures a pension
fund’s average investment horizon. A high liability duration DV implies less short-term
payments as only a small fraction of the liabilities has to be paid out in the near future.
In line with the findings in Ang et al. (2014), a high liability duration, therefore, creates
opportunities to invest in illiquid assets. The inability to frequently trade illiquid assets is
less of a restriction for a pension fund with a high liability duration.
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Liquidity requirement for interest rate derivatives
Next to short-term pension payments, liquidity requirements also arise to meet margin
requirements on derivatives. We consider margin requirements on interest rate swaps in this
section and on currency forwards in the next section. For model tractability we refer to
the interest rate derivates portfolio as a position in a single receiver swap. Pension funds
mainly use receiver swaps to hedge the interest rate risk embedded in the present value of
the pension liabilities. In a receiver swap a pension fund pays a counterparty a floating rate
and receives, in return, a fixed rate over a certain notional amount. We denote the notional
of the receiver swap by N and the duration of its fixed leg by DR. The fraction of interest
rate risk hedged with the receiver swap, again relative to the total value of liabilities V , is







We model the liquidity requirement on the swap through a margin call. In case of a
receiver swap an increase in the interest rate dr+ leads to a margin call because it lowers the








We could add a second-order, convexity, effect to (4.6). However, this has only a small effect
on the quantitative results of the model and is, therefore, excluded here to keep the model
simple.
Liquidity requirement for foreign exchange derivatives
The liquidity requirement on foreign exchange derivatives also results from margin calls in
case the value of the derivative portfolio decreases. Pension funds generally hedge exchange
rate risk using currency forwards. We assume that the pension funds in our model each have
a position in a single forward contract. We consider an increase in the foreign exchange rate
dFX+ because this lowers the value of the forward contract and, thus, results in a margin
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where wFX is the fraction of V invested in foreign assets and φFX is the foreign exchange
hedge ratio relative to V .
We can now determine the total liquidity requirement by adding together (4.5)-(4.7). This






+ + wFXφFXdFX+. (4.8)
4.2.2 Capital requirements
Next to liquidity requirements the pension funds in our sample also face capital requirements
to be able to absorb financial markets risks and longevity risk. In contrast to a bank or an
insurer, a pension fund generally does not have shareholders that provide capital. Instead,
a pension fund’s capital is the difference between the value of the assets and the value
of the liabilities. In the Netherlands, the capital requirement is risk-based and calculated
as a Value-at-Risk risk measure (Broeders and Pröpper, 2010). In fact, the level of the
required capital is calculated such that the probability that the funding ratio falls below
100 percent on a one-year horizon equals 2.5 percent. This level is pension fund specific.
Pension funds determine the capital requirement by applying a method prescribed by law
that takes the following risk factors into account: interest rate risk, equity and real estate
risk, currency risk, commodity risk, credit risk, and longevity risk. The capital required
for each of these risk factors is determined by simulating the impact on a pension fund’s
capital of a prescribed shock in the risk factor. The total capital requirement follows from
aggregating the individual requirements using a correlation matrix. In practice a pension
fund does not always have sufficient capital. If that is the case a pension fund gets a 10
year recovery period to become compliant again. The Dutch setting is unique and allows us
study the effect of capital requirements on the illiquid assets allocation. For the purpose of
our paper we only consider the capital requirement for interest rate risk and for currency
risk. Pension funds also have a capital requirement for equity risk. But this requirement is
only related to the equity allocation and does not depend on the liability structure, which
is the core risk driver in our model.
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Capital requirement for interest rate risk
The root cause of interest rate risk is embedded in the present value of the future pension
payments. Pension funds can hedge this liability interest rate risk not only with receiver
swaps but also with bonds. In the Dutch regulations, the capital requirement is therefore
based on the part of the liability interest rate risk that is not hedged with swaps and bonds.
We already introduced the swap hedge ratio φR. The bond hedge ratio, or the fraction of
interest rate risk hedged with bonds, is denoted by φB. If a pension fund invests fraction
B/V in bonds with a duration of DB then φ







Next we consider a decrease in the interest rate dr−. An interest rate decrease typically
lowers the funding ratio because it increases the value of the liabilities more than the value
of the swaps and bonds. The first-order approximation of the capital requirement for interest
rate risk is given by6
CRR = −(1− φR − φB)DV dr−. (4.9)
To keep the capital requirement for interest rate risk in (4.9) positive, we assume that pension
funds never over-hedge their interest rate risk exposure, so that φR + φB ≤ 1.7
Capital requirement for foreign exchange rate risk
Pension funds hedge foreign exchange rate risk typically with currency forwards. Exchange
rate risk occurs when the liabilities are dominated in one currency and the investments in
another currency. The capital requirement depends on the part of the exchange rate risk
that is not hedged with forwards. We consider a decrease in the foreign exchange rate dFX−
because this lowers the value of the assets in the local currency. The capital requirement for
6We again exclude the convexity effect here as it only has a small second-order effect on the quantitative
results.
7This assumption is realistic as the value-weighted average interest rate risk hedging across Dutch pension
funds equals 40 percent, meaning that φR + φB = 0.40.
157
CHAPTER 4. ILLIQUID ASSETS: LIQUIDITY AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
exchange rate risk equals
CRFX = −wFX(1− φFX)dFX−. (4.10)
Adding (4.9) and (4.10) together gives us the total capital requirement CR, again relative
to V , as
CR = −(1− φR − φB)DV dr− − wFX(1− φFX)dFX−. (4.11)
4.2.3 Overall liquidity and capital requirements
To derive the overall impact of liquidity and capital requirements on investment policy we
will combine them. In order to do that we make the following three assumptions. First, we
assume that capital and margin requirements are interchangable. If a pension fund hedges
risks with derivatives it will have a lower capital requirement but it will be more exposed
to margin calls. Second, we assume that a positive and negative shocks in a risk factor
are equally likely and that the changes are identical in absolute value. The latter means
for interest rate risk that dr+ = −dr− = dr and for exchange rate risk that dFX+ =
−dFX− = dFX. This is reasonable as a pension fund cannot ex ante know whether an
increase or decrease in the underlying risk factor occurs. Third, we assume that the capital
requirements and the margin calls are calibrated with the same probability on the same
horizon. We believe this to be reasonable because from a risk management perspective it is
logical to measure risk independent of how to manage the risk (via capital or via derivatives).





+ (1− φB)DV dr + wFXdFX. (4.12)
Equation (4.12) shows that the total requirement is a non-linear function of the liability
duration and a linear function of the foreign exchange risk exposure. The reader may notice
that Equation (4.12) does not depend on the swap hedge ratio φR. The intuition behind
this is that in our model a margin call on the swap cancels against the capital requirement.
The more a pension fund hedges it’s interest rate risk with swaps, the higher the liquidity
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requirement and equally lower the capital requirement.8 For the same reason, φFX also does
not appear in the total requirement (4.12).
Based on the analysis above we can derive for which pension funds the total requirement
TR is least constraining to invest in illiquid assets. For that we examine how the liability
duration of a pension fund impacts the total requirement. We equate the first-order derivative





+ (1− φB)dr = 0. (4.13)






Based on this we expect pension funds with a liability duration of around D∗V to have the
highest exposure to illiquid assets. Pension funds with a higher or a lower liability duration
are more constrained by capital and liquidity requirements to invest in illiquid assets.
We illustrate how liability duration impacts the total requirement TR in a stylized, but
representative, example. We take the following shocks to calculate the liquidity and capital
requirement to be equal to dr = 0.5% and dFX = 25%. These values are comparable to the
ones in Dutch pension funds’ regulations and to the calibration in Solvency II regulation.
Next we take a continuum of pension funds that are equal except for their liability duration.
We use the following parameter values that match with the average Dutch pension fund:
φR = 20%, φB = 20%, φFX = 25%, and wFX = 50%. Figure 4.1 shows how, all else
equal, the liquidity, capital, and total requirement depend on the liability duration. From
this figure it follows that the liquidity requirement is a convex decreasing function of DV ,
whereas the capital requirement is a linearly increasing function ofDV . The total requirement
TR is therefore first increasing and then decreasing depending on a pension fund’s liability
duration. A low total requirement implies that a pension fund has more opportunities to
invest in illiquid assets. Thus, our model predicts that the impact of DV on the illiquid assets
allocation follows the inverse shape of the total requirement in Figure 4.1. In other words,
DV creates a hump-shaped effect on the illiquid assets allocation. We will see in Section 4.4
8This is not exactly true in practice, because the total capital requirement takes into account a
diversification effect between interest rate risk and other risk factors. This diversification effect however
only has a marginal second order effect on the numerical solution of the model.
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Figure 4.1. Liquidity requirement, capital requirement, and total requirement as
a function of liability duration
We use the following parameter values dr = 0.5%, φR = 20%, φB = 20%, dFX = 25%,
φFX = 50%, and wFX = 50%.
that our empirical analysis confirms this.
The economic interpretation of Figure 4.1 is as follows. If we compare pension fund A
with a liability duration of 10 years, with pension fund B with a liability duration of 15 years,
we see that pension fund B has a lower total requirement. The lower liquidity requirement
of pension fund B (∆LR) is not fully compensated by a higher capital requirement (∆CR)
compared to A. The higher liability duration of B thus creates more opportunities to invest
in illiquid assets compared to pension fund A. If we compare pension fund C with a liability
duration of 20 years, with pension fund B, we see the reverse effect. The total requirement
of pension fund C is higher in comparison to pension fund B. Although pension fund C
has a lower liquidity requirement, this is more than fully compensated by a higher capital
requirement relative to pension fund B. In Figure 4.1 the reflection point is at DV = 15.8.
This reflection point will be different for other parameter configurations.
4.2.4 Summary of the hypotheses
In this section we summarize the hypotheses that follow from our theoretical framework. We
expect a hump-shaped impact of liability duration on the illiquid assets allocation and we
assess this by adding the square of the liability duration to the regression model. Based on
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the total requirement in (4.12) we expect that the swap hedge ratio and the foreign exchange
hedge ratio have no effect on the fraction of risky assets invested in illiquid assets. Both
the swap and foreign exchange hedge ratios do not appear in the total requirement because
the liquidity and capital requirement cancel out against each other. Following (4.12) we do
however expect that the bond hedge ratio will positively impact the illiquid assets allocation.
If a pension fund hedges more interest rate risk with bonds it will unlock some of its capital.
This can be used to invest a larger fraction of risky assets in illiquid assets. Further, we
expect that pension funds that invest more in non-euro dominated assets will allocate less
to illiquid assets. A higher exposure to currency risk will seize a larger part of the capital
that therefore is less available to invest in illiquid assets.
In the empirical section we will focus on three regression specifications. The main
regression uses the fraction of risky assets invested in illiquid assets as dependent variable.
We explain in detail why we use the fraction of risky assets allocated to illiquid assets as
dependent variable in Section 4.4. In addition to that, we will also assess the impact of
liability duration and hedging on the allocation to illiquid assets and on the allocation to
risky assets.
4.3 Data
We use quarterly data on N=219 Dutch pension funds including their asset allocations,
interest rate derivatives, currency derivatives, and other characteristics such as size and
pension fund type. The data are free from reporting biases because pension funds report
mandatory, following strict reporting requirements, to De Nederlandsche Bank the prudential
supervisor in the Netherlands. The sample runs from the beginning of 2012 to the end of
2017, or 24 quarters. Following a change in the reporting requirements in 2015, we carefully
merge the data before and after 2015 to ensure consistency.9 We only consider defined
benefit pension funds because those are subject to capital requirements. Because Dutch
pension funds cannot go bankrupt, there is no survivorship bias.10 We do however exclude
pension funds that are “liquidated” during the sample period. A liquidation means that the
9From 2015 onwards the reporting requirements are more granular in order to improve the knowledge
on pension fund investment behavior.
10As a measure of last resort to prevent bankruptcy pension funds in the Netherlands can reduce accrued
pension benefits.
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pension fund will gradually transfer assets and liabilities to either another pension funds or
to an insurance company for cost efficiency reasons. Because such a gradual transfer of assets
may result in non-representative asset allocations we exclude these pension funds. Table 4.1
shows that in terms of total AUM we only exclude a minor fraction of pension funds this
way, about 2 percent.
Table 4.1. Total assets under management
This table shows the total assets under management in billions of all pension funds (left
column) and of the pension funds selected for the analysis (right column) at the end of each
year. The total number of pension funds is denoted by N . In the analysis, we leave out
pension funds that are liquidated during the sample period.









Our data distinguishes between the following 12 assets classes: government bonds, stocks
in mature markets, credits, stocks in emerging markets, inflation index-linked bonds, cash
and short-term receivables, listed indirect real estate, commodities, non-listed real estate,
mortgages, private equity, and hedge funds.11 One minus the allocation to government bonds,
inflation-index bonds, cash and short-term receivables is defined as the allocation to risky
assets (wRISKY ).12
To distinguish between illiquid and liquid asset classes we need to define the concept of
11Credits contain all credit related products, e.g. corporate bonds, bank loans, and syndicated loans.
12Privately issued inflation-index bonds constitute only a small portion of the market. As a result, we
assume that all inflation-index bonds are issued by governments.
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liquidity. An asset is considered less liquid if the investor cannot quickly sell a significant
quantity of the asset at a price near its fundamental value. Asset classes such as private
equity require buyers to have significant capital and particular knowledge about the asset
class, which are both often limited in supply. Therefore, transactions costs of illiquid assets
can become substantial. For some illiquid assets, legal impediments make it impossible to
trade for a particular time period at all, such as lock-up periods that some hedge funds and
private equity funds impose. Certainly, each asset or asset class has some time-varying degree
of liquidity. Trading volume in a corporate bond may, e.g., drop to nil if the company runs
into a bankruptcy. During the Great Financial Crisis trading in mortgage backed securities
came to a stop. As a result, no clear distinction can be made between liquid and illiquid
assets. However, some asset classes are substantially more illiquid than others in terms of
the three dimensions (time, quantity and price) mentioned above. As pension funds are
long term investors, we use immediacy as the key criterion to distinguish between liquid and
illiquid asset classes. We classify the sum of non-listed real estate, private equity, mortgages,
and hedge funds allocations as the total allocation to illiquid assets (wILLIQ). Private
equity includes both listed and non-listed private equity, infrastructure investments and
micro finance investments. The allocation to private equity contains only the commitments
already made, so future commitments are not included. Mortgages contains mortgage-backed
securities and direct mortgage lending.
The sum of allocations to stocks in mature markets, credits, stocks in emerging markets,
listed indirect real estate and commodities is defined as total allocation to liquid risky assets
(wLIQ). We define the allocation to risky assets equal to the sum of the allocation to risky
illiquid assets and the allocation to risky liquid assets
wRISKY = wILLIQ + wLIQ.
Pension funds report both strategic and actual asset allocations. We focus on the strategic
asset allocations because those better reflect the decisions made by pension funds. The actual
asset allocation, by contrast, is less useful for our research question because it is influenced
by market fluctuations and imperfect portfolio rebalancing (Bikker et al., 2010).
Table 4.2 presents the summary statistics. Panel A highlights the strategic asset allocations.
The averages are equally weighted over pension funds and time. Government bonds, stocks
mature markets and credits are the most important asset classes, with average allocations
of 33, 29 and 18 percent respectively. Concerning the illiquid asset classes, non-listed real
estate is the largest asset class with an average allocation of 4 percent. The 90th percentile
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Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics
Panel A provides summary statistics of pension funds’ strategic asset allocation. The means
and standard deviations of the actual asset allocation are shown between brackets. Panel B
provides the summary statistics of the variables specified in Section 4.3: allocation to illiquid
assets (wILLIQ), allocation to risky assets (wRISKY ), fraction of risky assets allocated to
illiquid assets (wILLIQ/wRISKY ), liability duration (DV ), collateral requirements on interest
rate derivatives (CRr), collateral requirements on currency derivatives (CRfx), bond hedge
ratio (φB), fraction of investments outside euro area (wFX), log of total AUM (Size), required
funding ratio (Rfr), and one period lag of the actual funding ratio (Fr). The summary
statistics are computed as the equally weighted average over all pension funds and all quarters
in the 2012-2017 period.
Panel A: asset allocations mean std. dev. p10 p50 p90 obs.
Liquid assets
Government bonds 0.33 [0.31] 0.20 [0.21] 0.05 0.33 0.60 4,956
Stocks mature markets 0.29 [0.30] 0.13 [0.13] 0.16 0.27 0.43 4,956
Credits 0.18 [0.19] 0.12 [0.11] 0.00 0.17 0.34 4,956
Stocks emerging markets 0.05 [0.05] 0.04 [0.04] 0.00 0.05 0.10 4,956
Inflation index-linked bonds 0.02 [0.02] 0.05 [0.05] 0.00 0.00 0.08 4,956
Listed real estate 0.02 [0.03] 0.03 [0.04] 0.00 0.00 0.05 4,956
Commodities 0.01 [0.01] 0.02 [0.02] 0.00 0.00 0.05 4,956
Cash and short-term receivables 0.01 [0.03] 0.07 [0.08] 0.00 0.00 0.03 4,956
Illiquid assets
Non-listed real estate 0.04 [0.04] 0.05 [0.05] 0.00 0.03 0.12 4,956
Mortgages 0.02 [0.02] 0.04 [0.04] 0.00 0.00 0.07 4,956
Private equity 0.01 [0.01] 0.02 [0.02] 0.00 0.00 0.05 4,956
Hedge funds 0.01 [0.01] 0.02 [0.02] 0.00 0.00 0.04 4,956
Panel B: variables mean std. dev. p10 p50 p90 obs.
Allocation to illiquid assets 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.20 4,956
Allocation to risky assets 0.64 0.18 0.40 0.65 0.90 4,956
Fraction illiquid in risky assets 0.13 0.12 0.00 0.11 0.30 4,904
Liability duration 18.90 3.98 14.60 18.60 23.90 4,978
CR on interest rate derivatives 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.10 4,973
CR on currency derivatives 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.10 4,991
Bond hedge ratio 0.25 0.14 0.09 0.22 0.45 4,940
Foreign investments 0.22 0.22 0.00 0.20 0.51 3,682
Log of total AUM 5.84 0.81 5.00 5.79 6.86 4,997
Required funding ratio 1.16 0.07 1.10 1.16 1.23 4,992
Funding ratio (t-1) 1.09 0.13 0.96 1.07 1.22 4,992
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shows that 10 percent of the pension funds invest more than 12 percent in this asset class.
Pension funds on average invest 2 percent in mortgages. The other two illiquid asset classes
have a strategic allocation of around 1 percent on average. Panel A also shows the mean and
standard deviation of the actual asset allocations between brackets. The differences between
the strategic and actual asset allocations are small suggesting that pension funds on average
rebalance their portfolios accurately.
Turning to Panel B, we see that the average allocation to the illiquid assets equals 8
percent. Approximately one-third of Dutch pension funds do not invest in illiquid assets at
all. The 90th percentile however shows that 10 percent of the pension funds allocate over 20
percent of their total AUM to illiquid assets.
Table 4.3 shows that the strategic illiquid assets allocation is not fixed and varies over the
sample period. This holds for both the aggregate illiquid assets allocation and the illiquid
asset classes separately. Pension funds generally review their strategic asset allocation every
3 years. This implies that pension funds on average reviewed there illiquid assets allocation
twice during the sample period.
Table 4.3. Time variation in the strategic illiquid assets allocation
This table shows the cross-sectional average time variation of pension fund’s illiquid assets
allocation over the period 2012–2017. The average time variation is computed as the
cross-sectional average of the standard deviation of pension funds’ strategic illiquid assets
allocations over time.
Illiquid asset class time variation
Total illiquid assets 0.0251




B - Liability duration
Pension funds report the modified duration of their liabilities (DV ). The liability duration
is summarized in Panel B of Table 4.2. The average liability duration equals 18.9 years.
However, 10 percent of the pension funds have a liability duration below 14.6 years and 10
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percent have a liability duration in excess of 23.9 years. This shows there is quite some
variation in the average investment horizon of pension funds.
C - Collateral requirements
Unfortunately, pension funds do not report on their swap hedge ratio or their foreign
exchange hedge ratio. However, the data do allow us to calculate the collateral requirements
in case of an adverse event in the underlying risk factor, which we argue are good proxies
for the swap hedge ratio and the foreign exchange hedge ratio.13 We will, therefore, explain
in detail how we measure the collateral requirements.
Pension funds report the market value of the total interest rate derivatives and currency
derivatives that they have entered into. In addition, they also report the expected values of
these positions after some predefined shocks in the underlying risk factors. For interest rate
risk these shocks are an increase (decrease) in the term structure of market interest rates of
1 percentage points and for foreign exchange risk an appreciation (depreciation) of foreign
currencies with respect to the euro of 25 percent.
The collateral requirement on interest rate derivatives (CRr) is the absolute difference
between the market value of the portfolio of derivatives after a predetermined shock, MV rs,
minus its current market value, MV rc. We divide the absolute value of this difference by
the total assets under management (AUM)
CRr =
|MV rs −MV rc|
AUM
.
We define the collateral requirements on currency derivatives (CRfx) as the absolute
difference between the market value of the portfolio of derivatives after a predetermined
shock, MV fxs, minus its current market value, MV fxc. We express the absolute value of
the change relative to the total AUM
CRfx =
|MV fxs −MV fxc|
AUM
.
We determine the collateral requirements by using an increase in the interest rate of 1
percentage points and an increase of the foreign currency relative to the euro of 25 percent.
13As of 2015, pension funds do report the swap hedge ratio. The correlation between the reported swap
hedge ratio and our computation of the collateral requirement on interest rate derivatives equals 0.75. This
shows that our approximation of the swap hedge ratio is not far off.
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The collateral requirements on interest rate derivatives and on currency derivatives are
summarized in Panel B of Table 4.2. The averages of both are of the same order of magnitude
and equal 5 percent of AUM. The 10th percentiles are in both cases equal to zero, revealing
that some pension funds do not hedge these risks with derivatives at all.
D - Bond hedge ratio and foreign investments
Our theoretical model in (4.12) shows that the bond hedge ratio (φB) and the fraction
invested outside the euro area (wFX) affect the illiquid assets allocation. Table 4.2 shows
that pension fund on average hedge 25 percent of their liability interest rate risk with bonds.
About 10 percent of the pension funds in the sample have a bond hedge ratio in excess of 45
percent. The fraction investments outside the euro area equals 22 percent on average and 51
percent in the 90th percentile. In our theoretical model we express all results relative to the
liabilities. Here we take both the bond hedge ratio and the foreign investments as a fraction
of total AUM to make the quantities easier to interpret. Expressing the quantities in either
AUM or liabilities does however not materially affect our empirical analysis.
E - Control variables
As control variables we include the log of total assets under management (Size), pension
fund type (Type), the required funding ratio (Rfr) and the actual funding ratio at the end of
the previous period (Fr). We distinguish between three types of pension funds. There are 55
industry-wide pension funds, 10 professional group pension funds and 154 corporate pension
funds in the sample. Industry-wide pension funds are generally mandatory pension funds
and organize pensions for a specific industry or sector, e.g., civil servants or hospital staff.
Professional group pension funds provide pensions for a single profession such as hairdressers
or pharmacists. Corporate pension funds arrange pensions for a particular company.
The level of the required funding ratio to comply with regulations depends on the specific
risk profile of a pension fund.14 Including the required funding ratio in the regression model,
therefore, controls for differences in risk appetite. For instance, a “young” pension fund
(with a high liability duration) could substantially differ in its risk appetite compared to an
“old” pension fund (with a low liability duration), potentially driving the impact of liability
duration on the illiquid assets allocation. Furthermore, pension funds that hedge only a
14The risk profile is measured by the “mismatch” between assets and liabilities.
167
CHAPTER 4. ILLIQUID ASSETS: LIQUIDITY AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
small part of their interest rate risk or currency risk, could be the ones that take more risk
in general, potentially driving the effect of hedging on the illiquid assets allocation.
The actual, previous period, funding ratio is also included in the analysis. From the
literature on risk-taking behavior of pension funds, the actual funding ratio could either
have a positive or a negative effect on the illiquid assets allocation. Basak and Shapiro
(2001) show that, compared to normal circumstances, investors take more risk in worst case
scenarios when they are subjected to a VaR requirement. On the other hand, Rauh (2009),
using US corporate defined benefit pension funds data, finds that poorly funded pension
plans allocate a larger share of their assets to government bonds.
Size, required funding ratio and actual funding ratio are summarized in Panel B, Table 4.2.
The 10th and 90th percentile of the log of total AUM reveals that the size distribution is
right skewed: the largest pension funds in our sample are considerably larger compared to
the mean pension fund. The average required funding ratio equals 116 percent and varies
from 110 to 123 percent. The actual funding ratio equals 109 percent on average, which is
substantially below the required funding ratio of pension funds.
Table 4.4 splits the sample in pension funds that invest and that do not invest in illiquid
assets. The latter group takes less risk in general, having on average a 10 percentage points
lower risky assets allocation. The table also reveals that the average size of pension funds
that do not invest in illiquid assets is considerably smaller. On other dimensions, however,
the subsamples are comparable.
4.4 Allocation to illiquid assets: empirical results
To measure the impact of liquidity and capital requirements on the illiquid assets allocation,
we estimate a static random effects Tobit model.15 The Tobit model controls for left-
censoring of the allocation to illiquid assets at zero. This is necessary as a substantial
number of pension funds does not invest in illiquid assets. Asset allocation decisions are
typically first made to very broad asset classes such as safe assets (bonds) and risky assets
(stocks). In a second step, asset allocations are determined within each broad asset class
(Binsbergen et al., 2008). Following this top-down decision-making process, we first analyze
the aggregate illiquid assets allocation. Because illiquid asset classes differ in their degree of
15A random effects structure corrects for time-invariant pension funds’ characteristics that we do not
observe but potentially play a role in investment decisions.
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Table 4.4. Descriptive statistics - subsamples
This table specifies the summary statistics of the variables specified in Section 4.3 for
pension funds that do invest in illiquid assets (Panel A) and pension funds that do not
invest in illiquid assets (Panel B): allocation to illiquid assets (wILLIQ), allocation to
risky assets (wRISKY ), fraction of risky assets allocated to illiquid assets (wILLIQ/wRISKY ),
liability duration (DV ), collateral requirements on interest rate derivatives (CRr), collateral
requirements on currency derivatives (CRfx), bond hedge ratio (φB), fraction of investments
outside euro area (wFX), log of total AUM (Size), required funding ratio (Rfr), and the
one period lag of the actual funding ratio (Fr). The summary statistics are computed as the
equally weighted average over all pension funds and all quarters in the 2012-2017 period.
Panel A: pension funds that invest in illiquid assets
mean std. dev. p10 p50 p90
Allocation to illiquid assets 0.12 0.08 0.03 0.11 0.22
Allocation to risky assets 0.67 0.16 0.47 0.67 0.90
Fraction illiquid in risky assets 0.18 0.10 0.05 0.16 0.32
Liability duration 18.61 3.50 15.00 18.00 23.00
CR on interest rate derivatives 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.09
CR on currency derivatives 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.10
Bond hedge ratio 0.24 0.12 0.10 0.22 0.40
Foreign investments 0.23 0.22 0.00 0.23 0.53
Log of total AUM 6.05 0.77 5.19 5.98 7.00
Required funding ratio 1.17 0.07 1.11 1.17 1.24
Funding ratio (t-1) 1.09 0.12 0.96 1.08 1.22
Panel B: pension funds that do not invest in illiquid assets
mean std. dev. p10 p50 p90
Allocation to illiquid assets 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Allocation to risky assets 0.57 0.22 0.30 0.56 0.91
Fraction illiquid in risky assets 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Liability duration 20.00 4.88 14.00 20.00 26.00
CR on interest rate derivatives 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.12
CR on currency derivatives 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.09
Bond hedge ratio 0.28 0.18 0.08 0.23 0.58
Foreign investments 0.18 0.19 0.00 0.12 0.44
Log of total AUM 5.28 0.62 4.65 5.30 6.03
Required funding ratio 1.15 0.06 1.08 1.14 1.22
Funding ratio (t-1) 1.10 0.16 0.95 1.07 1.24
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immediacy, we look at individual illiquid asset classes separately in the next section.
We will however not assess the illiquid assets allocation directly. Instead we will take the
fraction of risky assets invested in illiquid assets as our key dependent variable. The main
reason to take this fraction is to circumvent mechanical effects. The following two examples
show these mechanical effects. First, suppose that a pension fund decides to invest more in
bonds, this mechanically results in a lower allocation to risky assets and therefore, potentially,
also a lower allocation to illiquid assets. Second, Dutch pension funds invest the majority of
their bond portfolio in the euro area, whereas the risky assets are generally invested more
globally. Currency hedging is thus directly related to the risky assets allocation. A positive
effect of currency hedging on the illiquid assets allocation could therefore be mechanical.
In alternative model specifications we nonetheless also use the allocation to illiquid assets
(wILLIQ) and to risky assets (wRISKY ) as dependent variables. In the latter case we estimate
a standard random effects model as there is no censoring around zero.
The general model specification is
wILLIQit
wRISKYit
= β0 + β1DV,it + β2D
2





+ β7Sizeit + β8Typei + β9Rfrit + β10Frit−1 + λt + εit
where wi indicates the allocation of pension fund i = 1, ..., N at the end of the quarter
t = 2012Q1, ..., 2017Q4. The main explanatory variables are the liability duration (DV ), the
square of the liability duration (D2V ), the collateral requirements on interest rate derivatives
(CRr), the collateral requirements on currency derivatives (CRfx), the bond hedge ratio φB,
and the fraction of total foreign investments wFX . To link the main regression specification
directly to our theoretical framework, we recall from the previous section that CRr proxies
for the swap hedge ratio φR and CRfx proxies for the foreign exchange hedge ratio φFX . The
control variables are the log of total AUM (Size), the pension fund type (Type), the required
funding ratio (Rfr) and the lag of the actual funding ratio (Fr). We include dummies for
the pension fund type, where the reference group consists of industry-wide pension funds.
A professional group pension fund is denoted by dummy Prof and a corporate pension
fund by dummy Corp. The fall in market interest rates over our sample period may have
caused pension funds to increase their allocation towards illiquid assets in a search for yield
(Boubaker et al., 2017). Therefore, we control for time-fixed effects (λ) in all our model
specifications.
Another potential concern is that pension funds with a high liability duration are more
170
4.4. ALLOCATION TO ILLIQUID ASSETS: EMPIRICAL RESULTS
likely to hedge interest rate risk using swaps. The reason for this is that there are not
sufficient long-term government bonds available to match with the duration of long-term
pension liabilities. This issue is more severe for pension funds with a high liability duration.
Therefore, liability duration DV and collateral requirement for interest rate risk CRr may
be correlated. Table 4.5 shows that there is indeed a positive correlation between DV and
CRr, however, given a value of 0.40 collinearity should not be an issue. This implies that
the results for DV and CRr can be interpreted separately.
16
Table 4.5. Correlation table of key variables
This table provides the correlation matrix of the key variables: liability duration (DV ),
collateral requirements on interest rate derivatives (CRr), collateral requirements on
currency derivatives (CRfx), bond hedge ratio (φB), fraction of investments outside euro
area (wFX), log of total AUM (Size), required funding ratio (Rfr), and the one period lag
of the actual funding ratio (Fr).
Correlation matrix
DV CRr CRfx φ
B wFX Size Rfr Fr
DV 1
CRr 0.40 1
CRfx 0.02 0.12 1
φB −0.29 −0.40 −0.24 1
wFX 0.20 0.01 0.27 −0.17 1
Size 0.04 0.06 0.21 −0.15 0.28 1
Rfr 0.12 −0.17 0.13 −0.24 0.29 0.16 1
Fr −0.33 −0.19 −0.08 0.06 −0.07 −0.15 −0.02 1
16We also run our models to test for a possible interaction between liability duration and collateral
requirements. The interaction term between both variables is, however, statistically indifferent from zero in
all of the model specifications. These results are available upon request. Further, the liability duration (Dv)
is negatively correlated with bond hedge ratio (φB) as well as the lagged funding ratio (Fr). The variance
inflation factor for liability duration equals 11−R2 = 1.15, which is far below the threshold for multicollinearity
issues (10), and hence multicollinearity is not an issue here.
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A - Liability duration
Table 4.6 shows the results for the main model specification in (4.15). The first column shows
that liability duration has a positive effect on the fraction of risky assets allocated to illiquid
assets, whereas the square of the liability duration has a negative impact. Both coefficients
are statistically significant at the 1 percent significance level. This means that there is




β1 + 2β2DV = 0 → DV = − β12β2 ), the effect of liability duration is positive. After this point
however, the effect reverses. The fraction of illiquid assets for a pension fund with a liability
duration of 11 years is 1.07 percentage points higher compared to a pension fund with a
liability duration of 10 years. A pension fund with a liability duration of 26 years allocates
1.02 percentage points less to illiquid assets compared to a pension funds with a 25 year
duration.17 Figure 4.2 shows the estimated hump-shaped impact of liability duration on the
fraction of the risky assets allocated to illiquid assets.
The results are in line with our theoretical predictions. Up to a liability duration of
18 years, the liquidity requirement decreases faster than the capital requirement increases.
A pension fund with a high liability duration has less short-term liabilities relative to a
pension fund with a low liability duration. A high liability duration implies that it is less of
a constraint for a pension fund not being able to trade frequently in illiquid assets. Beyond
a liability duration of 18 years however, the capital requirement increases faster than the
liquidity requirement decreases. This lowers the opportunity to invest in illiquid assets.
As an alternative specification we use the allocation to illiquid risky assets wILLIQ
(Table 4.6, Column (2)). Again, a hump-shaped impact of liability duration on the illiquid
assets allocation appears. We also assess the allocation to risky assets wRISKY . Table 4.6,
Column (3) shows a negative impact of liability duration on the risky assets allocation, while
the of duration squared is positive. Figure 4.3 plots the combined impact on the allocation
to risky assets. The increase in the risky asset allocation on the right-hand side of this figure
coincides with the findings in Andonov et al. (2017), who find that the investment policy
of public and private European and Canadian pension funds and private US pension funds
is more aggressive for less mature pension funds. A study by Alestalo and Puttonen (2006)
17Notice that the coefficients are estimates based on the uncensored latent variable, not the observed
outcome. The coefficients are the right interpretation for all observations on the dependent variable,
wILLIQ/wRISKY , above zero. In order to get the effect on the actual observed dependent variable, the
coefficient estimates have to be multiplied by the probability of the dependent variable being above zero.
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Table 4.6. Main results - total illiquid assets allocation
In this table, we show the random effects estimators based on the regression (4.15). The
dependent variable in the first column is the strategic fraction of risky assets allocated
to illiquid assets (wILLIQ/wRISKY ), the dependent variable in the second column is the
strategic allocation to illiquid assets (wILLIQ) and the third column uses the strategic risky
assets allocation as dependent variable (wRISKY ). The fourth column uses actual rather
than strategic allocations. The independent variables include the liability duration (DV ),
the liability duration squared (D2V ), the collateral requirements on interest rate derivatives
(CRr), the collateral requirements on currency derivatives (CRfx), bond hedge ratio (φB),
fraction of foreign investments (wFX), the log of total AUM (Size), Corp indicates a
corporate pension fund, Prof indicates a professional pension fund, Rfr is the required
funding ratio, and Fr the one period lag of the actual funding ratio. Standard errors are
between parentheses; ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable wILLIQ/wRISKY wILLIQ wRISKY wILLIQ/wRISKY
DV .0254
∗∗∗ .0126∗∗∗ −.0404∗∗∗ .0120∗∗
(0056) (.0039) (.0062) (.0050)
D2V −.0007∗∗∗ −.0004∗∗∗ .0009∗∗∗ −.0004∗∗∗
(.0001) (.0001) (.0002) (.0001)
CRr −.0124 −.0141 −.0208 .0355
(.0576) (.0405) (.0713) (.0517)
CRfx .1784∗∗∗ .1371∗∗∗ .4104∗∗∗ .0151
(.0363) (.0255) (.0481) (.0325)
φB .0204 −.0761∗∗∗ −.4038∗∗∗ .0127
(.0181) (.0127) (.0220) (.0162)
wFX −.0125 −.0013 −.1342∗∗∗ .0424∗∗∗
(.0125) (.0088) (.0152) (.0108)
Size .0736∗∗∗ .0566∗∗∗ .0604∗∗∗ .0625∗∗∗
(.0102) (.0075) (.0098) (.0093)
Corp −.0757∗∗∗ −.0454∗∗∗ .0218 −.0535∗∗∗
(.0217) (.0143) (.0194) (.0173)
Prof .0184 .0068 −.0234 .0053
(.0438) (.0288) (.0380) (.0341)
Rfr −.0006 .0045 .0192 .0608∗∗∗
(.0190) (.0133) (.0277) (.0180)
Fr −.0686∗∗ −.0562∗∗∗ −.0723∗∗ −.1418∗∗
(.0275) (.0192) (.0304) (.0245)
Time FE Y Y Y Y
N 3,401 3,401 3,433 3,400
Left-censored 877 890 n/a 606
Uncensored 2,524 2,511 n/a 2,794
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Figure 4.2. The effect of the liability duration on the fraction of risky assets
allocated to illiquid assets
The calculations are based on assuming an industry-wide pension fund that has average
foreign exchange risk hedging activities, average size, and average lag funding ratio (other
variables are set equal to zero as they are not statistically significant). The dashed line
represents the 95% confidence interval.
reports similar findings for Finnish pension funds. However, Figure 4.3 also highlights on the
left-hand side that mature pension funds invest more in risky assets compared to pension
funds with an average liability duration. A possible explanation is that mature pension funds
can more easily hedge their liabilities with bonds instead of swaps and can consequently use
their capital for risk-taking.
In Column (4) of Table 4.6 we use actual rather than strategic asset allocations. We
observe the following. First, the liability duration has a again hump-shaped impact on the
fraction of risky assets allocated to illiquid assets. The reflection point is now at a liability
duration of 15.0 years. Second, hedging of interest rate risk and currency risk does not affect
the fraction of risky assets allocated to illiquid assets. Third, foreign investments has a
significant and positive impact. Although these results seem to better support or theoretical
predictions, using actual instead of strategic asset allocations might cause effects that are
(partly) driven by the performance of the different asset classes or imperfect rebalancing by
pension funds.
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Figure 4.3. The effect of the liability duration on the risky assets allocation
The calculations are based on assuming an industry-wide pension fund that has average
foreign exchange risk hedging activities, average bond hedging activities, average foreign
investments, average size, and average lag funding ratio (other variables are set equal to
zero as they are not statistically significant).The dashed line represents the 95% confidence
interval.
B - Collateral requirements
Table 4.6 shows that the collateral requirements on interest rate swaps (CRr) do not have
an effect on the allocation to illiquid assets. This is in line with the theoretical predictions of
our model: the liquidity and capital requirement cancel out against each other. However, we
do find a significant and positive impact of collateral requirements on currency forwards. At
first glance, this result seems to conflict the predictions of our model. However, in practice
collateral requirements for currency forwards are less strict than for interest rate swaps and in
some cases even non-existent. In our theoretical framework, this implies the that the increase
in liquidity requirements for currency risk hedging is smaller than the decrease in the capital
requirement. This creates opportunities to invest in illiquid assets. A one standard deviation
increase in the collateral requirements (an increase of 0.04 CRfx) implies an increase in the
fraction of risky assets allocated to illiquid assets of approximately 0.71 percentage points.
The average fraction of risky assets allocated to illiquid assets of the pension funds that have
a positive allocation to illiquid assets equals 18 percent. This implies a relative increase in
the fraction of risky assets allocated to illiquid assets of approximately 4.0 percent.
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The impact of collateral requirements on the allocation to risky assets is also shown
in Table 4.6, Column (3). The findings are comparable to the effects of the fraction of
risky assets invested in illiquid assets. Notice that we control for the total fraction invested
in foreign currencies such that the results we obtain are not mechanical. A one standard
deviation increase in the collateral requirement (an increase of 0.04 CRfx) implies an increase
in the risky assets allocation of approximately 1.64 percentage points. This implies a relative
increase in the risky asset allocation of 2.6 percent. Taken together, a larger foreign exchange
hedge ratio increases the allocation to risky assets which in turn increases the fraction of
risky assets that is allocated to illiquid assets.
C - Bond hedge ratio and foreign investments
We do not find a statistically significant effect of the bond hedge ratio on the fraction
allocated to illiquid assets, although the sign of the coefficient is in line with our theoretical
framework. The bond hedge ratio negatively affects the allocation to illiquid assets and to
risky assets. The latter however is a mechanical effect because hedging interest rate risk
with bonds by construction lowers the allocation to risky assets.
We also do not find an effect of foreign investments on the fraction invested in illiquid
assets, although the sign of the coefficient is again in line with our model. The same is
true for the impact on the illiquid assets allocation. The fraction invested in foreign assets
has a significant negative impact on the risky assets allocation. Investing more in foreign
currencies, while keeping hedging fixed, increases the capital requirement and therefore limits
opportunities to invest in risky assets. A 10 percentage points increase in the fraction invested
in foreign assets decreases the risky assets allocation with 1.35 percentage points.
D - Control variables
We now turn to the control variables. Table 4.6 shows that size has a positive and
significant impact on the allocation to illiquid assets. A pension fund that is ten times larger
in terms of total assets under management allocates a 7.4 percentage points higher fraction
of risky assets allocated to illiquid assets. Illiquid assets are generally complex investment
products and therefore the pension fund needs to have sufficient knowledge to manage these
products. The larger a pension fund, the better it can afford to pay the costs involved in
managing complex investment products. Our finding is consistent with Andonov (2014) and
Dyck and Pomorski (2016), who show that the increase in the allocation to illiquid assets is
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more pronounced for large institutional investors. Moreover, Stoughton and Zechner (2011)
argue that economies of scale in alternative assets exist because only large investors can
afford to pay high fixed search costs to identify profitable projects or select skilled external
managers. On top of that, large institutional investors have more power to negotiate better
fees (Broeders et al., 2016). Table 4.6 also shows that large pension funds invest more in
risky assets in general, although the economic impact is somewhat smaller. A pension fund
that is ten times larger invests 6.0 percentage points more in risky assets.
We also find that corporate pension funds allocate significantly less to illiquid assets as
a fraction of risky assets compared to industry-wide pension funds. We believe that this
difference is due to the fact that a corporation is required to report on its pension fund
in the annual accounts and is therefore less willing to take risks. Indeed, the riskiness of
a corporate pension plan impacts the risk profile of the corporation (Jin et al., 2006). An
additional explanation is that corporate pension funds are more exposed to sponsor default
risk compared to compulsory and professional group pension funds. Therefore, they are less
willing to take risk (Broeders, 2010).
Finally the required funding ratio does not affect asset allocations, while the lag of the
actual funding ratio affects all allocations in Table 4.6 negatively. This implies that pension
funds with a lower last period funding ratio invest a larger fraction of their risky assets in
illiquid assets. This result supports the theoretical finding by Basak and Shapiro (2001)
that pension funds for which a VaR requirement is binding take additional investment risks.
This finding is also consistent with the empirical study of Peng and Wang (2019), who study
alternative investments decisions of US public pension plans, and find that pension plans
with lower funding ratios allocate more to alternative assets. A one standard deviation
decrease in the previous period funding ratio increases the fraction of risky assets allocated
to illiquid assets by 0.89 percentage points. Pension funds also increase the total risky assets
allocation when previous period funding ratio decreased. In other words, a lower funding
ratio implies a higher total risky assets allocation and a larger fraction of the risky assets
allocation is invested in illiquid assets.
4.4.1 Empirical results separate illiquid asset classes
So far, we treated illiquid asset classes as a homogeneous group. However, the degree of
immediacy differs across separate illiquid asset classes. For instance, the typical time between
transactions for residential housing is 4-5 years, although it can vary from months to decades
(Hansen, 1998) and (Miller et al., 2011). The average time between transactions is relatively
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high in case of private equity. Private equity investments generally run for 10 years and
trading before a contract expires is unusual (Metrick and Yasuda, 2010).
To reflect these difference in immediacy, Table 4.7 presents the results for the following
illiquid asset classes separately: real estate, mortgages, private equity and hedge funds.
The hump-shaped effect of the liability duration on the fraction of risky assets allocated
to illiquid assets is present in all four asset classes. The cut-off point where the marginal
benefits (lower liquidity requirement) and the marginal costs (higher capital requirement)
of a higher liability duration are equal, is close to the aggregate cut-off point of 18 for the
overall fraction of risky assets allocated to illiquid assets.
The results of swap hedge ratios are however mixed across the different asset classes.
Consistent with the aggregated results, the swap hedge ratio does not affect the allocation
to real estate and mortgages. In case of private equity, the swap hedge ratio positively
affects the real estate allocation. Notice that the economic magnitude is however small. A
one standard deviation increase in collateral requirement leads to an increase of the fraction
of risky assets allocated to private equity of 0.23 percentage points. On the other hand,
the swap hedge ratio negatively affects the allocation to hedge funds. The results for hedge
funds should however be interpreted with care for mainly two reasons. First, the number
of uncensored observations is relatively small compared to the total number of observations.
Second, events outside our model may have impacted hedge fund allocation. Some hedge
funds received negative publicity during the financial crisis, because investors who tried to
withdraw their money to meet liquidity needs where unable to do so. This may play a role
in the allocation to hedge funds.
The results for foreign exchange hedge ratio are also mixed across the different asset
classes. The foreign exchange hedge ratio does not affect the allocation to hedge funds and
negatively affects the allocation to private equity. A one standard deviation increase in
collateral requirement leads to an increase in the fraction of risky assets allocated to private
equity of 0.80 percentage points.
The required funding ratio also has different effects. Pension funds with a higher required
funding ratio invest more in private equity and less in mortgages. This reveals that pension
funds with higher tolerance for risk might prefer certain illiquid assets over others.
These differences in findings indicate that strategic decisions made at the top level do not
have to be implemented at each individual asset class level. What matters is that the overall
investment policy, risk exposures, and liquidity profile are in accordance with the policy set
by pension fund.
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Table 4.7. Main results - separate illiquid assets classes
In this table, we show the random effects estimators based on the regression (4.15) for
separate illiquid asset classes. The dependent variable in the first column is the fraction of
risky assets allocated to real estate (wRE/wRISKY ), in the second column the fraction of
risky assets allocated to mortgages (wMG/wRISKY ), in the third column the fraction of risky
assets allocated to private equity (wPE/wRISKY ), and in the fourth column the fraction of
risky assets allocated to hedge funds (wHF/wRISKY ). The independent variables include the
liability duration (DV ), the liability duration squared (D
2
V ), the collateral requirements on
interest rate derivatives (CRr), the collateral requirements on currency derivatives (CRfx),
bond hedge ratio (φB), fraction of foreign investments (wFX), the log of total AUM (Size),
Corp indicates a corporate pension fund, Prof indicates a professional pension fund, Rfr is
the required funding ratio, and Fr the one period lag of the actual funding ratio. Standard
errors are between parentheses; ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable wRE/wRISKY wMG/wRISKY wPE/wRISKY wHF/wRISKY
DV .0138
∗∗∗ .0178∗∗ .0076∗∗ .0753∗∗∗
(.0045) (.0070) (.0036) (.0088)
D2V −.0004∗∗∗ −.0004∗∗ −.0002∗∗∗ −.0022
(.0001) (.0002) (.0001) (.0002)
CRr .0409 −.0453 .0585∗ −.1474∗
(.0427) (.0947) (.0325) (.0835)
CRfx .1085∗∗∗ .2535∗∗∗ −.2068∗∗∗ −.0216
(.0316) (.0420) (.0435) (.0653)
φB .0187 .0151 −.0209∗∗ −.0855∗∗∗
(.0143) (.0281) (.0102) (.0243)
wFX .0767∗∗∗ −.0454∗∗∗ .0041 .0290∗
(.0101) (.0172) (.0069) (.0164)
Size .0541∗∗∗ .0510∗∗∗ .0608∗∗∗ .0156
(.0088) (.0120) (.0065) (.0102)
Corp −.0544∗∗∗ −.0846∗∗∗ −.0218∗∗ .0068
(.0175) (.0223) (.0091) (.0178)
Prof −.0004 −.0620 .0300∗ .0937∗∗∗
(.0377) (.0444) (.0161) (.0330)
Rfr −.0001 −.2514∗∗∗ .1340∗∗∗ .0172
(.0134) (.0705) (.0309) (.0138)
Fr −.1206∗∗∗ .1164∗∗∗ .0725∗∗∗ −.1167
(.0220) (.0357) (.0158) (.0360)
Time FE Y Y Y Y
N 3,432 3,432 3,432 3,432
Left-censored 1,359 2,186 2,200 2,851
Uncensored 2,073 1,246 1,232 581
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4.5 Robustness check
From the previous sections, it follows that the impact of liability duration on the illiquid
assets allocation is strong. As a robustness check we take an alternative measure of liability
duration in this section. Liability duration measures the maturity of a pension fund and
this is directly related to demographics. Although we have no data on demographics, we do
know the pension payments and the value of the liabilities per year. The ratio of pension
payments to the value of the liabilities is an alternative measure for maturity (De Haan,
2018). If this ratio is high, a large part of the participants consists of retirees.
In the robustness check we replace the liability duration by the ratio of pension payments
to liabilities (Benefits).18 Table 4.8 shows that using this alternative measure also results
in a hump-shaped impact on the fraction of risky assets allocated to illiquid assets. Up to
a ratio of 4.8 percent, the fraction of risky assets allocated to illiquid assets is positively
affected.19 After this point, the effect is reversed. Column (3) of Table 4.8 shows that the
hump-shaped effect is absent for the allocation to risky assets.
In our theoretical framework we saw that the ratio of pension payments to the value of
liabilities is given by 1
DV
(see Eq. (4.4) in Section 4.2). Figure 4.4 provides evidence that
the fitted curve for the observed ratios of pension payments to pension liabilities is indeed a
convex and decreasing function of liability duration, in line with the theoretical framework.
This confirms that the inverse of the liability duration is a good proxy for the liquidity
requirement from pension payments.
4.6 Illiquid assets allocation other regulatory frameworks
Compared to banks and insurance companies, pension fund regulation is much more diverse
across countries. Here, we focus on the difference in capital requirements for pension funds
in the US and Canada to show our model implications outside the Netherlands. The US
and Canada have fixed capital requirements, whereas the Netherlands has risk-based capital
requirements.
18We only include observations at the end of each year as the pension payments are only available on an
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Table 4.8. Robustness - alternative measure of liability duration
In this table, we show the random effects estimators based on (4.15) using an alternative
measure for the liability duration. The dependent variable in the first column is the fraction
of risky assets allocated to illiquid assets (wILLIQ/wRISKY ), the dependent variable in the
second column is the allocation to illiquid assets (wILLIQ) and the third column uses the risky
assets allocation as dependent variable (wRISKY ). The independent variables include the
ratio of pension payments to liabilities (Benefits), the ratio of pension payments to liabilities
squared (Benefits2), the collateral requirements on interest rate derivatives (CRr), the
collateral requirements on currency derivatives (CRfx), bond hedge ratio (φB), fraction of
foreign investments (wFX), the log of total AUM (Size), Corp indicates a corporate pension
fund, Prof indicates a professional pension fund, Rfr is the required funding ratio, and Fr
the one period lag of the actual funding ratio. Standard errors are between parentheses;
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable wILLIQ/wRISKY wILLIQ wRISKY
Benefits 6.9264∗∗∗ 4.3555∗∗∗ 2.8844∗
(1.5747) ( 1.0672) ( 1.7548)
Benefits2 −71.5539∗∗∗ −38.0856∗∗ 12.4495
(22.1661) (15.0461) (24.3063)
CRr .0894 .0708 −.0512
(.1408) (.0964) (.1830)
CRfx .1016 .0875 .3857∗∗∗
(.0806) (.0553) (.1100)
φB −.0767∗ −.1045∗∗∗ −.4227∗∗∗
(.0382) ( .0264) ( .0469)
wFX .0342 .0090 −.1412∗∗∗
(.0271) (.0186) (.0345)
Size .0774∗∗∗ .0543∗∗∗ .0368∗∗∗
(.0125) (.0083) (.0131)
Corp −.0760∗∗∗ −.0466 .0069
(.0216) (.0142) (.0227)
Prof −.0026 −.0099 −.0485
( .0415) (.0272) (.0431)
Rfr .2196∗∗ .2517∗∗∗ .6764∗∗∗
(.1153) (.0788) (.1479)
Fr −.0128 −.0406 −.1867∗∗∗
(.0513) (.0349) (.0576)
Time FE Y Y Y
N 700 700 707
Left-censored 182 182 n/a
Uncensored 518 518 n/a
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Figure 4.4. Benefits as a function of the liability duration
The dots in this figure show the observed ratios of pension payments to pension liabilities
(Benefits) and the fitted curve for the observed ratios of pension payments to pension
liabilities (red line), both as a function of the liability duration.
Boon et al. (2018) study public, corporate, and industry wide pension funds in the US,
Canada, and the Netherlands and find that the regulatory framework matters for the asset
allocation decisions. They show that risk-based capital requirements and mark-to-market
valuation are associated with a 7 percentage points lower allocation to risky assets, regardless
of market conditions. Given this evidence and the setup of our model we conjecture the
following implications for the illiquid assets allocations in the US and in Canada. A higher
interest rate risk exposure does not increase the capital requirements for pension funds in
the US and Canada. Under this condition the impact of the liability duration on the illiquid
assets allocation is likely to be increasing. In other words, the higher the liability duration,
the higher we expect the illiquid assets allocation to be. Therefore, we expect higher illiquid
asset allocations in the US and Canada. This is indeed what we observe empirically. The
Willis Towers Watson Global Pension Assets Study (2018) shows that the value weighted
average illiquid assets allocation in the US equals 28 percent and Canada equals 31 percent,
whereas in the Netherlands it is only 17 percent.20
The predictions of our model are likely to be amplified when considering life insurers. Life




Under this solvency regime the capital requirement is calibrated on a 0.5% one year default
probability. This implies that the capital requirement is more profound for European life
insurers than for Dutch pension funds, for which the capital requirement is calibrated on
a 2.5% probability. We therefore predict the turning point of the hump-shaped effect of
the liability duration on the illiquid assets allocation to be at a lower liability duration for
insurance companies. In other words, the negative effect of having a higher liability duration
(higher capital requirements) will outweigh the benefits (lower liquidity requirements) at a
faster rate.
4.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we empirically study the impact of liquidity and capital requirements on
a pension fund’s illiquid assets allocation. Liquidity requirements result from short-term
pension payments and collateral requirements on derivatives used for hedging purposes. In
addition, the pension funds in our sample are capital constrained. Liquidity and capital
requirements interact. By hedging interest rate risk and currency risk, a pension fund is
less exposed to these two risk factors and can take additional investment risks. However,
hedging strategies using derivatives involve margining. This hampers a pension fund to
invest in illiquid assets as they impose a liquidity requirement.
The key conclusions of our empirical analysis are as follows. First, we find a hump-shaped
impact of liability duration on the fraction of risky assets allocated to illiquid assets. Up
to 18 years, the liability duration positively affects this allocation. However, beyond this
point, the effect is reversed and the allocation to illiquid assets decreases. Second, we do not
find evidence that swap hedge ratios impact the illiquid assets allocation: the liquidity and
capital requirements cancel each other out. In the case of currency risk, however, hedging
does impact the illiquid assets allocation positively. Finally, pension fund size, pension fund
type and funding ratio also impact the illiquid assets allocation.
These findings offer important policy implications. Based on our model and empirical
findings it does not appear obvious for long-term investors to always invest more in illiquid
assets. The capital requirement for defined benefit pension funds becomes a binding constraint
if the liability duration is substantially high. Although relaxing capital requirements for
interest rate risk might seem a reasonable solution to mitigate the impact of this constraint,
this is not what we recommend. The interest rate risk is inherent to the nature of the
pension liabilities in a defined benefit pension contract. If a pension fund guarantees benefits,
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interest rate risk becomes the key risk factors to manage. An alternative approach would
be to redefine pension liabilities such that they no longer embed long-term interest rate
guarantees. This, however, means that the interest rate risk shifts to the beneficiaries.
Beneficiaries are less knowledgeable to understand and less equipped to manage interest rate
risk.
A more important policy implication concerns adequate liquidity and collateral management
for pension funds. Pension funds increasingly use derivatives to hedge risks. Derivatives
involve greater liquidity needs. These liquidity needs can increase exponentially in times of
market turbulence. Collateral management is therefore key and becomes even greater once
pension funds are integrated in the central clearing of derivatives. Pension funds should
prepare adequate contingency planning to be able to manage collateral through periods of
market turbulence. More emphasis could, therefore, be placed on liquidity and collateral
management in pension regulations.
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Chapter 5
A Survey of Institutional Investors’ Investment and
Management Decisions on Illiquid Assets1
5.1 Introduction
Investment and management decisions regarding illiquid assets (e.g. real estate, private
equity, and infrastructure) are of particular relevance to pension funds since they are important
investors in these asset classes. The recent Willis Towers Watson Global Pension Assets
Study 2018 shows that the seven largest pension markets in the world,2 with total pension
assets of USD 37,770 billion at the end of 2017, increased their average illiquid asset allocation
from 4% in 1997 to 25% in 2017. While there is a large literature on the benefits and
challenges of investing in illiquid assets, to the best of our knowledge the self-reported
attitudes and policies of institutional investors with respect to illiquid assets have not been
documented extensively before.
In this survey we provide insight into the self-reported attitudes and policies with respect
to illiquid assets and present the results of a survey of nine Dutch and five Canadian pension
funds and fiduciary managers. We have interviewed these survey participants regarding the
role of illiquid assets in the strategic asset allocation, the valuation of illiquid assets, and
1This chapter is based on joint work with Patrick Tuijp and forthcoming in the Journal of Portfolio
Management. We thank the survey participants for their willingness to participate and for their valuable
input, and Ortec Finance and Theo Nijman for arranging the interviews. We thank Mark Anson, Martin
Bakker, Marie Brière, Dirk Broeders, Chantal de Groot, Bert Kramer, Loranne van Lieshout, Rients
Miedema, Theo Nijman, Bas Werker, Pieter Wijnhoven, and the Netspar Editorial Board for their helpful
suggestions and comments. Kristy Jansen gratefully acknowledges the financial support from Netspar.
2Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK, and the US.
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liquidity management. We formulate four best practices based on the results of the survey.
The six Dutch pension funds in our survey represent assets under management (AUM) of
EUR 342 billion, and the four Canadian pension funds represent AUM of CAD 203 billion.3
We exclude the AUM of the three Dutch fiduciary managers and the one Canadian fiduciary
manager from the reported numbers since they also manage assets for investors other than
pension funds. The Dutch pension funds in our sample on average invest 15% of their
portfolio in illiquid assets, while for Canadian pension funds this is 34%.
The interviews with the survey participants were arranged by Ortec Finance and Theo
Nijman and took place during the period from December 2017 to January 2019. While we
do not have a random sample, we do cover approximately 26% of total pension assets in
the Netherlands and approximately 9% for Canada.4 These percentages do not include the
fiduciary managers for the same reason why we do not include them in the AUM figures.
We specifically asked the fiduciary managers to give answers from the perspective of their
pension fund clients. We therefore jointly analyze the answers given by pension funds and
fiduciary managers. The participating pension funds focus mainly on defined benefit plans.
The interview questions and the list of survey participants are listed in the Appendix. The
survey participants were allowed to give more than one answer to each survey question.
In our survey, we define the following asset classes as illiquid: private equity, private debt,
direct real estate, infrastructure, hedge funds, and mortgages. We base this classification on
the criterion that pension funds might not be able to trade the asset for a substantial period
of time. While the classification for particular asset classes may sometimes differ, the survey
participants generally indicated that our definition of illiquid asset classes aligns with theirs.
5.2 Investing in illiquid assets
The academic literature shows that illiquid assets may offer benefits to pension funds
and other investors in terms of liquidity premiums (Driessen and De Jong, 2015; Vayanos
3Total AUM reflects the situation at year-end 2017 and is based on the annual reports of the participating
pension funds.
4Willis Towers Watson (2019) reports total Dutch pension assets at year-end of 2017 of about EUR
1,331 billion and total Canadian pension assets at year-end of 2017 of about CAD 2,225 billion. Exchange
rate conversion has been applied from USD to local currency against year-end 2017 foreign exchange rates
obtained from Exchange Data International.
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and Wang, 2013),5 liability hedging (e.g. Sharpe and Tint, 1990b; Lucas and Zeldes, 2009),
and portfolio diversification (e.g. Kallberg et al., 1996; Hoesli et al., 2004; Bianchi et al.,
2014). In addition to these benefits, the long investment horizon of pension funds makes
them well-suited for investing in illiquid assets classes (Attig et al., 2012). The search for
yield in a low interest rate environment may provide additional incentives to consider riskier
and less liquid investments (e.g. Rajan, 2006; Yellen, 2011).
Investing in illiquid assets also involves challenges. Infrequent trading of illiquid assets
may lead to large losses in case of forced selling (Diamond and Rajan, 2011), for instance
due to sudden and unpredictable margin requirements on derivative positions. In addition,
whether real estate investments are managed internally or externally matters for investment
costs (Andonov et al., 2015). Finally, the valuation smoothing that results from appraisal
effects may present a challenge when assessing illiquid investments. Using an appraisal-
based index could lead to lower volatility and higher autocorrelation estimates relative
to a transaction-based index for similar assets (Fisher et al., 1994; Hoesli et al., 2004).
Anson (2016) demonstrates how to un-smooth illiquid asset returns for asset allocation, risk
management, and performance evaluation purposes.
In addition to these benefits and challenges, the literature has investigated portfolio choice
with illiquid assets. Ang et al. (2014) show that an investor should reduce the allocation to
illiquid assets in order to avoid situations where it would not be possible to meet, e.g., pension
payments.6 Given a certain allocation to illiquid assets, investors may still adopt different
strategies in response to immediate liquidity needs. For instance, they may sell liquid assets
first to minimize transactions costs, as opposed to selling illiquid assets, and keeping a cushion
of liquid assets (Duffie and Ziegler, 2003; Scholes, 2000). Empirical evidence indicates that
institutional investors tend to follow the former strategy (Ben-David et al., 2012; Manconi
et al., 2012; Driessen and Xing, 2017).
5However, the literature shows mixed evidence of liquidity premiums in different asset classes. For
instance in the case of direct real estate, Qian and Liu (2012) report a positive effect of illiquidity on expected
returns, although the effect is relatively small. Benveniste et al. (2001) show that REITs increase the value
of underlying real estate assets by 12-22%, which suggests that a direct real estate liquidity premium may
indeed exist. Ang et al. (2013b), on the other hand, show comparable performance of REITs and direct real
estate, which indicates the absence of a direct real estate liquidity premium.
6Beber et al. (2020) go a step further and show that short-term investors may choose not to invest in
the least liquid assets at all because the expected transaction costs may be prohibitively high relative to the
return over a short horizon.
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5.3 Pension fund regulations
Pension fund regulations are highly relevant to understand how pension funds invest.
For instance, Andonov et al. (2017) show that U.S. public pension funds have incentives to
invest in risky assets as their liability discount rate is linked to the expected return on assets.
In addition, Boon et al. (2018) study U.S., Canadian, and Dutch pension funds and show
that risk-based capital requirements and mark-to-market valuation of assets and liabilities
are associated with a 7 percentage points lower risky asset exposure.
In this section we provide an overview of relevant aspects of the Dutch and Canadian
pension fund regulations. First, we summarize the retirement systems for both countries.
Second, we focus on the following four aspects of pension fund regulation: investment
restrictions, asset and liability valuation methods, funding requirements, and recovery periods.
5.3.1 Regulations in the Netherlands
The Dutch pension system is built on three pillars. The first pillar is a pay-as-you-go
(PAYG) system and consists of state pensions that provide a basic income, called AOW
(Algemene Ouderdomswet). The second pillar consists of collective pension schemes which
are administered by pension funds. The pension schemes are financed from mandatory
contributions by employers and employees. The contribution rate amounts on average to 20-
25% of total wages.7 In most cases the employer contributes 2/3 and the employee 1/3.8 The
first pillar replaces broadly 30% of average wages and the second pillar 60-65% of average
lifetime wages (Gerard, 2019). The third pillar consists of individual pension products, such
as an annuity insurance. The pension funds participating in our survey are second pillar
funds.
Dutch pension funds do not face any quantitative investment restrictions, but they are
required to invest in accordance with the prudent-person rules outlined in the Pension Act.9
This implies that pension funds should invest in the best interest of the fund participants.
Pension funds use market valuation for both assets and liabilities. Market valuation of
defined benefit liabilities implies that they are discounted using a yield curve that is based
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on the euro swap curve as set by the Dutch Central Bank (DNB). The minimum funding
requirement (Minimaal Vereist Eigen Vermogen, MVEV) is determined by a calculation
method described in the Pensions Act. Importantly, the minimum funding ratio is based on
nominal valuation of liabilities, and only accrued benefits are taken into account. For most
pension funds, the minimum capital requirement corresponds to a funding ratio of about
104.2%.10
Besides the minimum capital requirement, Dutch pension funds also have risk-based
capital requirements. In fact, the required capital is calculated such that the probability
that the nominal funding ratio falls below 100% on a one-year horizon equals 2.5%. For a
stylized pension fund with equal investment in equity and bonds, the capital requirement
(Vereist Eigen Vermogen, VEV) amounts to a funding ratio of approximately 120%. If the
funding ratio falls below the required capital threshold, the pension fund enters a ten-year
recovery period to meet the capital requirement. If the funding ratio remains below the
minimum requirement for five years, a pension benefit cut may be necessary if recovery of
the fund is not possible otherwise.11
Since the valuation of the liabilities is nominal and market-based, the most important
risk factor for Dutch pension funds is interest rate risk. This is especially true for green
pension funds, i.e. pension funds with relatively young participants and therefore long-term
pension liabilities. Pension funds can substantially reduce their capital requirements by
hedging interest rate risk.
The regulatory framework does not force pension funds to hold capital depending on
their portfolio liquidity, although the prudent-person rule requires pension funds to carefully
consider liquidity in their investment strategies. Moreover, the capital requirements for
liquid and illiquid assets may vary. For instance, non-listed equities, such as private equity,
require a larger amount of capital than listed equities. On the other hand, direct real estate
investments have lower capital requirements than listed equities. The differences in risk-
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5.3.2 Regulations in Canada
The Canadian pension system also consists of three pillars. The first pillar is a PAYG
system and consists of state pensions, called Old Age Security (OAS). Canadians whose
income is below a certain threshold receive a Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) in
addition to OAS. The second pillar is the Canadian Pension Plan (CPP), except for Quebec,
which has its own Quebec Pension Plan (QPP). CPP and QPP provide contributors and
their families with partial replacement of earnings in case of retirement. The contribution
rate is set each year and equals 10.2% in 2019.12 The intention is to replace up to 25% of
full-time income upon retirement. The contribution is equally split between employer and
employee. The third pillar consists of workplace pensions and private savings plans. The
Canadian pension funds participating in the interviews focus on the third pillar.
Although prior to 2010 restrictions applied for investments in foreign assets, real estate,
and Canadian resource property, no investment restrictions exist for Canadian pension funds
today. Canadian pension funds are also subject to a prudent-person rule.13 The valuations of
assets and liabilities to determine the funding ratio are typically market-based. However, the
Canadian Institute of Actuaries argues that valuation of assets producing a value different
from market value may be suitable in some cases. For instance, smooth valuation of assets
may be appropriate to moderate the volatility of contributions.14 In accordance with the
Pension Benefits Act (PBA) and the Income Tax Act (ITA), each pension fund must file
an actuarial valuation at least every three years in order to estimate the fund’s surplus or
deficit and to determine the fund’s minimum funding requirements.15
The reported liabilities and funding ratios are based on a going-concern assumption as
well as on a solvency basis. The going-concern basis implies that all assumptions made in
estimating total pension fund liabilities are based on the principle that the pension fund
will continue to operate. The liabilities under the going-concern assumption depend on
expected returns of investment portfolios, inflation expectations, and the future growth rate
of employee wages. The solvency basis focuses on the ability of the plan to meet its liabilities
12https://www.canada.ca/en/services/benefits/publicpensions/cpp/contributions.html
13For instance, such as set out in Section 22 of the Ontario Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8.
https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/90p08
14https://www.cia-ica.ca/docs/default-source/2014/214100e.pdf
15For further details we refer to the certified general accountants association of Canada (Chartered
Professional Accountants Canada): https://www.cpacanada.ca.
190
5.4. SURVEY OUTCOMES
assuming that the plan is terminated on the date on which the report is filed. Liabilities are
computed based on market interest rates, where in some provinces pension funds are allowed
to average interest rates over the preceding five years.16
Unlike the minimum funding requirements in the Netherlands, the Canadian minimum
funding requirements are not risk-based. The recovery period for pension funds that do
not meet the minimum funding ratio differs across provinces. Federal plans and provincial
plans in Alberta and Ontario have a maximum recovery period of ten years. Other provinces
typically set this at five years (Boon et al., 2018).
5.4 Survey outcomes
In this section we provide the outcomes of our survey. We start by discussing the outcomes
for The Netherlands and Canada separately, and we conclude this section with a comparison
of the Dutch and Canadian outcomes.
5.4.1 Dutch fund outcomes
We start with the summary statistics of the Dutch pension funds in our sample (see
Exhibit 5.1). The average AUM equals 57 billion euros, with a standard deviation of 73
billion euros. This shows that our sample contains both large and small funds. The average
allocation to illiquid assets is 15%, close to the average 14% illiquid asset allocation reported
in the Willis Towers Watson Global Pension Assets Study 2018 for the Netherlands. The
ratio of active members to retirees is on average 1.2, indicating that the fraction of active
members is only slightly higher than that of retirees. The average (nominal) funding ratio
equals 115% with a standard deviation equal to 13%, revealing substantial variation in the
funding status across pension funds. As noted in the introduction, the fiduciary managers
are not included in the summary statistics as they manage assets for investors other than
pension funds as well.
16For further details we refer to the certified general accountants association of Canada (Chartered
Professional Accountants Canada): https://www.cpacanada.ca.
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Table 5.1. Summary Statistics Dutch Pension Funds
This table provides summary statistics for six Dutch pension funds (fiduciary managers




Percentage illiquid assets 15% 5%
Actives to retirees ratio 1.2 0.9
Funding ratio 115% 13%
Strategic asset allocation to illiquid assets for Dutch funds
From the full set of interviews, including both Dutch and Canadian survey participants,
five main reasons for investing in illiquid assets emerge: diversification benefits, liability
hedging purposes, risk-return trade-off, smooth valuation of assets, and steady cash flows.
Smooth valuation of assets results from the infrequent valuation of illiquid assets, and
valuations may also lag relative to those of more frequently traded assets. From a balance
sheet perspective these aspects may reduce the volatility of illiquid asset valuations. Several
illiquid asset classes provide steady cash flows, such as rental income for real estate, which
may help in ensuring that sufficient cash is available to meet cash requirements in the future.
The main reported reasons for the nine Dutch survey participants to invest in illiquid
assets are summarized in Table 5.2. The risk-return trade-off is one of the main reasons
for investing in illiquid assets, which fits with the search for yield phenomenon described
by Rajan (2006) and Yellen (2011). Some survey participants specifically mentioned the
natural comparative advantage that they have as long-term investors to capture liquidity
premiums. As a second important reason for investing in illiquid assets, six out of nine also
mentioned diversification. For the other three funds diversification is a positive side effect,
but not the main reason to invest in illiquid assets. Only a few pension funds indicated
liability hedging as a principal reason to invest in illiquid assets. The funds mentioning
liability hedging as a main reason particularly see benefits for real estate and infrastructure
but not so much for private equity. However, not all survey participants are convinced that
real estate and infrastructure are good hedges against inflation risk. A fourth reason for
investing in illiquid assets, given by one of the survey participants, is the ability to reduce
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balance sheet volatility through the smooth valuation of illiquid assets (see e.g. Hoesli et al.,
2004, for a further discussion). Representatives of the Dutch pension funds did not mention
steady cash flows as a principal reason for investing in illiquid assets.
Table 5.2. Reasons for Investing in Illiquid Assets
This table summarizes the number of Dutch survey participants who mentioned one of the
following main reasons to invest in illiquid assets: steady cash flows, smooth valuation,
risk-return trade-off, liability hedging, and diversification. The total number of survey
participants is nine, and survey participants could mention more than one reason.
number of participants
Smooth valuation 1




Table 5.3 summarizes how the survey participants determine their illiquid asset allocation.
Six of the nine survey participants determine their illiquid asset allocation using an asset
liability management (ALM) study. However, two survey participants mentioned that, if
the optimal allocation resulting from the ALM study is too high, the pension fund board
might decide to invest less in illiquid assets. Three of the nine survey participants stipulate
a target return for illiquid assets. These pension funds invest only in illiquid assets that they
expect to achieve at least the specified target return. Pension funds may therefore deviate
from initial strategic allocations depending on the amount of assets available for investment
that meet the specified target return.
The third question concerns whether pension funds apply an upper limit to the percentage
of assets allocated to illiquid assets. Most pension funds do have a maximum illiquid asset
allocation, of approximately 20-25%. The maximum allocations mentioned are relatively
close to each other. The prudent-person rule described in the Pension Act is interpreted by
many Dutch pension funds as a maximum of 25% in illiquid assets. Although some pension
funds have not explicitly specified their maximum allocation to illiquid assets, some note
that the maximum is implicitly set by the size of their portfolio components.
Dutch pension funds typically divide their total portfolio in a liability matching portfolio
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Table 5.3. Determination of Illiquid Asset Allocation
This table summarizes the number of Dutch survey participants who mention one of the
following ways to determine the allocation to illiquid assets: a target return, board decision,
and/or ALM study. The total number of survey participants is nine, and survey participants





and a return portfolio. As mentioned in our discussion of the regulatory framework, the
liabilities of Dutch pension funds are computed using a market-based yield curve. For this
reason, Dutch pension funds invest part of their portfolio in liquid fixed income assets to
reduce the interest rate exposure mismatch between their assets and liabilities. These fixed
income assets used for liability hedging purposes reside in the matching portfolio. With
potential exceptions such as mortgages, illiquid assets typically reside in the return portfolio.
If the liability matching portfolio is relatively large (say 60% of total assets), then even with
a relatively modest allocation the illiquid assets (say 10% of total assets) forms a sizable
fraction (in the example 25%) of the return portfolio. This may limit the allocation to
illiquid assets as a fraction of the total portfolio, since these would otherwise crowd out
return portfolio investments in more liquid assets such as listed equities.
Lastly, we asked pension funds which other aspects are taken into account when investing
in illiquid assets. We mention a few of these aspects here. Pension funds also take into
account the sustainability aspect of illiquid investments such as wind parks. The cost aspects
of illiquid assets also play a major role for Dutch pension funds. They mentioned that the
costs to invest in illiquid assets are generally much higher than the costs for liquid assets.
Finally, pension funds set strategic asset allocation bounds on the target weights for all asset
classes that they invest in. Since illiquid assets do not trade frequently, remaining within
asset class bounds is more challenging for illiquid assets than for liquid assets.
Asset valuation for Dutch funds
The second set of questions focuses on the asset valuation of illiquid assets. We first
asked how pension funds value their illiquid assets. The Dutch pension funds that we
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interviewed only invest in illiquid assets via fiduciary managers. Most pension funds rely
on the valuations of their external fiduciary managers. A large fraction of pension funds
analyzes past performance of illiquid assets to evaluate their performance. Some pension
funds monitor whether the valuation method used by fiduciary managers is compliant with
standards such as the ILPA Private Equity Principles. The fiduciary managers usually use
discounted cash flow (DCF) methods for real estate and infrastructure, whereas for private
equity the EBITDA multiple and the public market equivalent (PME) approach are more
commonly used valuation methods.
Second, we asked how expected returns on illiquid assets are characterized, and in
particular whether pension funds make assumptions for liquidity premiums. Most pension
funds use a benchmark-plus-spread approach to determine expected returns. The benchmark
is generally used as a public market equivalent, such as the S&P500 for private equity and
REIT returns for real estate. On top of the benchmark, pension funds assign a spread, which
they report varies between 100 to 300 basis points depending on the asset class and the
beliefs of the pension funds about the asset classes. The survey participants report that this
spread represents different aspects such as skill of the investment manager and compensation
for illiquidity. This spread is relatively conservative compared to the respective liquidity
premium estimates of 300 bps and 370 bps found by Franzoni et al. (2012) and Anson (2017)
for private equity investments.17 The difference could be driven by differences in beliefs, the
asset class, or both. Three of the nine pension funds aim to make explicit various components
of the spread and thus have an explicit number for the liquidity premium of illiquid asset
classes, at least where possible. Only one participant mentioned direct valuation of illiquid
assets as a way to determine expected returns.
The final question was about the certainty of contract periods for illiquid assets. For
private equity, all pension funds are aware that the scenario of an extension of the contract
period beyond ten years is quite likely. Pension funds indicated that the announcement of
contract extensions is more towards the end of the contract, and usually equals a two or
three year period. As pension funds already take into account the possibility of a contract
extension when entering the contract, pension funds do not consider contract extensions as
a potential risk.
17Franzoni et al. (2012) use the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity risk measure, whereas Anson
(2017) considers the liquidity level.
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Table 5.4. Assumption of Expected Returns on Illiquid Assets
This figure summarizes the number of Dutch survey participants who mention one of
the following ways to determine expected returns of illiquid assets: direct valuation or
benchmark plus a spread. We also asked whether survey participants specifically assume a
liquidity premium for illiquid assets. The total number of survey participants is nine, and
survey participants could mention more than one approach.
number of participants
Separate liquidity premium 3
Direct valuation 1
Benchmark + spread 7
Liquidity management and stress scenarios for Dutch funds
Many of the survey participants indicated that they have put either implicit or explicit
policies in place to ensure that sufficient resources are available to fulfill immediate obligations.
For instance, a cash buffer of about 0% to 7.5% of AUM may be maintained to cover
immediate liquidity needs. For the survey participants the cash buffer mainly exists to
cover margin payments for derivatives positions. This need may grow as central clearing
becomes the standard in the near future (EMIR regulation). Some survey participants have
outsourced liquidity management to their fiduciary manager.
The survey participants indicated that they perform stress tests (for instance, a negative
shock of a certain magnitude to financial markets) to analyze whether they have sufficient
liquid instruments to cover immediate obligations. This may be done through an analysis
that indicates after how many days they need to liquidate existing positions to free up cash.
In case of a stress event, the repo market may provide initial liquidity for some survey
participants. A few survey participants reported that they may consider securities lending.
Others indicated that they would sell positions in their most liquid instruments first (e.g.
equities and highly rated government bonds). This may be done either in the order of
liquidity, or according to the respective portfolio weights. In some cases the assets which are
most above strategic portfolio weights are sold first.
Although all survey participants indicated that there is an implicit policy, not all of them
have formally and explicitly formulated policies regarding which assets would be sold first
and in what quantities in case of a stress event. In spite of these policies being in place,
many survey participants mentioned that they do not expect to have to sell securities to
196
5.4. SURVEY OUTCOMES
free up liquidity. According to their stress analyses, the cash buffer should cover immediate
liquidity needs.
5.4.2 Canadian fund outcomes
For the Canadian pension funds in our sample, we also start with the summary statistics
(Exhibit 5.5). Average AUM of Canadian funds is 53 billion euros, with a standard deviation
equal to 37 million euros. Also for Canadian pension funds, our sample represents a mix of
relatively large and small funds. The ratio of active members relative to retirees is on average
1.8, showing that the average group of active members is larger than the group of retirees.
As for the Dutch funds, the standard deviation of the ratio of active members to retirees
reveals substantial variation across Canadian funds. Canadian funds invest on average 34%
in illiquid assets, in line with findings of the Willis Towers Watson Global Pension Asset
Study 2018.18 The average funding ratio (on a going-concern assumption) equals 109% and
the standard deviation 14%, which again shows that pension funds substantially differ in
their funding status. As noted in the introduction, the fiduciary managers are not included
in the summary statistics as they manage assets for investors other than pension funds as
well.
Table 5.5. Summary Statistics Canadian Pension Funds
This table provides summary statistics for four Canadian pension funds (fiduciary managers
are excluded). AUM is in millions of Canadian dollars. Source: annual reports (year-end
2017) of participating pension funds.
mean std.dev.
AUM 50,748 41,977
Illiquid assets percentage 34% 12%
Actives to retirees ratio 1.8 0.5
Funding ratio 109% 14%
18The average illiquid asset allocation in Canada equaled 31% in 2017.
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Strategic asset allocation to illiquid assets for Canadian funds
The main reported reasons for the five Canadian survey participants to invest in illiquid
assets are summarized in Table 5.6. For all survey participants the risk-return trade-off and
diversification benefits are the most important reasons for investing in illiquid assets, again
fitting with the search for yield phenomenon described by Rajan (2006) and Yellen (2011).
Some survey participants specifically mentioned their comparative advantage as long-term
investors to capture liquidity premiums. Four out of five also mentioned liability hedging as
an important determinant to invest in illiquid assets. Liability hedging is a relevant reason
mainly for real estate and infrastructure, and less so for private equity. Three out of five
survey participants also mentioned a fourth reason to invest in illiquid assets: cash flow
matching of liabilities. Canadian survey participants consider real estate and infrastructure
most suitable to obtain steady cash flow streams. Smooth valuation of illiquid assets was
not mentioned by Canadian survey participants as a principal reason for investing in illiquid
assets.
Table 5.6. Reasons for Investing in Illiquid Assets
This table summarizes the number of Canadian survey participants who mentioned one of
the following main reasons to invest in illiquid assets: steady cash flows, smooth valuation,
risk-return trade-off, liability hedging, and diversification. The total number of survey
participants is five, and survey participants could mention more than one reason.
number of participants
Smooth valuation 0




One participant mentioned that they see an important advantage of investing in illiquid
assets in the degree of control that pension funds have when investing in these asset classes.
Canadian pension funds manage a substantial fraction of their illiquid assets internally.
This implies that they invest directly in, for instance, real estate investments and unlisted
equity. The participant noted that this gives pension funds a high degree of active ownership,
incentive alignment, and superior information compared to listed asset classes.
Table 5.7 summarizes the responses to our second question, which concerns the most
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important ways to determine the allocation to illiquid assets. The answers vary, and pension
funds may take more than just one factor into account. Three out of five funds may deviate
from target allocations, which could be arrived at via e.g. an ALM study, depending on a
specified target return for illiquid assets. For instance, one survey participant stressed that
the fund would like to implement a (much) larger allocation to illiquid assets, but insufficient
investment opportunities that meet the target return were available at the time. Other funds
mainly arrive at their illiquid asset allocation based on an ALM study. Two out of five funds
mention the importance of the pension board in explicitly setting targets for the allocation
to illiquid assets.
Table 5.7. Determination of Illiquid Asset Allocation
This table summarizes the number of Canadian survey participants who mention one of the
following ways to determine the allocation to illiquid assets: a target return, board decision,
and/or ALM study. The total number of survey participants is five, and survey participants





Third, we asked whether funds have an upper limit for how much they invest in illiquid
assets. In general, Canadian survey participants do have an upper limit for their illiquid
asset allocation. For those who do have such an upper limit, it varies significantly across
survey participants, from 15% to 80%. In most cases the board decides on the upper limit.
Finally, we asked if there are any other aspects that are considered when investing in
illiquid assets. The survey participants indicated that there might be limits on how much the
pension fund can invest in domestic versus foreign investments, that there may be limits for
the amount invested in individual investments, and that there may be limits for the amount
of embedded leverage that illiquid assets create for the portfolio.
Asset valuation for Canadian funds
The second set of questions addresses the valuation of illiquid assets. The valuation
method for illiquid assets varies mainly across asset classes. For real estate and infrastructure
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the valuation is often done by an external appraiser using the DCF method. For private
equity a mix of valuation methods is used by pension funds: DCF, EBITDA multiples, and
PME multiples are often applied.
Table 5.8 summarizes the responses regarding the return assumptions on illiquid assets.
As for Dutch survey participants, most Canadian survey participants formulate expected
returns on illiquid assets through a benchmark-plus-spread approach, where the spread
consists of different components including skill of the manager and liquidity. Two funds
also aim to quantify the liquidity premium explicitly. As for Dutch survey participants, only
one mentioned direct valuation of illiquid assets as a way to determine expected returns.
Table 5.8. Assumption of Expected Returns on Illiquid Assets
This figure summarizes the number of Canadian survey participants who mention one of
the following ways to determine expected returns of illiquid assets: direct valuation or
benchmark plus a spread. We also asked whether survey participants specifically assume a
liquidity premium for illiquid assets. The total number of survey participants is five, and
survey participants could mention more than one approach.
number of participants
Separate liquidity premium 2
Direct valuation 1
Benchmark + spread 4
The final survey question asked how certain the contract periods of illiquid assets are.
The answers are comparable to those given by Dutch survey participants. For private equity,
all pension funds are aware that the scenario of an extension of the contract period beyond
ten years is quite likely. Most survey participants indicated that a two to three year extension
of the contract period is expected and taken into consideration when entering the contract.
Liquidity management and stress scenarios for Canadian funds
Similar to the Dutch survey participants, their Canadian counterparts also have put
either implicit or explicit policies in place for liquidity management. Cash is held mainly to
cover the liquidity needs of derivatives rather than to account for illiquid assets, although in
certain cases it is necessary to plan for large capital calls generated by illiquid investments.
The repo market was mentioned by one participant as a serious avenue for managing liquidity
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needs. One participant remarked that the attitude towards liquidity may depend on the ratio
of payouts to contributions. For funds with higher payout amounts, liquidity may be more
important since cash needs are larger.
Survey participants have projections for their cash inflows and outflows, so they explicitly
plan sufficient liquidity to meet immediate obligations, also under adverse market conditions.
When such obligations arise, many survey participants report the preference to first use cash,
then the repo market, then selling liquid public securities, and as a last resort selling illiquid
private assets.
We found that, when making their investment decision, some survey participants take
into account the possibility to liquidate the investment in order to free up cash for immediate
obligations. They tailor the investment type of the illiquid assets that they choose to invest
in (e.g. open-end vs. closed-end real estate funds) such that they do not have their full
position in a relatively illiquid type.
5.4.3 Comparison of Dutch and Canadian outcomes
In this section we describe the main differences in survey results between the Dutch
and the Canadian survey participants and we provide a comprehensive summary of these
differences in Exhibit 5.9. From the summary statistics we immediately note the biggest
difference: the Canadian pension funds invest substantially more in illiquid assets, on average
34% of AUM, than the Dutch pension funds, for which the average is 15% of AUM. The
variation in the fraction allocated to illiquid assets across pension funds is also substantially
larger in Canada compared to the Netherlands. These differences are also reflected in the
maximum allocations to illiquid assets reported by the survey participants. Dutch survey
participants often indicated a maximum allocation to illiquid assets of approximately 20-25%,
whereas this upper limit varies from 15 to 80% across Canadian survey participants.
The Willis Towers Watson Global Pension Assets Study 2018 shows that the difference
in average allocations to illiquid assets between Dutch and Canadian pension funds was
relatively small in 2007 and has increased strongly since then. The average allocation of
Canadian pension funds to assets other than equities, bonds, and cash has increased from
14% in 2007 to 22% in 2017. For the eight largest Canadian pension funds, Bédard-Pagé
et al. (2016) report that the allocation to less-liquid alternative assets has even increased
from 21% in 2007 to 29% in 2015, in line with the finding of Broeders et al. (2020) that large
pension funds invest more in illiquid assets than small pension funds. In contrast, for Dutch
pension funds the allocation to assets other than equities, bonds, and cash has remained
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Table 5.9. Comparison Dutch and Canadian outcomes
This table summarizes the main differences in the survey results between the Dutch and
they Canadian survey participants. The statistics refer to six Dutch and four Canadian
pension funds (fiduciary managers are excluded).
Netherlands Canada
Average AUM in millions of EUR 57,030 33,608
Average allocation illiquid assets 15% 34%
Cross-sectional variation allocation illiquid assets 5% 12%
Maximum allocation illiquid assets 20-25% 15-80%
Management illiquid assets external internal
Regulatory framework nominal real
stable going from 18% in 2007 to 17% in 2017.
Interestingly, the average AUM of the Canadian pension funds is slightly more than half
the average AUM of the Dutch pension funds in the sample and yet they have a much larger
allocation to illiquid assets on average. Consequently, pension fund size does not seem to
be the driver of the stark difference in allocations. We put forward three other reasons to
explain the allocation gap between the two countries.
First, the cost aspect of illiquid assets plays a major role for Dutch pension funds. One
of the underlying reasons is that Dutch pension funds have to mandatorily report their
investment costs to the supervisor (DNB), who subsequently publishes the investment costs
for each individual pension fund on their website.19 The supervisor holds the position that
pension funds should be able to justify the investment costs to the public, which creates
the potential for public scrutiny and reputational risk. During the interviews, Dutch survey
participants mentioned that the costs to invest in illiquid assets are generally much higher
than the costs for liquid assets and that this plays an important role in their asset allocation
decision. On the other hand, competitive pays are the standard in Canada. Commonwealth
Partners (2017) reports that Canadian pension funds pay competitively such that they can
build internal investment teams.20 Canadian compensation costs are therefore generally
19The pension fund specific investment costs are available at https://statistiek.dnb.nl/downloads/.
20See also PwC (2016), page 17, which reports on insourcing portfolio management that “In order to
retain high-level talent, pension funds must pay competitive salaries to people who might otherwise choose
to work in the commercial fund management sector.”
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higher than those of pension funds in some other countries. However, competitive pays
also give pension funds the ability to bring investment management and other functions
internally, which they believe tend to result in lower costs and better net performance, in
line with the findings of Andonov et al. (2015).
The second explanation relates to both the supervisory framework as well as the difference
in how illiquid assets are managed. The Dutch supervisor imposes stricter requirements on
pension funds when they invest in alternative investments and other non-listed assets, and
also when assets are managed internally.21 The Dutch supervisor may examine whether it
finds that a pension fund sufficiently understands its investments and knows the associated
risks.22 When pension funds do not manage illiquid assets directly, which is typically the
case for Dutch pension funds, understanding illiquid assets is a much harder task. On the
other hand, Canadian survey participants manage a large fraction of their illiquid assets
internally. As mentioned by one of the Canadian survey participants, in-house management
of illiquid assets has the advantage that there is a high degree of control. This participant
finds that this gives a high degree of active ownership, incentive alignment, and superior
information compared to listed asset classes.
Third, there is a division of Dutch pension fund assets into a liability matching portfolio
and a return portfolio, where illiquid assets typically reside in the return portfolio. If the
liability matching portfolio, which contains mainly fixed income assets, is relatively large
(say 60% of total assets), then even with a relatively modest allocation the illiquid assets
(say 10% of total assets) forms a sizable fraction of the return portfolio (in the example 25%).
This may limit the allocation to illiquid assets as a fraction of the total portfolio, since these
would otherwise crowd out return portfolio investments in more liquid assets such as listed
equities. One of the Dutch survey participants indicated explicitly that the division in a
matching and return portfolio limits their allocation towards illiquid assets.
Regarding the allocation decision, Dutch survey participants tend to arrive at their
21See e.g. the DNB policy rule regarding risk management for alternative investments,
https://www.toezicht.dnb.nl/binaries/50-211807.pdf, and the DNB letter dated 3 July 2019 on their
investment review findings, https://www.toezicht.dnb.nl/binaries/50-237819.pdf.
22That the supervisory pressure is restrictive for Dutch funds is supported by the IPE article dated 20 June
2016 “APG: Dutch pension funds should follow Canadian schemes’ example”, https://www.ipe.com/apg-
dutch-pension-funds-should-follow-canadian-schemes-example/10013847.article. In this article, the CIO of
the Dutch pension fund APG is quoted saying “Pension funds over here are apprehensive because of
regulatory pressure” regarding investments in infrastructure, private equity, and real estate in a specific
comparison of the Netherlands and Canada.
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illiquid asset allocation via an ALM study. Canadian survey participants indicate that
they may deviate from target allocations, which could be arrived at via e.g. an ALM study,
depending on how many investment opportunities are available that meet a specified required
target return on illiquid assets.
In terms of liquidity management, the main difference is that Dutch survey participants
are more concerned about larger future cash needs due to the central clearing of derivatives,
while we see a large similarity between Dutch and Canadian survey participants in the
approaches to liquidity stress testing and which assets to sell first to free up cash when
necessary. The preference to sell liquid assets first to cover their liquidity needs is in line
with Ben-David et al. (2012), Manconi et al. (2012), and Driessen and Xing (2017).
5.5 Best practices
We have formulated four best practices based on the results of our survey of nine
Dutch and five Canadian pension funds and fiduciary managers on their investment and
management decisions regarding illiquid assets. These best practices focus mainly on the
actions and processes of the fiduciary managers and investors.
Rationale for investing in illiquid assets
Investors should have a clear rationale for investing in illiquid assets. Based on this
rationale, informed decisions can be made regarding the role of specific illiquid assets in the
investment portfolio. For instance, inclusion of illiquid assets to ensure an attractive risk-
return tradeoff may lead to different decisions than inclusion for liability hedging purposes
(this is illustrated by the framework of Sharpe and Tint, 1990b).
Awareness of valuation method used for illiquid assets
Investors should be aware of the valuation methods used for the illiquid assets they invest
in. For example, the valuation method has important consequences for the extent to which
the risk and return statistics reflect transaction-based prices. Appraisal-based valuations
may lead to a lower volatility assessment than transaction-based valuations (Fisher et al.,
1994; Hoesli et al., 2004). Depending on the intended method, inadvertently using a different
method could lead to volatility measures which understate the actual risk. Investors should
therefore understand how valuation methods affect their overall portfolio value, their risk
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measures, and in particular their solvency position. Anson (2016), for instance, demonstrates
how to un-smooth illiquid asset returns for asset allocation and risk management purposes.
Analysis of liquidity needs and liquidity stress testing
Investors should regularly analyze their current and future liquidity needs. The available
cash and liquid instruments should be sufficient to cover the net cash outflows arising
from the various inflows and outflows (see, for instance, the framework of Ang et al.,
2014). Cash inflows could, for example, originate from pension contributions and from
distributions obtained from investments. Cash outflows could occur due to margin payments
on derivatives, payouts to retirees, and capital calls related to investments.
Stress tests are needed to analyze the impact of an adverse shock to market conditions
on the ability to satisfy immediate cash requirements since the latter may be substantial
(Brunnermeier, 2009). Such stress tests should take into account that the size of the cash
requirements themselves may also depend on these market conditions.
Liquidity stress testing is particularly relevant for investors in illiquid assets. Even when
sufficient cash and liquid instruments are available to cover immediate cash requirements, the
impact of an adverse shock as well as the sale of liquid instruments may lead to deviations
from target asset allocations. Rebalancing towards the desired allocation may then involve
the forced sale of illiquid assets, potentially with large losses (e.g. Diamond and Rajan, 2011),
even though it was initially possible to satisfy the cash requirements without such forced
sale.
Policy for liquidation of assets during stress events
Investors in illiquid assets should have an explicit policy regarding the methods to free
up cash for immediate liquidity needs (see the considerations in Duffie and Ziegler, 2003).
Such policy should stipulate the preferred order in which these methods should be used, as
well as which assets to sell, and in which sequence and amount, should other sources to fulfill
immediate obligations prove insufficient.
By establishing explicit policies to free up cash for immediate liquidity needs, it will
be possible to investigate the impact of different policy choices under adverse shocks to
market conditions. Such analyses are highly relevant to investors in illiquid assets for the
same reasons as outlined in the best practice regarding the analysis of liquidity needs and
liquidity stress testing.
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5.6 Conclusions
In this paper we report the results of a survey of nine Dutch and five Canadian pension
funds and fiduciary managers on their investment and management decisions towards illiquid
assets. This is of particular relevance in a low interest rate environment where a search for
yield may arise (e.g. Rajan, 2006; Yellen, 2011). The Dutch pension funds in our sample
invest 15% of their portfolio in illiquid assets, while for the Canadian pension funds this
fraction is 34%.
We put forward three reasons to explain the allocation difference between the two countries.
First, the cost aspect of illiquid assets plays a major role for Dutch pension funds. During
the interviews, Dutch survey participants mentioned that the costs to invest in illiquid assets
are generally much higher than the costs for liquid assets and that this plays an important
role in their asset allocation decision. The supervisor holds the position that pension funds
should be able to justify the investment costs to the public, which creates the potential for
public scrutiny and reputational risk. The second explanation relates to both the supervisory
framework as well as the difference in how illiquid assets are managed. The Dutch supervisor
imposes stricter requirements on pension funds when they invest in alternative investments
and other non-listed assets, and also when assets are managed internally. Third, there is a
division of Dutch pension fund assets into a liability matching portfolio and a return portfolio,
where illiquid assets typically reside in the return portfolio. Even with a relatively modest
allocation to illiquid assets, these potentially crowd out other more liquid investments from
the return portfolio such as listed equities.
Both Dutch and Canadian survey participants most often indicated the risk-return trade-
off as their main reason to invest in illiquid assets, with diversification benefits as the second
most often provided reason. The Canadian survey participants indicated steady cash flow and
liability hedging as main reason more often than Dutch survey participants. In terms of the
implementation, Canadian survey participants manage a large fraction of their illiquid assets
internally, whereas Dutch survey participants typically manage illiquid assets externally.
Dutch survey participants often mentioned ALM studies as their main basis for determining
how much to invest in illiquid assets, while Canadian survey participants often mentioned
that they may deviate from target allocations, which could be arrived at via e.g. an ALM
study, depending on how many investment opportunities are available that meet a specified
target return on illiquid assets. One Canadian survey participant indicated that the fund
would like to achieve a (much) larger allocation to illiquid assets, but that insufficient
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investment opportunities that meet the fund’s target return were available at the time.
Regarding the valuation methods for illiquid assets, we found that most survey participants
use discounted cash flow methods for real estate and infrastructure, and EBITDA multiples
or the public market equivalent for private equity. Survey participants indicated that they
determine expected returns on illiquid assets through a benchmark-plus-spread approach.
The spread may include components such as liquidity and asset manager skill, although
these components are not necessarily made explicit.
Most participants in the survey have either explicit or implicit liquidity policies in place,
such as maintaining a cash buffer, making use of the repo market or securities lending, and
an implicit or explicit sequence in which to liquidate positions to free up cash if necessary.
Many of the survey participants perform liquidity stress tests under a given adverse market
shock. They find that their cash buffer should be sufficient in most cases, and they do not
expect to have to sell assets to free up cash under adverse market conditions.
The survey participants reported that the main cause of immediate cash requirements
is margin payments on derivatives. They expect that this cause may become even more
relevant in the near future as central clearing becomes the standard. The survey participants
indicated that they either apply cash flow planning or specifically set cash aside for other
immediate cash requirements, such as capital calls by private equity funds and payments to
retirees.
We close with four best practices based on the results of the survey. First, investors
should have a clear motivation for investing in illiquid assets, as this may depend on the
role that illiquid assets play in the overall portfolio. Second, investors should be aware of
the valuation methods used for illiquid assets that they invest in, so as to correctly interpret
their portfolio value, risk measures, and solvency position. Third, to assess the adequacy of
liquid resources in the portfolio, investors should regularly analyze their current and future
liquidity needs. Fourth, investors should have an explicit policy regarding which methods to
use and in which sequence to free up cash when immediate liquidity needs arise.
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5.7 Appendix
A Survey questions illiquid assets
This appendix provides the list of questions answered by the survey participants.
Role in the organization
1. What is your role in your organization and how does it relate to the investment process?
Strategic asset allocation to illiquid assets
1. What are the main reasons to invest in illiquid assets (e.g. private equity, private debt,
direct real estate, infrastructure, hedge funds)?
2. What determines the amount of total assets invested in illiquid assets? In other words,
how is the optimal allocation to illiquid assets defined?
3. Is there an upper limit to the percentage of total assets invested in illiquid investments?
If so, what is this upper limit based on?
4. Which aspects are taken into account in the decision to invest in illiquid assets?
Valuation illiquid assets
1. How is the value of an illiquid asset determined? Can you provide an example, i.e.
how does it work in the case of private equity?
2. How are the expected returns of these assets characterized? In particular, what is the
assumption about the liquidity premium for these assets?
3. How certain is the contract period of illiquid assets? For instance, private equity
contracts generally last for ten years, but sometimes the contract is extended by one or
two years. Is this known well in advance or does it remain uncertain for a long time?
Liquidity and fund management
1. What are the policies put in place to ensure that sufficient resources are available to
fulfill immediate obligations at any point in time? For instance, does the fund hold a
cash buffer to specifically compensate for the illiquidity of the portfolio?
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2. Suppose a stress scenario occurs and market liquidity dries up. Is there a particular
strategy to deal with this? Are there certain securities that would be sold first if the
cash at hand is not sufficient to fulfill immediate obligations?
Other
1. Do you have any additional information that you think would be relevant in the context
of the discussion?
B Survey participants
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